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SCALING STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP ORGANIZA-
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ABSTRACT 
Despite their sometimes ingenious solutions, many social entrepreneurs fail to scale 
which is at odds with their overall objective of social change. Yet, though considered highly 
important in practice, scaling is still under-researched. Taking this imbalance as a starting 
point, my PhD thesis contributes to the social entrepreneurship literature by shedding new 
light on the role of the actor-motivation in scaling social ventures. Put together, papers 1-3 try 
to answer the general research questions of how do actors and their specific motivations, par-
ticularly the social entrepreneur, influence the scaling strategies (and success) of social ven-
tures? Based on a brief review of the literature on scaling, I identify social franchising as a 
promising scaling strategy that requires more research. Here, paper 1 argues that the social 
mission of the involved actors can serve as an informal functional equivalent to formal con-
tracts as well as a means to safeguard the local small group logic. Paper 2 discusses the effects 
of stewardship on social franchising coming to the conclusion that stewardship relationships 
may impede speed of and degree of scaling. Based on these insights, paper 3 more closely 
analyzes the motivations of social entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage. It empirically con-
structs a taxonomy of (social) entrepreneurs based on their motivations. To this end, paper 3 
employs a three-step methodological approach that combines the inductive insights from 80 
interviews with entrepreneurs with a statistical cluster analysis. Following, this paper then 
discusses contributions of and implications for scaling research as well as to social entrepre-
neurship, entrepreneurship, and management research.  
 
Keywords: social entrepreneurship, social franchising, motivation, entrepreneurial 
types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nürnberg, 07 June 2014 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social entrepreneurship uses innovative and entrepreneurial means to solve social 
problems (Dees, 1998) that are so far unmet by governments, existing nongovernmental or-
ganization (NGOs), and markets (Squazzoni, 2008). Due to its novel approach to tackle so-
cietal problems, social entrepreneurship is a field of increasing interest to both practitioners 
and researchers (Granados, Hlupic, Coakes, & Mohamed, 2011; Volkmann, Tokarski, & 
Ernst, 2012). While many social entrepreneurs have come up with ingenious ways to fight 
issues such as poverty, discrimination or unemployment (Bornstein, 2007), many social ven-
tures fail to increase their impact beyond local boundaries, as they are small and remain so 
throughout their life cycle (Bacq, Hartog, & Hoogendoorn, 2013; for the German context: 
Spiess-Knafl, Schües, Richter, Scheuerle, & Schmitz, 2013). This empirical phenomenon is 
astounding when considering that these organizations set out to “save the world”, which en-
tails reaching as many beneficiaries as possible so as to alleviate or eradicate the respective 
problem (Schram & Giardeli, 2006).  
The most common term used to describe efforts to increase the impact of a social ven-
ture is scaling (e.g., Dees, Anderson, & Wei-Skillern, 2004b). In comparison to growth – the 
dominant term in entrepreneurship and management – scaling can occur without an increase 
in the size of the original social venture; be it in terms of employees or sales (Bloom & 
Chatterji, 2009). Due to the importance of scaling to the objectives of social entrepreneurship, 
practitioners place great emphasis on this subfield of social entrepreneurship (e.g., Bloom & 
Chatterji, 2009; Bradach, 2003). Yet, despite its importance to the phenomenon, scaling is 
still under-researched.  
Taking this imbalance between practical relevance and academic attention as a starting 
point, my PhD thesis aims to contribute to social entrepreneurship literature by shedding new 
light on scaling strategies of social ventures. Specifically, this PhD thesis focuses on the key 
actor – the entrepreneur. I chose this focus to acknowledge the central of the (social) entre-
preneur to their venture (Mintzberg, 2003; Woo, Cooper, & Dunkelberg, 1991) as their choic-
es shape the strategy, structure, and operations of the venture. Therefore, their choices will 
also influence the scaling strategy of their social venture (see similar Delmar & Wiklund, 
2008). In order to generate more insights into the role of the social entrepreneur in scaling 
processes and strategies of social ventures, my PhD thesis followed three separate approaches 
(paper 1-3). Put together, these papers try to answer the general research questions of how do 
actors and their motivations, particularly the social entrepreneur, influence the scaling strat-
egies (and success) of social ventures? The purpose of this framework paper is to provide 
details on the separate papers as well as on their link. Moreover, this framework paper will 
also provide implications for research and practice for the areas of scaling, social franchising, 
social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship, and management.  
This framework paper proceeds in the following steps. First, I will provide a brief lite-
rature review on social entrepreneurship to justify the relevance of scaling for both practice 
and research. Specifically, I address three general shortcomings of the current social entrepre-
neurship literature that influenced the choice of research undertaken in my PhD thesis.  
Second, based on a brief review of the literature on scaling, I identify social franchis-
ing as an interesting and promising scaling strategy that requires more research. Specifically, 
the question is raised why some social franchises are successful while others fail? To address 
this question, this section of the framework paper presents and combines the insights from 
paper 1 and 2 of my PhD thesis. While paper 1 used an agency perspective to understand so-
cial franchising, paper 2 used stewardship theory. In combination, both papers generate valu-
able insights into social franchising. For example, based on these two papers, my co-authors 
and I identified at least three different types of social franchising. This differentiation has so 
far been absent in the literature on social franchising. A second finding is that the suitability 
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and success of the various forms of social franchising depend on the behavioral pattern of the 
entrepreneur (and franchisee) as well as on the business model and context of the venturing.  
In a third step, I take the insights from the foregone section as a starting point to more 
closely analyze the motivations of social entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage of their ven-
tures. By transferring the known multi-dimensionality of entrepreneurial motivation to the 
post-founding phase, paper 3 empirically constructs a motivation-based taxonomy of entre-
preneurs that cuts across the usual social-commercial dichotomy. To this end, paper 3 em-
ploys a three-step methodological approach that combines the inductive insights from 80 in-
terviews with entrepreneurs with a statistical cluster analysis.  
Step 4 then takes the insights from paper 1-3 to address the overarching research ques-
tion of my PhD thesis as well as to respond to the question of why some social franchises 
work while others fail. Moreover, this step explores potential links between the identified 
types of entrepreneurs (paper 3) and existing scaling strategies. By briefly linking the insights 
of my PhD thesis to the existing literature on scaling and growth, I point to future research 
avenues. 
 In the fifth and final step, I go beyond the specific issue of scaling and discuss the 
more general contributions to and implications for social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship, 
and management research. I emphasize the idea of combined samples of social and commer-
cial entrepreneurs, the benefits of an actor-perspective to social entrepreneurship research, the 
implications of the idea of stewardship costs, and the insights to agency and stewardship 
theory that could be developed through the social mission focus of my analysis. I conclude 
with some final remarks.  
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP – A BRIEF REVIEW 
From a research perspective, the field of social entrepreneurship is still in its infancy 
(Bacq et al., 2013; Felício, Martins Gonçalves, & da Conceição Gonçalves, 2013; Granados et 
al., 2011; Welsh & Krueger, 2012). As a consequence, it is still very phenomenon-driven 
(Mair & Martí, 2006) and relies on single or small-N case studies (Hoogendoorn, Pennings, & 
Thurik, 2010; Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009). Moreover, social entrepreneurship scholarship 
focused a considerable amount of attention on definitional questions, thus trying to identify 
‘what social entrepreneurship is’. This literature review will start with this definitional pers-
pective to clarify the core understanding of social entrepreneurship used in this paper and my 
overall PhD thesis. Second, this section will then provide a brief overview of themes and top-
ics discussed in social entrepreneurship literature. I will use this overview to justify the need 
for more research on scaling in social entrepreneurship research.  
The concept of social entrepreneurship 
The question of what social entrepreneurship is triggered extensive debates. To give 
an example, Dacin, Dacin, and Matear (2010) and Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, and Shulman 
(2009) counted 37 and 20 different definitions of social entrepreneurship, respectively. So the 
question emerges which aspects are scholars debating about? 
The major points of continuous disagreement concern the type of venture and its fund-
ing structure. In their often-cited work, Dees and Anderson (2006) separate definitions in two 
major categories: The Social Enterprise and the Social Innovation School. The former is most 
concerned about the type of organization and its funding sources. Social enterprise representa-
tives analyze nonprofit organizations that employ earned income strategies to achieve finan-
cial self-sustainability, i.e. independence of donations and grants (see also Defourney & 
Nyssens, 2010). An “extreme” form of this perspective is the concept of social business 
(Beckmann, Zeyen, & Krzeminska, 2014) as proposed by Muhammad Yunus (Yunus & 
Weber, 2010). A social business is entirely self-sustaining, thus it earns all its income through 
market mechanisms to fund its social mission (Yunus, Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010; 
Yunus & Weber, 2010).  
Framework Paper PhD thesis 
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In comparison, the Social Innovation School emphasizes the innovativeness of the so-
lution to a specific social problem proposed by the social entrepreneur. In this regard, the So-
cial Innovation School follows a Schumpeterian perspective on entrepreneurship as it calls, at 
least in part, for the “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1911) of current solutions and their 
replacement through more efficient and effective means. In other words, while the Social En-
terprise School gives specifics about the venture form (nonprofit to social business) and the 
primary or desired funding strategy (earned income), the Social Innovation School delineates 
social entrepreneurship based on the novelty of the solution proposed. With its focus on a 
specific venture form, the social enterprise perspective would be too narrow to look at the 
issue of scaling social innovations–that is to grow innovative solutions irrespective of a par-
ticular venture or organizational form. As the social innovation perspective offers a greater 
variety of social ventures and social entrepreneurs for analyzing scaling, this PhD thesis pri-
marily refers to this school of thought1.  
Relative to the dispute on the ‘entrepreneurship’ part of the term social entrepreneur-
ship, there is more of a consensus about the ‘social’ part of the concept. This part is grounded 
in the social mission of the venture (Dees, 1998). By social mission, social entrepreneurship 
scholars understand the objective to solve or alleviate problems that society faces (P. A. Dacin 
et al., 2010), which is the reason for the sheer diversity of issues addressed by social ventures. 
Therefore, social entrepreneurs are active in e.g. the field of education, health care, economic 
development, and environmental protection (Bornstein, 2007). Moreover, the social mission is 
often used as the key distinguishing factor that delineates social entrepreneurship from e.g. 
commercial entrepreneurship characterized as profit focused (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2006; Bacq & Janssen, 2011; P. A. Dacin et al., 2010; Lyon & Sepulveda, 2009; 
Martin & Osberg, 2007; Roper & Cheney, 2005; Rosengard, 2004; Short et al., 2009). Yet, 
despite the close-to-consensus on the social mission, the ongoing debate about the entrepre-
neurship part makes it unlikely that research finds a uniform definition (similarly Choi & 
Majumdar, 2014). 
Brief review of the literature on social entrepreneurship 
Generally speaking, much of the research on social entrepreneurship aims to under-
stand the distinctiveness of social entrepreneurship as well as the effects of its particular con-
text conditions. Most frequently, these delineation efforts address the differentiation between 
social and commercial entrepreneurship. In this pursuit, social entrepreneurship scholars often 
employ concepts used in commercial entrepreneurship research. These issues include oppor-
tunity exploration and exploitation (Shaw & Carter, 2007), funding structures (Bacq et al., 
2013), business models (Mair & Schoen, 2007; Mueller, 2012; Zeyen, Beckmann, & 
Akhavan, 2014), leadership styles (Thompson, Alvy, & Lees, 2000), and resource mobiliza-
tion (Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & Reynolds, 2010) as well as organizational 
structures (Bacq et al., 2013) and survival (Terjesen, Lepoutre, Justo, Bosma, & GERA, 
2012). Overall, these studies came to ambiguous results suggesting that social entrepreneur-
ship, social ventures, and the social entrepreneur are different in some aspects from their 
commercial counterparts (e.g. business models, see Zeyen et al., 2014) but are similar in oth-
ers (e.g. resource mobilization, see Shaw & Carter, 2007).  
From a more meta-level viewpoint, social entrepreneurship research suffers from at 
least three shortcomings. First, current research consists primarily of single or small-N case 
studies (Hoogendoorn et al., 2010; Short et al., 2009; Spiess-Knafl et al., 2013). Notable ex-
ception are the large-N study by Bacq et al. (2013), Estrin, Mickiewicz, and Stephan (2013) 
and in the specific context of Germany Spiess-Kraft et al. (2013). As a consequence, much of 
                                               
1
 Paper 2 is an exception to this rule.  
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the insights generated in extant literature cannot be easily generalized due to the focus on 
idiosyncrasies of specific cases.  
Second, contrary to its commercial counterpart, social entrepreneurship research un-
der-emphasizes the entrepreneur from an actor-perspective (Hoogendoorn et al., 2010). While 
there is a considerable amount of publications that highlight the role of the social entrepreneur 
(M. T. Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011; Montgomery, Dacin, & Dacin, 2012), these publica-
tions rarely apply rigorous theoretical or empirical methods but rather present narratives on 
the role of the social entrepreneur. This is noteworthy due to at least two reasons. For one, 
extensive and rich literature in commercial entrepreneurship substantiates the central role of 
the entrepreneur (Mintzberg, 2003; Williams & Tse, 1995; Woo et al., 1991). This is because 
their motivation and intentions shape their choices which in turn shape their behaviors 
(Carsrud & Brännback, 2011) and thus influence both strategy and daily operations of the 
entrepreneurial organization. Or as Shane, Locke, and Collins put it: “We believe that the 
development of entrepreneurship theory requires consideration of the motivations of people 
making entrepreneurial decisions” (Shane et al., 2003). On the other hand, in comparison to 
the academic literature on social entrepreneurship, the practitioner world almost over-
emphasizes the entrepreneur leading to “heroization”. For example, some of the largest sup-
port organizations – Ashoka (2013), Skoll Foundation (2014), and Schwab Foundation (2014) 
– search for social entrepreneurs as individual “changemakers®” (Drayton, 2006). Due to the 
rich insights that commercial entrepreneurship research gained from an actor focus, it seems 
that social entrepreneurship research could also enhance its understanding of the overall con-
cept by employing an actor-focus that goes beyond anecdotal narratives. Moreover, such a 
focus might also shed light on why practitioners place so much focus on these actors.  
Third, much of the research in social entrepreneurship lacks theoretical grounding (M. 
T. Dacin et al., 2011; Zeyen et al., 2013). So far, social entrepreneurship scholars have pre-
dominately employed institutional theory (Mair & Marti, 2009; Nicholls, 2010a; Sud, 
VanSandt, & Baugous, 2008; Townsend & Hart, 2008), especially to understand the process 
of legitimization (Dart, 2004; Hervieux, Gedajlovic, & Turcotte, 2010; Nicholls, 2010b; 
Ruebottom, 2013; Rueede & Kreutzer, 2014). While other theoretical approaches start emerg-
ing, they are still scarce. Yet, in order to better understand social entrepreneurship, the appli-
cation of additional theories seems of great value. 
This call is echoed in various reviews on social entrepreneurship research (M. T. 
Dacin et al., 2011; P. A. Dacin et al., 2010; Short et al., 2009). Moreover, these reviews point 
towards research gaps, they consider worth studying. For instance, Short et al. (2009) suggest 
more research on the social dimension, in particular in regards to other social organizations, 
whereas M. T. Dacin et al. (2011) call for the exploration of the identity and cognition of so-
cial entrepreneurs.  
Interestingly, these reviews do not call for research on scaling (for instance M. T. 
Dacin et al., 2011; Haugh, 2005; for a notableexception see Mueller, Nazarkina, Volkmann, 
& Blank, 2011). I consider this remarkable because scaling is a key element in enabling social 
entrepreneurs and their ventures to fulfill the proclaimed objective of social entrepreneurship, 
i.e. social change (Fisac-Garcia, Acevedo-Ruiz, Moreno-Romero, & Kreiner, 2013; Uvin, 
Jain, & Brown, 2000). Social change refers to systemic change (Bornstein, 2007), which is 
unobtainable without scaling. Again, this is a subfield of social entrepreneurship with an im-
balance in emphasis between practice and research. While there is only little academic re-
search on scaling (e.g., Bloom & Smith, 2010; Schmitz & Scheuerle, 2013), there is much 
debate amongst practitioners reflected in conference themes as well as handbooks (e.g., 
Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Bloom & Smith, 2010; Brooks, 2008; Durieux & Stebbins, 2010; 
Harris, 2006). Furthermore, scaling is becoming a term synonymous to success in the world 
of social entrepreneurship practice (Davies & Simon, 2013). Due to the importance of scaling 
to social entrepreneurship, I believe it of great value to further research in this area.  
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In sum, this brief review section pointed to some important insights: (1) the social 
mission delineates social entrepreneurship; (2) social entrepreneurship lacks large-N research 
as well as (3) insights on the actor, and (4) only employs established theories in a limited way. 
In combination with (5) limited insights on scaling despite its importance to the concept, these 
insights build the foundation of my PhD thesis. For one, I used these insights to reformulate 
my overall research question to: how do actors driven by a social mission, particularly the 
social entrepreneur, influence the scaling strategies (and their success) of social ventures? 
On the other hand, to respond to the shortcomings identified, my PhD papers use and advance 
established theories (paper 1 and 2), as well as large-N rigorous empirical research that goes 
beyond case studies (paper 3). In short, I hope to contribute to both social entrepreneurship 
research and practice by shedding new light on scaling in social ventures by adapting an ac-
tor-motivation based perspective.  
SCALING STRATEGIES AND SOCIAL FRANCHISING 
Similar to the term “social entrepreneurship”, there are also multiple understandings of 
the concept “scaling”. The more established understanding is derived from general manage-
ment studies and therefore refers to reaching scale in the sense of efficiency and increasing 
the output (Uvin et al., 2000; VanSandt, Sud, Marmé, & Marme, 2010). In other words, the 
organization grows. However, in recent years, the discussion on scaling in the context of so-
cial entrepreneurship has moved away from this understanding and now focuses on the diffu-
sion of the underlying social innovation. As such, the organization that originally invented 
and introduced the novelty does not necessarily need to grow or for that matter be involved in 
the scaling process (Uvin et al., 2000). As this PhD thesis predominately follows an innova-
tion understanding of social entrepreneurship, I use the latter understanding of scaling.  
An overview of the literature on scaling 
Overall, the scaling literature focuses on two main themes: barriers to and capabilities 
required for scaling and scaling strategies.  
Barriers and capabilities in scaling 
Social entrepreneurs face multiple challenges when scaling. First, they often offer ser-
vices that require specific knowledge (VanSandt et al., 2010). Take the example of a social 
entrepreneur providing care for the elderly. Not everyone can do this before receiving instruc-
tions or training. Second, there may be laws and regulations that require certain licenses or 
permissions from government agencies or specific trainings to deal with specific vulnerable 
groups such as children (Beckmann & Ney, 2013). If this is the case, it can greatly impede the 
speed of scaling. Third, as most social ventures externalize their benefits while internalizing 
costs (Morduch, 1999), scaling might not be possible due to lack of resources, be it human or 
financial (VanSandt et al., 2010). Fourth, this lack of resources can also limit or slow down 
their scaling efforts (Chowdhury & Santos, 2010; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012). Fifth, due to this 
lack of resources, scaling can also entail several management problems as the human re-
sources available might not match the coordination efforts required (Wei-Skillern, Austin, 
Leonard, & Stevenson, 2007). Sixth, in order to scale, social entrepreneurs need to know what 
they wish to scale (Chowdhury & Santos, 2010; Dees, Anderson, & Wei-Skillern, 2004a). Put 
differently, they need to understand the core of their innovation. However, the process of de-
termining this is time-consuming and complex (Dees et al., 2004a). Thus, if social entrepre-
neurs misinterpret the core of their innovation, scaling can fail or be impeded.  
In order to overcome these barriers, scholars propose various options. For instance, 
Dees et al (2004) suggest that the social entrepreneur needs to ensure that their venture is 
ready for scaling i.e. it has sufficient knowledge about its context and innovation and that 
staff and volunteers are well prepared. One strand of this research has proposed the SCA-
LERS model which stands for staffing, communication, alliance building, lobbying, earnings 
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generating, replicating, and stimulating market forces (Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Bloom & 
Smith, 2010). The idea being that if social entrepreneurs focus on these seven elements, they 
will be able to successfully scale their ventures. Other proposed issues to overcome barriers 
include the increase in legitimacy of the venture and its provided goods or service as well as 
the use of information and communication technology (ICT) (VanSandt et al., 2010). Howev-
er, most scholars agree that the key lies in the choice of the “right” scaling strategy (e.g., Dees 
et al. , 2004; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012).  
Scaling strategies 
There are various ways to distinguish scaling strategies, which is often reflected in 
nuances in the terms used. These terms include scaling up (Gillespie, 2004; London, 2011; 
Lyon & Fernandez, 2012; Uvin et al., 2000), scaling wide (London, 2011), scaling deep (Desa 
& Koch, 2014; London, 2011), scaling breadth (Desa & Koch, 2014) and replication 
(Coffman, 2010; Creech, 2008), adaptation (Coffman, 2010), and non-replication scaling 
(Clark, Massarsky, Schweitzer Raben, & Worsham, 2012).  
Generally speaking, these distinctions in their respective combination primarily aim to 
make the same point. For that reason, I will only elaborate on one of these distinctions. Lon-
don (2011) distinguishes between scaling deep, scaling wide, and scaling up. By scaling deep 
he refers to all scaling strategies that involve the same base of beneficiaries, i.e. the same be-
neficiaries receive more services by the social venture. In comparison, scaling wide uses the 
same services but offers them to new kinds of beneficiaries (different to their original target 
group). Finally, scaling up uses the same services or products and aims to reach the same kind 
of target group but in a different geographical region. Thus, whereas scaling deep and wide 
are qualitative forms of scaling that require substantial degrees of adaptive innovation, scaling 
up is quantitative and focuses on increasing the impact of an existing solution. As my PhD 
thesis looks at diffusing an existing solution to an existing target group, I refer to scaling up, 
thus focusing on strategies that allow reaching many beneficiaries and thus achieve social 
change.  
Here, research identified three main types of scaling2 strategies: dissemination, affilia-
tion and branching3 (Dees et al., 2004b). Branching is probably the most intuitive, as it greatly 
resembles growth strategies in commercial ventures. Here, organizations scale through the 
growth of their own organization. They may do so through the provision of new goods and 
services, reaching a wider customer (beneficiary) base through opening new sites, or by merg-
ing with or acquiring other organizations (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012).  
In contrast, dissemination is a form of scaling that may occur entirely independent of 
the organization that originally innovated. Forms of dissemination range from training to open 
source. The “original” social venture, for example, uses training and coaching to instruct mul-
tipliers so that they can set up operations in other geographic areas. In comparison to branch-
ing, the social entrepreneur has no or only very limited control over whether and how the 
multipliers implement the social venture’s idea. Once, the training finishes, there is no further 
control or check-up unless the trainees ask for additional trainings. While there is still some 
limited control in training, as the social entrepreneur can at least control the duration and con-
tent of the workshops, open source models allow for virtually no control. Known from the 
world of software development, open source makes all necessary information to copy or de-
                                               
2
 From hereon onwards, this PhD thesis refers to scaling up as scaling.  
3
 While there are other typologies of scaling strategies, when looking at their content 
they usually boil down to the stated three strategies. Moreover, there are studies that only look 
at one or two of the three identified types (e.g., Uvin et al., 2000). Yet, for the purpose of this 
paper, I follow the typology with the widest scope in order to access the diversity of possibili-
ties in scaling.  
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velop the idea further publically available, often through the means of ICT (Fisac-Garcia et 
al., 2013; Waitzer & Paul, 2011). In its extreme form, the social entrepreneur has no contact 
with the individuals or organizations using this or her idea or might not even know about rep-
lications through others. 
The third type of scaling strategy – affiliation – is a mix between dissemination and 
branching. Instead of opening its own new sites, the venture cooperates with individuals or 
organizations through the means of contractual agreements. These agreements include part-
nerships, licensing agreements, and franchising. Here, the social entrepreneur is still partially 
involved in the scaling process, yet does not need to oversee the local operation in all its de-
tail.  
Overall, the strategies differ in their level of control over and speed of scaling as well 
as resources required to scale (Dees et al., 2004; Lyon & Fernandez, 2012). Whereas open 
source (dissemination) offers a means to scale fast even on a global level, branching is often a 
slow process. Similarly, branching is the most capital and resource-intensive, as the social 
venture will need to fund the entire process, whereas in open source the social venture only 
requires resources to put together their starting kit or develop trainings. Again, affiliation 
strategies are in the middle. Thus, the control over and speed of scaling are moderate as are 
the required resources. For that reason, many practitioners and scholars focus their attention 
on this scaling strategy type as it offers the “best of three worlds”. Amongst the affiliation 
strategies, social franchising is the one considered most promising (VanSandt et al., 2010), 
yet is still poorly understood (Schmitz & Scheuerle, 2013). Against this background, my PhD 
thesis will take a closer look at social franchising to better understand how it works.  
Social franchising 
Put in simple terms, social franchising transfers the idea of franchising from the com-
mercial realm to the nonprofit world4 (Montagu, 2002). Franchising is a contractual agree-
ment in which one party (the franchisor) grants another (the franchisee) the rights to her busi-
ness model or products in exchange for a one-off franchise fee and continuous royalty pay-
ments (e.g., Lafontaine & Shaw, 1998).  
So far, research on social franchising is scarce (Schmitz & Scheuerle, 2013) and has 
lead to ambiguous results. Whereas its proponents stress its benefits for scaling (Ahlert et al., 
2008; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012; Heinecke, 2011; Volery & Hackl, 2010), some researchers 
come to the conclusion that it does not work (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007); while again others 
come to unclear conclusions (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011). Similar patterns 
emerge in practice. As current research does not help to gain a clear picture of the potential or 
challenges entailed in social franchising, I raise the question: why do some social franchises 
succeed while others do not? Specifically, how does an actor-motivation perspective help to 
understand the success or failure of social franchises? 
Due to the ambiguous results of extant empirical studies (mainly case studies), I deem 
it useful to take a step back and consider social franchising from a conceptual perspective. By 
so doing, underlying mechanisms that might have been overlooked during empirical research 
may emerge, which can then help to inform future empirical research. To this end, the follow-
ing subsections will first introduce theoretical approaches to commercial franchising. Follow-
ing, the subsequent two subsections will then provide insights on paper 1 and 2, respectively. 
The final subsection will conclude with some general implications for social franchising prac-
tice and research.  
                                               
4
 In some studies social franchising is understood not as a scaling strategy but as a 
means of profit-generation (Netting & Kettner, 1987). To give an example, Ben & Jerry’s Ice-
Cream grants free franchise licenses to nonprofits (Stephens, 2003), so that they can use the 
product sales as income for their social mission.  
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Theoretical grounding of franchising  
The first approach to theoretically explaining franchising was Oxenfeldt & Kelly's 
(1969) resource scarcity theory. This theory consists of two parts of which only the first could 
so far be empirically substantiated (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006). In simple terms, 
according to resource scarcity theory, organizations choose franchising due to their lack of 
financial resources. Through franchising, they are able to tab into financial resources of other 
individuals who then take on the risk of opening new sites under a franchise agreement. The 
second part of this theory argues that once the franchisor has stable finances, they will start 
buying back the franchise outlets not held by them so that eventually all subsidiaries will be 
wholly-owned by the original organization. As mentioned previously, despite many attempts 
this part of the theory could so far not be verified.  
Due to the ambiguous prediction capabilities of resource scarcity theory (e.g., Combs 
& Ketchen, 2003), researchers turned to other theoretical explanations for the occurrence of 
franchising. As a franchise agreement is a form of delegation, the most common theory used 
to illuminate franchising is agency theory (Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short, 2010; Combs, 
Ketchen, & Short, 2011; Combs & Ketchen, 2003). Agency theory indicates that franchisors 
engage in franchising as it reduces both the ex-ante costs of adverse selection as well as the 
ex-post cost of moral hazard (Combs & Ketchen, 2003). To be precise, entering a franchise is 
costly for potential franchisees, as they need to put up an initial franchise fees. Thus, only 
those individuals, who perceive themselves capable of running a franchise outlet, would apply 
as franchisees. Therefore, the applicants for a franchise outlet are generally more qualified, 
thus reducing the costs of adverse selection. Once the outlet is opened, the fact that the fran-
chisee’s income is entirely dependent on the performance of their franchise outlet reduces the 
risk of poor performance. In short, the ex-ante franchise fee and the ex-post financial rewards 
in a franchise arrangement help to align the goals of the franchisee to those of the franchisor, 
which would, according to agency theory, otherwise not necessarily be aligned (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
As agency explanations have proven very insightful to commercial franchising re-
search, it might be a good starting point for a theoretical exploration of social franchising. 
However, there are significant design differences between social and commercial franchising 
that may affect the predictions by agency theory. First, social franchisees are often organiza-
tions rather than individuals as in commercial franchising (Montagu, 2002). Second, as social 
franchisees are often organizations, the franchise operation is often only one fragment of their 
overall service provision. In contrast, commercial franchisees mostly operate their franchises 
as stand-alone ventures (Montagu, 2002). Third, social ventures have a different financial 
situation. In some cases their legal or organizational form does not allow for profit-making 
(e.g., Yunus & Weber, 2010). Moreover, social ventures sometimes pay below market wages 
(Volkmann et al., 2012) and may be active in non-lucrative markets. As a consequence, oper-
ating a social franchise outlet is unlikely to yield much if any financial rewards. Yet, as the 
brief outline above indicated, financial incentives are a key element of the agency explanation 
for franchising. Based on these differences, it might seem apparent that agency theory is un-
suitable for the context of social franchising. Indeed, such remarks are found in the literature 
(Volery & Hackl, 2010). In light of these alleged shortcomings of agency theory, there are 
two possible paths to continue the theoretical exploration of social franchising: either to use 
another theory or to refine agency theory such that it can be fruitfully applied to a social fran-
chising context. My PhD thesis follows both paths. Paper 1 analyzes social franchising from 
an agency perspective. Specifically, it investigates how the social mission of specific actors 
affects agency costs. Paper 2 then uses stewardship theory, which emphasizes intrinsic moti-
vations of individuals and might thus offer insights into social franchising.  
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An agency and resource scarcity theory perspective on social franchising (paper 1) 
In my first paper entitled “Franchising as a Strategy for Combining Small and Large 
Group Advantages (Logics) in Social Entrepreneurship: A Hayekian Perspective“, Markus 
Beckmann and I theoretically explored the applicability of agency and resource scarcity 
theory in the field of social franchising. Thus, this paper addressed the research questions: Do 
resource scarcity and agency theory help to explain why some social franchises are success-
ful and others are not? How can a distinction between small and large groups help to under-
stand the role of mission-driven self-selection and coordination for explaining successes and 
failures of social franchises? (see Table 15).  
Before elaborating on resource scarcity and agency theory, paper 1 introduces an idea 
brought forward by Friedrich August von Hayek (1988). In his book “the fatal conceit”, he 
distinguishes between two forms of social order: the macrocosm (big group) and the micro-
cosm (small group) logic, which occur simultaneously in modern societies. In the small group 
such as the family or the Stone Age tribe, members with a common identity rally around 
shared objectives and are thus end-connected. Personal face-to-face relationships can then 
enable the group to coordinate and achieve their goals. In the big group such as modern mar-
kets, in contrast, individuals coordinate in a rule-connected way. Despite different identities, 
individuals can pursue their pluralistic objectives through often impersonal or even anonym-
ous, albeit rule-based interactions. While both coordination logics are consistent for them-
selves, problems occur if the logic of the microcosm (small group) is applied to the macro-
cosm (big group) and vice versa (Hayek, 1988).  
Building on Hayek’s distinction between two coordination logics, we argue that this 
idea has great implications for the idea of scaling in social ventures. Volunteers or staff mem-
bers often self-select and engage in a social venture based on its social mission (shared goal). 
However, if the social entrepreneur wishes to scale to widespread geographical areas, this 
small group would fall apart, as members from say Berlin and Munich could not constantly 
interact and coordinate on a personal and shared identity basis. Adding formal rules to coor-
dinate the growing, however, would add big-group elements to the social venture which then 
undermine and conflict with the existing mission-based forms of small-group coordination 
and motivation.  
In this situation, social franchising offers a means to ensure small group logics on a 
local level by separating the small group logic from the big group logic. To be precise, the big 
group logic is moved to the contractual (rule-based) interaction between the franchising or-
ganizations whereas the small group logic between local staff or volunteers is ensured. 
This mechanism also holds insights in regards to agency and resource scarcity theory. 
First, the importance of the local small group indicates that an important resource in scaling 
for some social ventures is not necessary financial but social capital. For this reason, in social 
franchising, the local franchisee is typically an already existing mission-driven organization 
with a network of volunteers and supporters. Trust and local embeddedness therefore seem of 
greater importance than finances. Thus, social franchising may be explained through resource 
scarcity theory, if the latter is refined to include not only financial but also social capital.  
A social franchising perspective on agency theory illuminates that as mentioned earli-
er, social ventures have little resources and could thus potentially not afford strict monitoring 
to ensure quality standards in the local outlets. Moreover, as franchisees are also social organ-
izations they are unlikely to be able to pay high upfront license fees. Additionally, as the pur-
pose of the franchise is not to generate income but to reach more beneficiaries, the key me-
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 Table 1 includes a complete overview of all three papers, their research questions, 
key findings and contributions to both the scaling literature and social entrepreneurship, en-
trepreneurship, and management research in general. 
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chanisms to achieve goal alignment in franchising is disturbed. So why are franchises such as 
Wellcome (illustrative case in paper 1) so successful? 
In paper 1, we argue that the answer lies in the social mission drive of the actors in-
volved. Local volunteers donate their time only to ventures they perceive as legitimate and 
honest. Similarly, individuals only enter employment in social organization based on their 
legitimacy as the wages are often under market wages and thus do not offer incentives. Due to 
their mission focus, members (staff and volunteers) self-select themselves to a venture which 
they consider worthwhile from an intrinsic perspective. Moreover, as members are highly 
motivated to achieve the social mission, they self-monitor each other and are more likely to 
report or exit, if activities emerge that are unrelated or even harmful to the venture’s mission. 
In other words, informal mechanism of self-monitoring and self-selection of and between 
mission-driven individuals serve as functional equivalents to formal contracts and thus reduce 
agency costs and ensure goal alignment.  
In sum, this paper contributes to social franchising research by introducing the idea of 
small and big groups. In particular, it sheds light on the function that mission-driven actors 
within a social venture can serve within a social franchise. 
As mentioned above, paper 2 used stewardship theory to analyze social franchising. In 
the literature, stewardship and agency theory are often portrayed as opposites (Fox & 
Hamilton, 1994) where stewards are the “good” and agents the “bad” (Arthurs & Busenitz, 
2003). In contrast to this viewpoint, I consider stewardship theory a complement to the agen-
cy perspective. Agency theory analyzes how contracts can serve to align and ensure continued 
alignment of goals between principal and agent. In comparison, stewardship theory assumes 
initial goal congruence between principal and steward a priori. Thus both strive for the same 
objective. While at first glance, this seems indeed the opposite of agency theory; stewardship 
theory also addresses measures to ensure the continuation of the initial goal congruence. Dif-
ferent to agency theory however, stewardship theory refers to informal mechanisms such as 
personal power and involvement-oriented management (Davis, Schoorma, & Donaldson, 
1997). If these measures are not taken, stewardship theory predicts that the pro-organizational 
behavior of individuals turns to anti-organizational behavior, which can deteriorate the entire 
delegation relationship. Thus, while the starting point of both theories is different (goals need 
aligning versus goals are congruent), both theories try to ensure that goals between principal 
and agent/steward remain aligned. In the context of social franchising, paper 1 showed how 
the social mission of actors can reduce agency costs and aligns goals. Complementary to this 
perspective, the social mission may also allow stewardship relationships to occur as actors 
involved may share the same social mission. Taking the latter notion as a starting point, paper 
2 analyzed how stewardship theory links to social franchising.  
 A stewardship perspective on social franchising (paper 2) 
Anna Krzeminska and I employed this theoretical approach in paper 2 entitled “to-
wards a stewardship (cost) theory of social franchising”. In particular, we looked at the suc-
cess potential of social franchises based on a steward-steward relationship. For the purposes 
of analytical clarity, we narrowed our conceptual investigation to social franchises whose 
franchisee are non-beneficiaries. The research question of paper 2 is: How does goal congru-
ence based on a social mission affect the scaling potential of social franchises that franchise 
to non-beneficiaries? 
 According to stewardship theory, stewards are intrinsically motivated by higher-order 
needs, and are other-regarding (Davis et al., 1997). Additionally, they perform pro-
organizational behaviors and respond to personal power of their principal and involvement-
oriented management. Throughout the paper, we use these characteristics in combination with 
those of a social enterprise to develop propositions on the effects of stewardship relationship 
on social franchising. This theorizing is divided into two parts: effects on the selection 
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process and effects on the management process. Throughout the analysis, we identified chal-
lenges that are rooted in the stewardship relationship, which we termed stewardship costs.  
A closer look at the selection process in social franchising based on stewardship rela-
tionships indicates that the importance of this process increases. Not only are stewards moti-
vated intrinsically to fulfill the mission of their principal, but they also react negatively to 
external incentives. Thus, once the steward is within the organization (as a franchisee), it is 
much more difficult to steer their behaviors than in agency relationships. Against this back-
ground, the franchisor needs to make sure that the potential franchisee fully identifies with the 
venture’s mission as well as with the franchisor. The latter is essential, as this personal identi-
fication with the franchisor ensures that the steward will react to personal power when they 
enter the franchise chain. However, the identification of “true” intrinsic motivation and identi-
fication is a complex and time-consuming process. To build identification, the franchisor 
needs to interact with the potential franchisee regularly before entering the agreement. Yet, 
the franchisor can only arrange a certain number of such meetings per month to avoid loosing 
track of other strategic and operative tasks. This bottleneck thus slows down the scaling 
process. Additionally, a focus on intrinsic motivation and identification during the selection 
process may lead to motivated but incapable franchisees entering the network.  
Once stewards are franchisees, the franchisor needs to manage the franchise chain. 
Here, our analysis suggests that the need for involvement-oriented management delimits the 
maximum size of the franchise chain. In this form of management, members (franchisees) 
have the right to participate in decision-making processes. Thus, the larger the network, the 
longer such meetings will take until a consensus is reached. Moreover, practical issues also 
play a role. Once the franchise is spread widely, it will take time till meetings can be sche-
duled and it may require significant resources to get all members to the same location (partic-
ularly if the franchise is globally active).  
Furthermore, stewards are part of the social franchise to help a certain target group. 
Thus, if frictions occur between helping the target group and helping the franchisor, stewards 
may have a greater tendency to shift their focus towards their beneficiaries. In such situations, 
the franchisor has no measures to return the franchisee’s attention back to the franchise. As a 
consequence, the outlet and headquarter might drift apart.  
Finally, the low power distance of stewardship relationships (Davis et al., 1997) im-
pedes standardization efforts by the franchisor. One key benefit of franchise chains is that 
they all operate under the same brand and to the same quality standards (Combs, Michael, & 
Castrogiovanni, 2004). Thus, customers (or beneficiaries) that change their location will rec-
ognize the brand and remain involved with the venture. Therefore, standardization is an im-
portant part of franchising. However, due to a low power distance and the perception of being 
social entrepreneurs themselves, stewards are more likely to be reluctant to follow such stan-
dardization attempts, thereby potentially watering down the brand.  
In sum, paper 2 suggests that social franchising enables the social entrepreneur to 
build their management on stewardship relationships by which they attract individuals that are 
(most likely) like themselves also intrinsically motivated to achieve a social mission. Howev-
er, these relationships face stewardship costs of for instance reduced speed and scope of scal-
ing.  
Implications for social franchising  
The following section presents two implications and contributions of paper 1 and 2 for 
theory and practice of social franchising. First, I point to the potential benefits of a more fine-
grained analysis of social franchising based on different types. Second, I point to the contex-
tual contingency of social franchising success.  
Different types of social franchising: First, paper 1 and 2 point to a multitude of social 
franchising types. So far, the literature only distinguishes between social franchising as profit 
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generating or scaling tool (Netting & Kettner, 1987) and points to franchising by organiza-
tions rather than individuals (Montagu, 2002). Yet, paper 2 suggests that social franchisees 
may also be individuals. Moreover, social franchisees may be beneficiaries (as in Kistruck et 
al., 2011) or non-beneficiaries (paper 1 and 2). Based on paper 1, it would also be possible to 
delineate social franchises that build on a small group business model and those that do not.  
By distinguishing different forms of social franchising, future research may be more 
accurately able to predict hurdles and success of specific franchises. In particular, future re-
search could try to understand which type of franchise might be better managed based on 
agency or stewardship principles. I insinuate that such a more differentiated perspective might 
also help to resolve the ambiguous results in current literature. Finally, future research may 
discover additional dimensions that help to further fine-grain the analysis. To give an exam-
ple, a social franchisor that deals with organizations would be ill advised to use stewardship 
management, as personal power will have a limited impact. To be precise, while in individual 
franchising the franchisor is likely to always be in contact with the same individual (franchi-
see), in an organizational context the person responsible for handling the franchise agreement 
might change, thus rendering personal power ineffective.  
Contextual contingency of social franchising: Second, the success of the respective 
types of franchising depends on the situation and contexts in which it is embedded. As the 
case studies by Kistruck et a. (2011) showed, some of the social franchisees involved clearly 
acted on their own behalf rather than on behalf of the mission (as would be expected based on 
social entrepreneurship research). However, Kistruck et al. (2011) primarily looked at social 
franchises that employed the rural poor in developing countries. As such, these individuals are 
unlikely to portray stewardship behavior; yet not because they are per se “opportunistic” indi-
viduals but because they are in a situation that does not allow them to consider others or high-
er-order needs when their own family is still struggling to meet basic lower-order needs. 
Therefore, in such a situation, franchising that will most probably rely on stewardship man-
agement would be unsuitable. Rather, the franchisor would be advised to choose a different 
franchise type. For instance, the franchisee could be an organization active in economic de-
velopment or an individual who is not the beneficiary of the social mission. He could then 
employ the rural poor. By so doing, the beneficiaries receive a steady income and the franchi-
see-franchisor relationship would be unperturbed by the economic situation of the beneficia-
ries.  
In short, the findings, contributions, and implications of paper 1 and 2 seemingly subs-
tantiate the relevance of an actor-based perspective. Paper 1 showed the relevance of the mis-
sion-drive of the actors (staff and volunteers) involved to the success of social franchising, 
while paper 2 provided insights on how social franchising is affected by relationships between 
two intrinsically motivated actors.  
As such, both papers also support the importance of motivation to the success and fail-
ing of social franchising and potentially scaling in general. Whereas agency behavior is more 
grounded in self-interested motivations, stewardship theory emphasizes pro-social motives. 
By turning to the literature on motivations, it becomes clear that individuals are motivated by 
multiple motives (Shane et al., 2003). Thus the final paper of this PhD thesis takes the in-
sights on the importance of the actor motivation and the insights on the multi-dimensionality 
of motivations as a starting point to further investigate motives of social entrepreneurs as this 
may serve to gain an even deeper understanding into scaling.  
 
TYPES OF ENTREPRENEURS AND THEIR DRIVERS 
Based on the insights from the previous section, I argue that the scaling literature can 
greatly benefit from better understanding the entrepreneur, in particular their motivations. To 
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substantiate this claim, I briefly turn to the literature on growth motivation in commercial 
entrepreneurship, as these insights are likely to relate to social entrepreneurs.  
Motivation, growth, and types of entrepreneurs 
The motivations of an individual (and thus of an entrepreneur) influence their choices 
(Ajzen, 1991; Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; Delmar & Wiklund, 2008; Locke & Latham, 
2002; Wiklund, Davidsson, & Delmar, 2003). Specifically, the literature on growth in com-
mercial entrepreneurship has identified links between the motivation of the entrepreneur to 
grow and growth of the ventures (Barringer, Jones, & Neubaum, 2005; Delmar & Wiklund, 
2008; Kolvereid, 1992; K. G. Smith, Baum, & Locke, 2001; N. R. Smith & Miner, 1983). For 
instance, Barringer et al. (2005) point out that growth aspirations by the entrepreneur once 
articulated in any form positively influence the growth of the venture. Additionally, research 
indicates that the type of entrepreneur is linked to the (growth) strategy type (Ucbasaran, 
Westhead, & Wright, 2001; Williams & Tse, 1995).  
Recent studies started to recognize diversity in social entrepreneurs by introducing dif-
ferent types. For instance, Zahra et al. (2009) distinguish social entrepreneurs based on the 
type of innovation they recognize and implement. Others distinguish social entrepreneurs 
based on psychological aspects (Miner, 2000), based on the role of the social entrepreneur 
within the organization (e.g. CEO versus founder) (Roper & Cheney, 2005), the type of ser-
vice they provide (Vidal & Claver, 2006), or on their scale reached or approach taken 
(Trivedi, 2010). While such differentiations help to perform more nuanced analyses of various 
topics in the field of social entrepreneurship, their potential to serve as types to identify stra-
tegic choices might be limited.  
Turning back to the growth literature, it becomes apparent that the entrepreneur’s mo-
tivation is an important element in a firm’s growth strategy. Thus, following this line of scho-
larship, I argue that the social entrepreneur’s motivation is crucial to understanding their 
choices in scaling strategies. Due to the lack of current research on such motivations, paper 3 
used an exploratory approach to identify types of (social) entrepreneurs based on their moti-
vation.  
A motivation perspective on social and commercial entrepreneurs (paper 3) 
My third and final paper entitled “What Drives Entrepreneurs? An Empirically-Based 
Taxonomy Beyond the Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship Distinction” empirically 
analyzes the drivers of entrepreneurs. By drivers, I understand the motivations of entrepre-
neurs in a post-founding stage. In comparison to the rich literature on ‘entrepreneurial motiva-
tion’ which analyzes pre-founding motivations (Shane et al., 2003), this focus on ‘entrepre-
neurial drivers’6 allows me to gain insights into the entrepreneur who is in the situation of 
considering or already in the process of scaling their idea and/or venture. To achieve this ob-
jective, this paper addressed the following research questions: What drives social and com-
mercial entrepreneurs in a post-founding phase? Can these drivers be used to identify differ-
ent types of entrepreneurs and, if so, what are these different types? How do these empirically 
observable entrepreneurial characters relate to the distinction between social and commer-
cial entrepreneurship found in the literature?  
To this end, cluster analysis can serve as a powerful tool to empirically develop classi-
fications (Rencher & Christensen, 2012). The objective of cluster analysis is to separate popu-
lations into homogenous subgroups with high inter-cluster heterogeneity. To perform a cluster 
analysis requires quantitative or quantified data.  
While there is a rich literature on entrepreneurial motivation, this is hardly the case for 
entrepreneurial drivers. Moreover, the extant literature on drivers is often primarily focused 
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 The term entrepreneurial driver is only chosen to avoid confusion with the estab-
lished term of entrepreneurial motivation.  
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on growth while neglecting other motivations. Yet, other drivers might influence the growth 
aspirations of an entrepreneur. Additionally, the existing literature only recently included 
prosocial motivations (Renko, 2013), which, however, might be of particular importance to 
the context of social entrepreneurship. Thus, there is insufficient prior knowledge on entre-
preneurial drivers of commercial and social entrepreneurs. Hence, I used an exploratory qua-
litative approach to collect the necessary data.  
During data collection, I interviewed 30 social and 50 commercial entrepreneurs. By 
means of emergent coding (Saldana, 2009) of these interviews, I was able to derive codes on 
drivers of these entrepreneurs. These codes were then merged into code categories yielding 
seven dimensions of drivers. These are numbers, personal gratification, employees, market, 
product, customers, and impact. For instance, numbers reflects that indicators and their 
achievement drive an entrepreneur. Employees refers to wishing to achieve employee satisfac-
tion, paying them good wages, and enhance their skills. Impact reflects the desire to help oth-
ers and to improve the livelihood or situation of other people outside the organization (thus 
not employees). Overall, numbers, employee, personal gratification and to a lesser degree 
customer are more inward-oriented (towards the venture) whereas market, impact, and prod-
uct are more outward-oriented.  
As these categories are still qualitative in nature, I developed a scoring system to 
quantify the data and had three other researchers apply the scoring scheme independently. The 
final scores were then used as data in the cluster analysis. The cluster analysis combined the 
seven dimensions of drivers into unique combinations (in terms of the respective scores) and 
yielded five types of entrepreneurs. These are the rational missionary, the bonding self-
actualizer, the number junkie, the “textbook” businessperson, and the product-adjusting 
competitor. While full descriptions of all types are provided in the paper, I will use the ration-
al missionary as an example to illustrate the concept of the driver function.  
The rational missionary is characterized by a high score in impact and customer (pri-
marily described as customer satisfaction), by a medium score in numbers as well as by a very 
low score for personal gratification and employees. This indicates that the rational missionary 
is more outward-oriented as they wish to help others and their customers. However, during 
this pursuit, numbers are at least of a moderate importance in their efforts. (see Figure 1). 
On a more aggregate level, only one out of the five clusters is comprised exclusively 
of commercial entrepreneurs (namely the “textbook” business person). The remaining four 
clusters both contain social and commercial entrepreneurs. I use this finding to suggest that 
future research could benefit from combined samples of social and commercial entrepreneurs.  
In sum, paper 3 further supports the notion that there are multiple types of social en-
trepreneurs. As types of entrepreneurs seem to be linked to types of strategy (e.g., Ucbasaran 
et al., 2001), these findings will help to further research on scaling by offering a more diffe-
rentiated perspective on the key actor.  
 
Spider web diagram of rational missionary
IMPLICATIONS FOR AND
PRACTICE OF SCALING 
This section serves to summarize the contributions of
their implications for future research. On a more speculative note, step 1 will link the types of 
entrepreneurs of paper 3 with the scaling strategies from the literature review. Second, I will 
briefly link some of the insights on scaling to those of the literature on growth. The third and 
final step will then go back to the initial research question of my PhD thesis and summarize 
the responses as developed in each paper as well as by linking paper 1
Types of entrepreneurs and types of strategy
This subsection tries to give a rough and speculative response to 
(2001) call for more research that links scaling strategies with types of social entrepreneurs. I 
conjecture that the various drivers identified in paper 3 pull an entrepreneur towards certain 
scaling strategies and away from others (see Figure 1). For reasons of brevity, I will
borate on a selective number of driver dimensions and illustrate my argument on one type of 
entrepreneur.  
For instance, I insinuate that the driver 
people and many of them – pushes a social entrepreneur 
nation strategies than towards branching. This is because dissemination strategies have the 
tendency to allow the fastest scaling 
social entrepreneur is greatly motivated by impact, her inclination to scale fast will potentially 
be high.  
In contrast, the driver numbers
progress – is likely to have the opposite 
indicators will be less satisfied with scaling through dissemination strategies
have no means to identify whether they have reached their set indicators. In other words, 
numbers-driven entrepreneurs may have a higher tendency to prefer some form of control as it 
is easier to measure progress of activities that one controls than those others act out. Ther
fore, numbers is more likely to pull a social entrepreneur towards affiliation or branching 
strategies.  
The driver customers – i.e. the motivation to satisfy customers and build a reputation 
is somewhat ambiguous at this stage. On the one hand, the part of this driver that desires to 
ensure customer satisfaction through quality would pull towards bra
they would enable control over the services provided. On the other hand, to satisfy customers 
also requires accessibility, thus this would pull the entrepreneur in the other direction to allow 
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more customers access to the services. In sum, customers will probably lead to a light pull 
towards affiliation and branching.  
The driver personal satisfaction is a particularly interesting one and might have two 
effects. As this driver dimension is strong about the direct feedback an entrepreneur receives 
in her work (e.g. the “fun” working with the target group), both dissemination and affiliation 
strategies provide less of such feedback. Yet, even in branching, the nature of the entrepre-
neur’s work changes with a growing organization. And in effect, despite the proclaimed mis-
sion to change the world, many social entrepreneurs have a preference to stay small (Bacq et 
al., 2013).  
To give one final example, take the driver dimension employees. This driver may push 
a social entrepreneur more towards choosing branching or affiliation strategies. In branching, 
the entrepreneur will have more contact with their employees and can thus ensure their satis-
faction. While the entrepreneur may still have some influence on the job situation of affiliated 
organizations’ employees, he cannot influence this factor in dissemination strategies. 
 
Figure 2 
A speculative link between drivers and scaling strategy 
 
Figure 2 depicts the speculated choices of the rational missionary who scores high for 
impact and customers, modest for numbers, and very low for both employees and personal 
gratification. The high impact score pulls the entrepreneur towards the right of the continuum 
(dissemination). However, at the same time the moderate numbers score may counterbalance 
this effect by pulling the social entrepreneur more towards branching. The high score in cus-
tomers also pulls the entrepreneur to the left. While employees and personal gratification 
would usually strengthen this pull towards the left (branching), as it has an extremely low 
score, it has no effect. As a consequence, the rational missionary might be most likely to scale 
through affiliation.  
To be sure, as already indicated above, these tentative reflections are still at a specula-
tive stage. However, I believe they give a clearer picture of potential research that could build 
on the identified types of entrepreneurs. In a first step, research could try to determine real-
life examples of the various types through surveys or in-depth interviews. No matter the em-
pirical approach, the seven drivers would need to be converted into items with scales. Such 
items could be loosely based on the original emergent codes of paper 3. Second, once empiri-
cal examples for each type are identified, research can then analyze their chosen scaling strat-
egy. Note the importance of doing both steps closely together as motivations may change over 
time (Carsrud & Brännback, 2011). Thus, if the time delay between type identification and 
strategy identification is too long, there might be noise in the data. Moreover, scholars could 
use conjoint analysis to test if higher scores in certain drivers indeed influence the choice of 
scaling strategy. Such research may yield insights into the direction of correlation between 
drivers and types. Based on the speculation above, it is unclear whether rational missionaries 
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choose affiliation strategies because they are rational missionaries or whether other factors –
e.g. a social investor – push the entrepreneur towards affiliation strategy, which in turn shapes 
their motivation so that they become a rational missionary. Such insights would also help 
practitioners, particularly in those organizations that invest in and support social ventures.  
The “big picture” of scaling 
The focus of my PhD thesis was on actors to better understand scaling strategies. Dur-
ing the respective analysis, various influential factors emerged, of which I will state a few 
below. First and foremost, the social entrepreneur plays a central role in the scaling process 
of social ventures. More precisely, our analysis indicates that the motivations (paper 3 com-
bined with previous subsection) and behavioral patterns (paper 1 and 2) of the entrepreneur 
influence the choice of scaling strategy as well its implementation.  
Second, despite the focus on the actor, papers 1-3 also yielded insights that go beyond 
the actors involved. For example, all three papers point to the relevance of the context in 
which social entrepreneurs are embedded. Though only indirectly, paper 1 points to the influ-
ence of existing legal systems. The separation of the small and big group as described in pa-
per 1 depends on the enforceability of contracts. In addition, the social franchising process 
described in paper 1 also requires other established social organizations to which the social 
entrepreneur can franchise. However, such established welfare organizations as in Germany 
do not exist in many other countries, especially those in the developing world. Paper 2 identi-
fied the effect of the economic situation of the scaling partner in affiliation strategies. Finally, 
the literature review of paper 3 conjectures that the motivations of individuals are dependent 
on their situation, be it at home or in their economic surroundings.  
Third, paper 1 and 2 suggest an influence of issues internal to the social venture. The 
importance that the small group logic within the business model has for the franchise success 
supports this notion. Thus, the respective business model of the social venture will also factor 
in the choice of scaling strategy. Moreover, paper 2 discusses the influence of management 
style (involvement-orientation) and its consequences for social franchising.  
These three overarching insights relate to the existing literature on growth in commer-
cial entrepreneurship. Here, Davidsson, Achtenhagen, and Naldi (2010) developed a growth 
model that includes the three main blocks of entrepreneur, internal aspects of organization, 
and environment. In particular, they stress the interdependence of these factors, which is still 
only partially understood. Here, my PhD thesis is able to offer insights on the entrepreneur 
and some preliminary insights into the link between the three blocks. Future research could 
thus try to better understand these links.  
Moreover, future research could elaborate on each of the blocks separately as well as 
analyzing their effects on each other. The following paragraphs provide some potential areas 
of future research on scaling based on the model of growth.  
The entrepreneur: Other factors that influence the entrepreneur are their perceived ab-
ilities to grow (see similar Ajzen, 1991) as well as their past behaviors (Delmar & Wiklund, 
2008), which have so far not been addressed in social entrepreneurship research. Furthermore, 
scaling literature could benefit from a better understanding of the cognition of the entrepre-
neur (M. T. Dacin et al., 2011). 
Internal aspects: Internal factors that may influence the scaling process are the size or 
age of the organization. Indeed, recent studies indicate that the age of the organization influ-
ences the social venture’s growth aspiration (Bacq et al., 2013). As indicated by the insights 
of paper 1, the business model also influences the choice of scaling strategy. So far, research 
identified several business models in social entrepreneurship (Mueller et al., 2011; Zeyen et 
al., 2013, 2014). To be precise, the scaling strategy could be affected by the value architecture 
and/or revenue model (Osterwalder, Pigneur, & Tucci, 2005; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). 
Furthermore, the degree of volunteer involvement is also likely to alter the choice of scaling 
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strategy. Thus research could aim to understand the link between business model and scaling 
strategy. Moreover, paper 2 points to the effect of management styles (e.g. involvement-
oriented).  
Environment: Here, research may benefit from systematically analyzing the PESTLE 
(political, economic, social, technological, legal, and natural environmental) factors 
(Dransfield, 2001) of a social ventures. For instance, Beckmann and Ney (2013) conjectured 
that institutional fragmentation and restricted access to administrative decision-makers could 
significantly impede scaling speed. In addition, similar to commercial entrepreneurs, social 
entrepreneurs are also in competition either for grants, donations, beneficiaries, or media at-
tention (Dees, Emeson, & Economy, 2002). As such the competitive environment is also of 
importance to the scaling process. 
In sum, future research on scaling will benefit from a better understanding of the re-
spective links between the entrepreneur, their venture, and its context.  
Scaling from an actor-motivation perspective 
This subsection serves to respond to the overarching research question of this PhD 
thesis: how do actors driven by a social mission, particularly the social entrepreneur, influ-
ence the scaling strategies (and their success) of social ventures?, as well as to the major sub-
question: why do some social franchises succeed while others do not? Specifically, how does 
an actor-motivation perspective help to understand the success or failure of social franchis-
es? 
I start with the latter. Paper 1 answered this question by highlighting three main 
points. (1) Social franchising can be a means to not only safeguard local small group logics 
but to also use the small group logic as part of the franchise governance. However, such an 
approach only works for those social ventures that actually do build on small group coordina-
tion in their service provision. Yet, this is not necessarily the case for all social ventures. For 
instance, as discussed in paper 1, it would be inadvisable for a microcredit loaner to use social 
franchising, as their internal mode of service provision does not require small group interac-
tions.7 (2) Paper 2 showed that social franchising can be a means to employ stewardship man-
agement. However, this process incurs stewardship costs of, for instance, reduced maximum 
size and reduced speed. Thus, social franchising may succeed if the franchisor manages to 
properly set up stewardship management and finds ways to overcome or at least reduce ste-
wardship costs. (3) Moreover, insights from paper 2 and stewardship theory also indicate that 
the success of this form of social franchising is dependent upon maintaining a steward-
steward relationship. In other words, some social franchises may fail because either the prin-
cipal or the steward changes their behavioral pattern away from stewardship and towards 
agency.  
The latter reference to the importance of keeping stewardship behavior in sync be-
comes even more important when combined with the insights from paper 3 that motivations 
may change over time. Such changes in motivation may not only collapse a stewardship-
based social franchise but may lead to challenges in any scaling strategy.  
Based on the papers as well as on the brief discussion in the foregone subsection, scal-
ing efforts may also fail because the social entrepreneur misjudges the context variables. For 
instance, rather than realizing that potential franchisees are not in a situation to act out ste-
wardship behavior, the social entrepreneur tries to implement stewardship management in-
stead of using a different scaling strategy (e.g., franchising based on agency mechanisms).  
                                               
7
 Note that the relevant relationship here is that between the microfinance institute and 
their borrowers – and not that between borrowers.  
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TABLE 1 
Overview of Research Questions, Key Findings, and Contribution of Papers 
 
 
# Research Question Methodology Key findings / contributions based on re-
search question 
Additional findings / contributions 
1 Do resource scarcity and 
agency theory help to explain 
why some social franchises 
are successful and others are 
not? How can a distinction 
between small and large 
groups help to understand the 
role of mission-driven self-
selection and coordination for 
explaining successes and fail-
ures of social franchises? 
Conceptual 
Illustrative 
case study 
- Social entrepreneurs use social franchising as 
a means to safeguard local small group 
- Distinction between social ventures that rely 
on small group logic and those that do not 
- Social franchises dependent on small groups 
successfully scale if they manage to protect 
the small group logic 
- Introduction of distinction between mi-
crocosm and macrocosm to debate on 
social entrepreneurship 
- Social mission as informal functional 
equivalent for formal contracts for the 
governance of agency relationships 
- Advancing of resource scarcity theory to 
include social capital  
2 How does goal congruence 
based on a social mission af-
fect the scaling potential of 
social franchises that franchise 
to non-beneficiaries? 
Conceptual 
Small case 
examples for 
plausibility 
- Social entrepreneurs can build on stewardship 
relationships to initiate a social franchise sys-
tem 
- Stewardship relationships then reduce the 
speed of scaling through social franchising 
- Stewardship relationships limits the maxi-
mum number of outlets in social franchising 
- Advancement of stewardship theory 
through the introduction of concept of 
stewardship costs 
- Social mission enables the establishment 
of stewardship relationships 
- Pointing to contextual dependence of 
stewardship relationships 
3 What drives social and com-
mercial entrepreneurs in a 
post-founding phase? Can 
these drivers be used to identi-
fy different types of entrepre-
neurs and, if so, what are 
these different types? How do 
Explorative 
interviews 
with emergent 
coding 
Scoring 
scheme 
Cluster analy-
- Addresses the research gap of little research 
on motivation in a post-founding stage  
- Inductively identified seven dimensions of 
motivational drivers: numbers, employees, 
personal gratification, product, market, and 
impact 
- Empirically developed taxonomy of five 
- Larger-N study on social entrepreneur-
ship that employs a non-case study ap-
proach 
- Empirical elaboration of the multidi-
mensionality of actor motivations 
- Suggestion of combined research on so-
cial and commercial entrepreneurship 
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these empirically observable 
entrepreneurial characters 
relate to the distinction be-
tween social and commercial 
entrepreneurship found in the 
literature? 
sis types of entrepreneurs based on their post-
founding drivers: rational missionary, bond-
ing self-actualizer, number junkie, “textbook” 
businessperson, and product-adjusting com-
petitor 
- Only one out of five types consists only of 
commercial entrepreneurs 
- Methodological innovation through  
 
An overview of the publication status and conference contribution of the three papers can be found in Appendix A.
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Despite the valuable insights by the actor-motivation perspective, this approach suffers 
at least from one major limitation. The motivation of a social entrepreneur will only influence 
their choices in behavior if this choice is within their control (McCloy, Campbell, & Cudeck, 
1994). Take the example of an entrepreneur whose motivation dimensions lead her to favor 
branching. However, she has an investor who greatly values social franchising concepts. 
Thus, even though she might want to use branching, the influence of the investor will push 
her towards franchising without – necessarily – changing her motives.  
This notwithstanding, in sum, actors driven by a social mission influence the scaling 
process by (1) serving as an informal functional equivalent to formalized monitoring or con-
tracts (paper 1), (2) allowing stewardship management that, however, may create specific 
scaling costs in turn, and (3) influencing the choice of scaling strategy.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MANAGEMENT  
In addition to providing insights on scaling and especially social franchising, this PhD 
thesis also offers several contributions and consequent implications for social entrepreneur-
ship, entrepreneurship, and management scholarship in general.  
Social entrepreneurship research and practice beyond scaling 
Implications and contribution to social entrepreneurship research are six-fold. My PhD 
thesis contributes to social entrepreneurship research by (1) building on a larger-N dataset as 
well as (2) by applying and advancing existing theories to the context of social entrepreneur-
ship. Moreover it offers a more nuanced view of the social entrepreneur that can enrich both 
(3) research and (4) practice. (5) It suggests that not all social entrepreneurs wish to scale. (6) 
It proposes linking dual identity literature with multiple types of entrepreneurs.  
Larger-N sample  
Paper 3 responds to the call by Hoogendoorn et al. (2010) for larger-N samples in so-
cial entrepreneurship research. In particular, they criticized that the majority of empirical stu-
dies only uses three to five cases. Moreover, my empirical study also answers the call by 
Short et al. (2009) for more diversity in methodologies. The majority of social entrepreneur-
ship research is case-based. Thus, by employing large-N scoring schemes and cluster analysis, 
my PhD thesis is able to offer a different methodological approach.  
Application of established theories  
Many of the review articles on social entrepreneurship point to the lack of rigorous 
theoretical analysis in the field of social entrepreneurship (P. A. Dacin et al., 2010; Short et 
al., 2009; Zeyen et al., 2013). Thus, by applying and advancing agency and stewardship 
theory, paper 1 and 2 contributed to a more theoretically sound analysis of social entrepre-
neurship.  
Entrepreneurial types may enhance research  
The findings of paper 3 support the notion that there are multiple types of social entre-
preneurs. While this notion has been previously suggested in the social entrepreneurship lite-
rature (e.g., Vidal & Claver, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009), most studies still look at social entre-
preneurs as one homogenous group of actors. As briefly discussed in the implications section 
of paper 3, I believe that social entrepreneurship research could generate valuable insights 
from taking a more differentiated perspective on the entrepreneur. Similar to the discussion on 
entrepreneurial types and scaling strategies, such a nuanced viewpoint may yield insights into 
the link between type of social entrepreneur and overall strategy, type of innovation em-
ployed, legal form used, or other strategic and operative differences within social ventures. 
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Therefore, by better understanding the actor, research might unlock other so far unknown 
mechanisms in social entrepreneurship.  
Multiple types of entrepreneurs help improve support programs 
A better understanding of the diversity of entrepreneurs also has implications for so-
cial entrepreneurship practice, especially for organizations that coach and support social ven-
tures. Enhanced knowledge of the distinct types allows adapting programs to better suit the 
needs of the respective types. For instance, a number junkie would be responsive to different 
training offerings than a rational missionary. Take the rational missionary. She would be very 
responsive to trainings on achieving impact (high score). Yet, she might be less enthusiastic 
about a workshop on employee satisfaction (low score). Thus, support organizations would 
not only benefit from knowing what areas or themes a social entrepreneur is more responsive 
to, but also from being better able to identify in which areas they might be more reluctant to 
accept guidance.  
Not everyone wants to scale 
Furthermore, my research indicates that not all social entrepreneurs score high in im-
pact. Indeed, during the interviews some of them did not even mention their mission or its 
impact. This is particularly noteworthy, as all social entrepreneurs in my empirical study were 
Ashoka Fellows. To become a Fellow, candidates go through a one-year rigorous selection 
program (Ashoka, 2013). One of the core aspects Ashoka looks out for during this process is 
the determination of the social entrepreneur to reach scale. This finding can be interpreted in 
at least two ways. First, some social entrepreneurs might not be as interested in their mission 
but e.g. equally in the reputational aspects of it. Yet, they nevertheless manage to pass as “ge-
nuine” social entrepreneur. Second, the motivation changed after the social entrepreneur was 
selected. Indeed, recent research indicates that older social ventures show much less growth 
aspiration than their younger counterparts (Bacq et al., 2013). Nevertheless, I conjecture that 
both scenarios emerge in practice and thus require managing.  
Multiple drivers lead to multiple identities? 
It would be interesting to social entrepreneurship research to combine the identified 
types of entrepreneurs with existing research on dual identities (Kreutzer & Jager, 2011; 
Moss, Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2011) or dual cultures (e.g., Dees, 2012). By simultaneously 
investigating existing dual identities or organizational culture and the driver function of the 
social entrepreneur might yield new insights into the occurrence of such phenomena.  
Entrepreneurship research and practice 
My thesis contributed to entrepreneurship research by (1) suggesting undertaking 
combined sample research and (2) by proposing to transfer the idea of small group logics to 
commercial entrepreneurship context.  
Combined sample research  
Based on the findings of paper 3, I suggest research that combines both social and 
commercial entrepreneurs in one sample. However, the purpose of such research would not be 
to delineate both groups but to identify common underlying patterns that may cut across the 
dual social-commercial distinction. In particular, such research could inform motivation re-
search on the simultaneous occurrence of self-interested and pro-social behavior (De Dreu, 
Nijstad, Bechtoldt, & Baas, 2011) 
Building small groups in commercial entrepreneurship 
Some owners of small businesses do not wish to grow (Getz & Petersen, 2005) be-
cause they fear the effects organizational growth might have on their staff and themselves 
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(Davidsson et al., 2010; Wiklund et al., 2003). In other words, they wish to preserve the “feel-
ing” of the small group. In particular small enterprises build on the personal interaction of 
employees. As such, they are not much different to social ventures. While small business em-
ployees do not rally around a social mission, they often still follow a shared goal, which may 
be to bake good quality bread or to provide good consultancy services. Here, the insights from 
paper 1 might help to develop growth concepts that safeguard the small group logic that some 
small business owner-manager price so dearly. Thus, entrepreneurship scholarship could try 
to identify how the idea of splitting small and big group logics may be applied to commercial 
ventures. In addition, entrepreneurship practice could test such approaches and try to identify 
potential adaptations that need to be undertaken.  
Implications for management research and practice 
My PhD thesis contributes to management research by (1) introducing the idea of ste-
wardship costs as well as (2) by suggesting how a social mission can serve as a functional 
equivalent to contracts. Moreover, this subsection proposes potential future research in (3) the 
context conditions of stewardship relationships, and (4) on stewardship and dual missions.  
The idea of stewardship costs 
Paper 2 proposes the concept of stewardship costs. Stewardship costs occur in situa-
tions in which two actors (the principal and the steward) engage in relationships that are go-
verned by initial goal congruence. In other words, stewardship costs emerge because both 
principal and steward strive for the same goal. These costs are rooted in the specific characte-
ristics of stewardship behavior. For example, the need to lead through personal rather than 
institutional power (Davis et al., 1997) has significant impacts on management. In addition, 
once the organization grows, stewardship management leads to the stewardship costs of de-
creased maximum size. In order to overcome such stewardship costs, research and practice 
could find out suitable measures. For instance, organizations could try to build up multiple 
principals, i.e. try to get stewards to grant personal power to more than one individual. By so 
doing, the principal becomes less of a bottleneck in the growth or general management 
process.  
I propose that future research tries to empirically test stewardship costs as well as tries 
to identify more stewardship costs. Such research would help to better advise and instruct 
principals that wish to follow stewardship management.  
Social mission and agency theory  
This PhD thesis contributes further to management research by introducing the con-
cept of social mission into agency theory. This combination generated insights on how the 
social mission can create situations in which informal measures such as personal interaction 
reduce agency costs by serving as functional equivalents to formal contracts. To better under-
stand this mechanism, future research could analyze the boundary and context conditions of 
such functional equivalents. For practice, this finding might support practitioners in identify-
ing means to secure goal alignment in situations where contract enforceability is difficult or 
impossible.  
Context conditions of stewardship theory  
Research on stewardship also analyzes corporate governance issues as well as internal 
management of some specific forms of companies – e.g., the concept of “familiness” in fami-
ly businesses (Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2011). Thus, stewardship behavior can occur in 
different contexts. As paper 2 suggested, it is more likely to find stewards in economically 
sound conditions that allows them to act on their higher-order needs. In other words, steward-
ship behavior is some sort of superior good, if not even a form of luxury. Similarly, steward-
ship behavior might be responsive to other contextual conditions. Future research could aim 
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to unlock these. Moreover, practitioners could take these context variables into consideration 
when choosing a management style. For instance, it would be ill advised to use stewardship 
management in areas of destitute. 
Stewardship and dual missions 
A common theme in social entrepreneurship research is the theme of dual mission, i.e. 
to serve both a financial and a social mission at the same time (e.g., Herranz, Council, & 
McKay, 2011). As my PhD thesis conjectures, the social mission of individuals allows the 
establishment of stewardship relationships. Yet, the question would be if this were still feasi-
ble in a dual mission context. If both principal and steward serve a higher-order objective (so-
cial mission) and a self-interested goal (financial) simultaneously, this may render steward-
ship relationships very unstable or make them impossible. Thus future research could try to 
understand how stewardship theory applies in situations of dual mission and dual identities.  
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this framework paper was to provide details on the background, find-
ings, contributions, and implications of my PhD thesis on the role of actor-motivation in scal-
ing social ventures. To this end, this paper started by briefly reviewing the literature on social 
entrepreneurship. Based on this review, it identified scaling as well as the role of the entre-
preneur as so far under-represented subfields in social entrepreneurship research.  
 Against this background, this framework paper derived the overall research question 
of my PhD thesis: how do actors driven by a social mission, particularly the social entrepre-
neur, influence the scaling strategies (and their success) of social ventures? Based on the 
findings and insights generated by paper 1-3, this framework paper suggests that actors moti-
vated by a social mission influence scaling in at least three ways. (1) In specific forms of so-
cial franchising, small groups of mission-driven actors can serve as an informal functional 
equivalent to formal contracts. Moreover, this process also helps to safeguard the small group 
logic on which the business model builds. (2) Social franchising allows for the establishment 
of stewardship relationships by pulling in intrinsically motivated actors. However, social 
franchises may fail precisely because they worked with intrinsically motivated franchisees. 
The reason lies in the inherent costs of stewardship relationships, which my co-author and I 
name stewardship costs. (3) Actors in social entrepreneurship are driven by a multitude of 
motivations, which can shape their choices in strategy and operations. Thus, different types of 
social entrepreneurs are likely to choose different strategies to scale. In other words, there is 
no “one-fits-all” scaling strategy but it depends on the actor and their motivation, internal 
features of their ventures, and the context in which they are embedded.  
In addition to these insights on scaling, the framework paper also presents multiple 
contributions, and implications for social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship, and manage-
ment research. To give but some examples, my PhD thesis offers one of the first large-N em-
pirical studies with original data. It contributes to social entrepreneurship research by offering 
five distinct and empirically developed types of social entrepreneurs. It provides suggestions 
on new growth models for small businesses that fear change in organizational climate when 
growing. In terms of management implications, my PhD thesis introduces the concept of ste-
wardship costs to the research on stewardship theory (for a summary of contributions please 
see Table 1 & 2).  
In conclusion, I hope that my thesis holds valuable insights to scholars in the areas of 
scaling, social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship, and management theories.  
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TABLE 2 
Overview of Addressed Research Gaps 
Research gap Raised by Addressed in 
Lack of large-N studies in social entre-
preneurship 
(Hoogendoorn et al., 2010; 
Short et al., 2009) 
Paper 3 
Need for multivariate analyses in social 
entrepreneurship research 
(Short et al., 2009) Paper 3 
Lack of theoretical rigor in social en-
trepreneurship 
(M. T. Dacin et al., 2011; Short 
et al., 2009; Zeyen et al., 2013) 
Paper 1 & 2 
Need for a more differentiated perspec-
tive on motivations / success notions of 
entrepreneur 
(Dyke & Murphy, 2006; 
Reijonen & Komppula, 2007; 
Walker & Brown, 2004) 
Paper 3 
Need for insights on link between type 
of social entrepreneur and type of scal-
ing strategy 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2001) Framework pa-
per in combina-
tion with paper 3 
Need for more fine-grained analyses of 
the mechanisms of social franchising 
(Schmitz & Scheuerle, 2013) Paper 1 & 2 
Need for a more in-depth understanding 
of scaling in social ventures 
(Davies & Simon, 2013; 
Mueller et al., 2011) 
Paper 1 & 2, 
framework paper 
Need for research that combines pro-
social and self-interested motivations 
(Renko, 2013) Paper 3 
Necessity to better understand scaling 
strategies that do not involve increasing 
the size of the social venture 
(Bradach, 2010) Paper 1 & 2 
Need for deeper analysis of Ashoka 
Fellows from all fields of work 
(Meyskens et al., 2010) Paper 3 
Need for more theoretical diversity in 
franchising research (beyond agency 
and resource scarcity theory) 
(Combs et al., 2010, 2004) Paper 2 
Need for a more in-depth analysis of 
the potential costs and benefits of rela-
tional contracting in franchising 
(Combs et al., 2010; Tracey & 
Jarvis, 2007) 
Paper 2 & paper 
1 (partially)  
Need to understand how the societal 
context, within which franchising takes 
place, effects franchising outcome 
(Combs et al., 2010) Paper 1 & 2, 
framework paper 
Need to develop or understand adapta-
tions of commercial scaling mechanism 
to fit social ventures 
(Lyon & Fernandez, 2012) Paper 1 
Gain a more in-depth understanding of 
the role of motivations in social ven-
tures 
(M. T. Dacin et al., 2011) Entire PhD the-
sis 
Need to move away from the dicho-
tomous perspective of social versus 
commercial entrepreneurship to gener-
ate insights into common patterns 
(Mueller et al., 2011) Paper 3 
Need to analyze whether scaling modes 
can be adjusted to avoid agency costs in 
social franchising  
(Tracey & Jarvis, 2007) Paper 1 
Need to understand in detail what moti-
vates different types of entrepreneurs 
(e.g., social and commercial) 
(Carsrud & Brännback, 2011) Paper 3 
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for Combining Small and 
Large Group Advantages 
(Logics) in Social 
Entrepreneurship:  
A Hayekian Perspective
Markus Beckmann1 and Anica Zeyen1,2
Abstract
This article develops a Hayekian perspective on social franchising that distinguishes 
between the end-connected logic of the small group and the rule-connected logic of 
the big group. Our key claim is that mission-driven social entrepreneurs often draw on 
the small-group logic when starting their social ventures and then face difficulties when 
the process of scaling shifts their operations toward a big-group logic. In this situation, 
social franchising offers a strategy to replicate the small group despite systemwide 
scaling, to mobilize decentrally accessible social capital, and to reduce agency costs 
through mechanisms of self-selection and self-monitoring. By employing a Hayekian 
perspective, we are thus able to offer an explanation as to why social franchising is a 
suitable scaling strategy for some social entrepreneurship organizations and not for 
others. We illustrate our work using the Ashoka Fellow Wellcome.
Keywords
social entrepreneurship, social franchising, scaling, volunteer involvement, agency theory
Dialogue in the Dark and Wellcome are examples of social entrepreneurship ventures 
that use franchising to scale. Social entrepreneurship uses innovative means to solve 
social problems (e.g., Dees, 1998) that are otherwise unmet by market or state (e.g., 
Squazzoni, 2009).
Article
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With this article, we aim to contribute to the literature on social entrepreneurship, 
social franchising, and nonprofit organizations by introducing a new theoretical per-
spective on social franchising, that is, franchising as a means to increase impact 
(Mueller, Nazarkina, Volkmann, & Blank, 2011). In so doing, we show why social 
franchising is a suitable scaling strategy for some organizations, particularly volunteer 
organizations, and not for others.
To shed new light on these questions, we develop a Hayekian perspective on social 
entrepreneurship, scaling, and social franchising. We draw on Hayek’s (1988) often-
neglected distinction between the small-group logic of the microcosm (e.g., family) 
and the big-group logic of the macrocosm (e.g., capitalist markets). We argue that this 
distinction helps generate new insights to the question raised above. First, from a 
Hayekian perspective, social entrepreneurship particularly draws on the end-con-
nected logic of the small group. Second, applying this Hayekian perspective to the 
issue of scaling, we argue that conflicts between the microcosm and macrocosm logics 
are prone to arise when a mission-driven small-group social venture tries to scale up 
to the macro societal level. Third, in Hayekian terms, social franchising can be under-
stood as the attempt to separate and then recombine the distinct logics of the small 
group needed for the local delivery of mission-driven services and the big-group logic 
driving the scaling process to the social system level.
We develop this argument in five steps. First, we look at the general issue of scaling 
in social entrepreneurship. Second, we shift the focus toward conventional theories for 
explaining the use of franchising—resource scarcity and agency theory. The article 
then identifies open questions regarding the concept of social franchising. Third, we 
develop our Hayekian perspective on social franchising. The key claim is that mission-
driven social entrepreneurial start-ups are firmly rooted in a Hayekian small-group 
logic. Although scaling such ventures is difficult, social franchising offers a possible 
solution. We show that a Hayekian perspective can be usefully combined with the 
established explanations for franchising provided by resource scarcity and agency 
theories. Fourth, we illustrate our conceptual discussion using the case of Wellcome, a 
German nonprofit social venture that has scaled up to more than 200 franchisees. In 
the fifth and last step, the article concludes and spells out some important implications 
of our argument.
Social Franchising as a Scaling Strategy 
in Social Entrepreneurship
Social entrepreneurs and their organizations seek to solve societal problems (Dees & 
Anderson, 2006) that are otherwise unmet by market or government (Squazzoni, 
2009). Therefore, their social mission is central to their organization (Zahra, 
Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009). Because of the recent increased attention 
on social entrepreneurship, there are numerous understandings in circulation. Whereas 
some define social entrepreneurship from an innovation perspective (e.g., Dees & 
Anderson, 2006), others define social entrepreneurship as profit-generation models of 
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nonprofit organizations (e.g., Bagnoli & Megali, 2011; Cooney, 2011; Dart, 2004; 
Herranz, Council, & McKay, 2011). For the purpose of this article, we follow the 
former understandings so as to talk to all potential organizational forms regardless if 
they are social enterprises or nonprofit organizations rooted in voluntary work.
Because the very raison d’être of social entrepreneurs is to create social change, 
scaling seems unavoidable as social change can occur only when a large number of 
people alter their behavior (e.g., Schram & Giardeli, 2006). Therefore, most practitio-
ner handbooks offer in-depth advice on scaling strategies (e.g., Brooks, 2008; Durieux 
& Stebbins, 2010). Moreover, in many conversations with practitioners or in practitioner-
focused events, the issue of scaling is nearly always a dominant theme.
However, despite its practical importance identified in the literature (Bloom & 
Smith, 2010; Bradach, 2003; Mueller et al., 2011), to date little scholarly work has 
explicitly dealt with scaling in the context of social entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Ahlert 
et al., 2008; Bradach, 2003; Dees, Anderson, & Wei-Skillern, 2004; Grant & 
Crutchfield, 2007). Therefore, more research is needed (Mueller et al., 2011).
So far, various scaling strategies have been identified (e.g., Dees, 2008). Table 1 
provides an overview of these strategies that differ in the degree of control the original 
organization has over the scaling of its idea. Thus, if social entrepreneurs follow a 
branching strategy, they have the highest level of control. Here, the headquarters has 
more control over the activities of its subsidiaries as the managers are employees. This 
option is often chosen in areas where control is necessary, for example, to ensure qual-
ity or where extensive training is a prerequisite. In contrast, control is lowest if an 
open-source-style replication strategy is chosen.
In social entrepreneurship practice, it is particularly the strategy of franchising that 
enjoys special prominence. Many successful social entrepreneurs choose this strategy 
(see Table 2 for examples). So far, there are various case studies on social franchise 
systems available in the literature (e.g., Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011; 
Tracey & Jarvis, 2007; Volery & Hackl, 2010). Yet some more fundamental questions 
Table 1. Scaling Methods in Social Entrepreneurship.
Full intraorganizational 
growth
Contracting as 
hybrid governance
Extraorganizational 
multipliers
Contractual control of the 
“rules of the game”
Yes Yes No
Actual control of the 
“moves of the game”/actual 
production process
Yes No No
Degree of control ++ + 0
Example Setting up own 
branches
Franchising, 
licensing
Open source, 
sharing 
information
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remain unanswered. Why is franchising such a prominent strategy for scaling in the 
field of social entrepreneurship? Why does social franchising seem to work very well 
for some social ventures whereas others refrain from this practice? Before offering our 
Hayekian answer to these questions, the next section looks at the conventional litera-
ture on franchising and its established theories.
Theories of (Social) Franchising
Franchising is a way of growing an organization without necessarily increasing its 
size. A franchise consists of two parties, the franchisor (original organization) and the 
franchisee (license taker), that enter a relationship based on a contractual agreement 
(Jensen & Smith, 1985; Ketchen, Short, & Combs, 2011). Franchising has been a 
growth strategy in the commercial sector for more than 80 years (Ahlert et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, there is a vast body of literature on franchising, albeit limited in scope 
(Stanworth & Curran, 1999) and in need of more thorough theoretical grounding 
(Ketchen et al., 2011).
In a nonprofit or social entrepreneurship context, there are two different under-
standings of franchising. One refers to franchising as means to generate profits (e.g., 
Netting & Kettner, 1987); the other attempts to transfer knowledge from commercial 
franchising to the nonprofit sector as a means to increase impact (Montagu, 2002; 
Volery & Hackl, 2010). As this article looks at scaling, we follow the second 
understanding.
Table 2. Examples of Social Franchise Systems.
Brief description
CASA—Care and Share 
Associationa
Provide home care solutions for those who do not 
wish to enter residential care
CORE Community Renewable 
Energya
Aim to increase the number of community-owned 
renewable energy systems
Dialogue Social Enterpriseb Runs exhibitions, trainings, seminars, and restaurants in 
total darkness or silence to change perspectives on 
disability
EcoKidsa Provides education on environmental and sustainability 
issues to young children
FIETSenWERKa Provides bike mobility serves (rental, repair, etc.)
LeMata Sustainable and small-business tourism
MyBanka Financial support and education service to youth 
between 11 and 25 years of age
Specialisterne Provides suitable workspaces for autistic people and 
uses their special skills in the IT industry
a. www.socialfranchising.com. Profiles of these organizations can be found on this website.
b. Volery and Hackl (2010).
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In the following, we show how the two main theoretical explanations in franchising 
scholarship—resource scarcity and agency theory (Combs, Ketchen, & Short, 2011)—
can be transferred to social entrepreneurship franchising.
Resource scarcity theory. According to resource scarcity theory, organizations wish-
ing to expand their geographical range franchise to overcome problems of scarce 
resources (Nga & Shamuganathan, 2010) that hinder the rapid growth needed to secure 
market share and organizational survival in a competitive environment (Oxenfeldt & 
Kelly, 1969). These resource scarcity problems derive from an organization’s liability 
of newness and smallness.
Social ventures seem to encounter similar challenges of scarce resources (Ahlert 
et al., 2008; Hoffman & Preble, 1991). They are often underfinanced because of oper-
ating in unchartered institutional environments (Mair & Martí, 2009), which increases 
their liability of newness. Therefore, as in the private sector, using a franchise can 
help in accessing important capital. Moreover, scaling through franchising is cheaper 
than branching, as the existing concept “only” needs to be scaled through others 
(Ahlert et al., 2008). Therefore, resource scarcity theory seems to apply also to social 
franchising.
Agency theory. Generally, agency theory analyzes the difficulties that arise when a 
principal hires an agent to perform a task in the principal’s interest. Given conditions 
of incomplete and asymmetric information, the agent could then use this for his or her 
own interests and at the principal’s cost (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory looks at how different contractual arrangements deal with this problem 
of moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when agents abuse their information advantage 
(e.g., regarding potential quality) to increase their own benefits by, for example, hold-
ing back essential information. However, no contract, no matter how costly, can cover 
in advance every possible situation that might occur (Alchian & Woodward, 1988). As 
a result, agency theory emphasizes the agency costs and benefits of alternative gover-
nance arrangements for delegating tasks from a principal to an agent.
In the context of franchising, agency theory focuses on the relation between the 
owner of the original company (principal) and the person running a local subsidiary 
(agent). There are two basic options for managing this principal–agent relation (Brickley 
& Dark, 1987): hiring a local manager or franchising (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). From an 
agency perspective, this decision depends on the respective (dis)advantages of both 
alternatives, thus on trade-offs in agency costs (Brickley & Dark, 1987).
Franchising offers a company two fundamental advantages when managing a 
principal–agent relationship. The first advantage involves the ex ante problem of hid-
den characteristics and intentions. When recruiting highly talented staff to run a sub-
sidiary, it is difficult to know whether the applicant is motivated, skilled, and 
experienced enough. However, since becoming a franchisee is costly, time-consum-
ing, and lucrative only if one works hard, only those with the required characteristics 
are likely to apply. This self-selection mechanism allows an organization to recruit 
highly skilled and motivated entrepreneurs to run a subsidiary at limited agency costs 
(Hoffman & Preble, 1991).
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The second advantage of franchising addresses the ex post problems of hidden action, 
hidden information, and moral hazard. Once a contract has been entered, the organiza-
tion wants to be sure that the local entrepreneur will act in its interest. A salaried manager 
might not work as hard as desired. Franchisees, in contrast, have strong incentives to 
maximize the revenues of the subsidiary because they have a personal stake in them. 
This additional motivator can lead to lower monitoring costs (Norton, 1988).
Franchising, however, is not a perfect solution for principal–agent problems. For 
example, a franchise system cannot fully reduce information asymmetries and moral 
hazard. More generally, franchising can incur agency costs in terms of free-riding 
effects, that is, the agent either uses resources such as brand, knowledge, or materials 
of the principal without adequately paying for them or even abuses them. This is not 
the case only when franchisees free ride on (and thus reduce) overall system quality 
(Michael, 1991); it can also occur if a franchisee utilizes the knowledge and training 
received from the franchisor, terminates the contract, and starts up a competitor 
(Brickley & Dark, 1987).
In sum, however, agency theory suggests that franchising often incurs fewer agency 
costs than hiring a local manager (Brickley & Dark, 1987) and that this advantage 
explains why franchising is such a popular growth strategy.
Social franchising is also theorized to be a feasible strategy for recruiting entrepre-
neurial talent to operate and run a local subsidiary (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). However, 
some striking differences have been identified. In their case study of Dialogue Social 
Enterprise, Volery and Hackl (2010) found that despite the existence of contracts, both 
sides—franchisor and franchisee—highlighted that if problems occurred, they would 
rely on their trust to solve them. Such findings might be interpreted as evidence that 
the key motivations for both social franchise parties are different from those of com-
mercial franchises (Ahlert et al., 2008).
If this interpretation were correct, one could argue that the principal–agent dilemma 
does not occur in social entrepreneurship franchising as the common mission orienta-
tion of both parties makes potential information asymmetries irrelevant: Both are 
striving for the same good and thus have no conflicts of interest.
Yet, this interpretation can explain neither why franchising is used instead of open-
source strategies nor why some social entrepreneurs use it with great success and oth-
ers don’t. We therefore follow the call by Ketchen et al. (2011) for new theoretical 
approaches to franchising and now introduce a Hayekian perspective.
Hayek’s Two Worlds, Social  
Entrepreneurship, and Franchising
The Austrian social philosopher Friedrich August von Hayek is a famous figure in the 
theoretical fields of innovation, entrepreneurship, and market evolution. In this sec-
tion, however, we draw on a lesser-known aspect of Hayek’s work that we believe 
offers a fresh perspective on social entrepreneurship, scaling, and social franchising. 
We develop our argument in three steps. The first step introduces and illustrates 
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Hayek’s (1988) distinction between the microcosm of small groups and the macro-
cosm of big groups. The second step applies this distinction to the field of social 
entrepreneurship. The third step shifts the focus to social franchising and discusses 
our Hayekian perspective on social franchising as complementary to the perspective 
of resource scarcity and agency theory.
The Hayekian Distinction Between the Microcosm  
and the Macrocosm
In his work The Fatal Conceit, Hayek (1988) sketches an evolutionary perspective on 
modern society. Hayek distinguishes two paradigmatic forms of social order. On one 
hand, there is the logic of the small group or microcosm. This microcosm focuses on 
social interactions characterized by face-to-face personal relationships and informal 
norms. For Hayek, small groups are end connected: Their coordination relies on all 
group members striving for one shared goal. In Hayek’s perspective, this small-group 
dynamic was the dominant logic that shaped man during the Stone Age when people 
lived in small groups of hunters and gatherers. Imagine a Stone Age tribe hunting a 
mammoth. All tribe members participate equally as otherwise they could face social 
segregation because of strong face-to-face relationships. For Hayek, altruism and 
solidarity are remnant instincts of this heritage. The logic of the microcosm is still 
relevant today in small groups such as the family where we still share a strong collec-
tive identity and interact based on personal face-to-face relations.
Despite the continuing relevance of the microcosm, Hayek argues that modern 
society is built on the very distinct logic of the macrocosm. The “macrocosm” encom-
passes the complex and manifold interactions that take place in the larger society. 
Here, individuals follow their own pluralistic objectives, but do so within a framework 
of formal and informal rules. Such big groups are thus not end connected but rule con-
nected. Their coordination relies not on personal relationships but on impersonal or 
even anonymous interactions. A case in point is modern capitalist markets. In global 
markets, millions and millions of people interact in complex ways, often without 
knowing each other. And yet there is order and coordination. This environment is 
founded not in the collective pursuit of shared goals but in the pursuit of individual 
goals coordinated by rules. Table 3 summarizes the Hayekian distinction between 
microcosm and macrocosm.
For Hayek (1988), a key challenge for modern humans is to simultaneously live in 
both kinds of “cosm.” We need (or want) to be able to both live in families and interact 
in anonymous markets. Hayek emphasizes that frictions arise if one logic is inappro-
priately applied to the domain of the other. He forcefully warns that if we apply the 
small-group logic to society and try to plan, say, the economy like a family meal and 
directly decide who gets how much of the pie, we will destroy the workings of effi-
cient markets. And, vice versa, we will destroy our intimate small groups if we try to 
run, say, our family life the same way we order our markets through prices and anony-
mous auctions.1
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In short, Hayek points out that there are different logics of coordinating social inter-
actions. Each logic is appropriate for a certain context, but tension will arise if one 
logic is inappropriately applied to the domain of the other.
Social Entrepreneurship, Scaling, and the  
Small-Group/Big-Group Distinction
Hayek’s distinction provides an interesting lens with which to look at scaling in social 
entrepreneurship. The key idea is that many social entrepreneurship ventures system-
atically build on a microcosm logic when founded and then experience difficulties 
when the process of scaling moves the organization toward macrocosm dynamics.
Although not only social ventures follow a small-group relationship-driven logic 
(Kreutzer & Jager, 2011), it is important to bear in mind the key differences between 
commercial and social entrepreneurship, differences that significantly magnify the 
microcosm nature of the social venture.
First, business entrepreneurs have commercial goals; social entrepreneurs have a 
social mission (e.g., Dees, 1998). When starting a social venture, they rally resources 
and people around a shared social goal and thus set up an end-connected small group. 
In comparison to a business start-up where private interests in the business such as 
equity shares are also important, social entrepreneurs often recruit people who primar-
ily contribute resources (e.g., volunteer time or funding) based on the shared 
mission.
Second, the strong social mission of the small group helps social ventures not only 
to recruit resources but also to coordinate them. People in a small group motivated by a 
shared ethical goal build strong social relationships (Kreutzer & Jager, 2011),2 the 
importance of which for entrepreneurial success is explicitly highlighted in literature 
(e.g., Unger, Rauch, Frese, & Rosenbusch, 2011). Moreover, the shared goal can serve 
Table 3. Hayek’s Distinction Between Microcosm and Macrocosm.
Small-group logic Big-group logic
Type of social structure Microcosm Macrocosm
Pattern of cohesion End connected Rule connected
Principle of social 
coordination
Informal norms focused on 
personal identity and group 
membership
Abstract rules with no regard 
for personal identity
Actor motivation Shared group objectives Pluralistic individual objectives
Quality of relationships Personal Impersonal, even anonymous
Degree of complexity Low Potentially very high
Size Small group Big group
Source: Based on Hayek (1988).
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as a focal point (Schelling, 1960) for coordinating people. However, this is possible 
only if the group is of limited complexity and everyone can see and understand what the 
others do; thus, personal face-to-face relations also act as a monitor and potentially 
lower sanctioning costs (North, 2005). This is nicely illustrated by the mammoth-
hunting example. While engaged in the hunt, men could communicate with each other 
and oversee the entire process. Anyone noticed to be not participating could be excluded 
from the meal. As a consequence, both in terms of monitoring and in terms of enforcing 
norm compliance, sanctioning is easier than in anonymous relationships.
Another difference between commercial and social entrepreneurship is that success 
measurement in commercial entrepreneurship is more clear-cut than in social entrepre-
neurship (Bagnoli & Megali, 2011). Even commercial start-ups are strongly embedded 
in the institutional structures of the market macrocosm. These market rules provide 
guidance for social coordination and agreed-on outside focal points. Prices and profits, 
for example, provide informative signals as to whether the venture is “on track.”
In contrast, the social entrepreneur strives for social betterment. To this end, the 
social entrepreneur may follow a combination of strategies from the private, the non-
profit, and the public sectors. Furthermore, to increase their impact, social entrepre-
neurs often do not charge market prices for their products. Put differently, social 
entrepreneurs initially often operate in an ambiguous institutional environment (Mair 
& Martí, 2009), and thus neither give nor receive the clear signals of success that are 
so established in the big-group logic of functioning markets and bureaucratic 
structures.
In short, social entrepreneurial start-ups often are particularly characterized by the 
microcosm. What is more, for some social entrepreneurs, their “business model” is 
actually based on a small-group logic. In these cases, important resources are not 
mobilized through the big-group price mechanism; rather, people voluntarily contrib-
ute personal resources because they follow a shared end. For a mission-driven start-up, 
the small-group logic of the microcosm thus can be vital.
In light of the predominance of the small-group logic in social entrepreneurship, it 
is easy to see why the process of scaling poses such a challenge for these ventures. If 
scaling means creating an organization that reaches thousands of customers in com-
pletely different places, then the process of scaling puts stress on the microcosm of the 
social venture. To grow the organization, more division of labor and specialization are 
needed, thus making personal interaction less central. As complexity increases, it 
becomes less obvious how each person is contributing to the shared mission. Instead 
of being end-connected, the mechanisms of coordination need to more strongly rely on 
rules and hierarchy. Such a development can lead to a clash of cultures. The very pro-
cess of scaling thus may threaten the stability of the venture. Moreover, if the venture’s 
business model is based on small-group interactions, turning into a big-group organi-
zation will be difficult when, for example, personal interactions are the key element of 
motivation for volunteers (Garner & Garner, 2011).
The challenge of organizational growth is not unique to social ventures. Any start-
up or family business that grows experiences the tensions that arise when an 
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organization reaches the point where informal rules no longer suffice to manage the 
business appropriately (Cressy, 2006). Nevertheless, the problem can be far more 
severe in a mission-driven group of people who have created or joined the organiza-
tion based on the very premise of following an overarching goal. Given these difficul-
ties, the next section looks at social franchising as a potential solution.
A Hayekian Perspective on Social Franchising
We believe that Hayek’s distinction between small-group and big-group logic offers a 
fresh perspective to discuss social franchising as an interesting scaling strategy for at 
least three reasons: (1) franchising allows scaling without forcing organizational 
growth, (2) it addresses specific resource scarcity challenges, and (3) it can mitigate 
certain agency problems.
Social franchising as a means of scaling without organizational growth. Social franchis-
ing provides social entrepreneurs with a means of scaling without forcing organiza-
tional growth. Social franchising duplicates the original organization, thereby 
replicating small-group conditions locally. Figure 1 illustrates this point.
Figure 1. A Hayekian perspective on social franchising.
Note, in Figure 1, the differences between a subsidiary and the original social ven-
ture. A hired subsidiary manager is much more integrated into an impersonal rule 
system. Also, local volunteers and employees have less ownership and a weaker group 
identity. With the central organization being responsible for much of the decision mak-
ing, face-to-face relations in the local subsidiary become less important and hierarchy 
and impersonal elements become more so.
A social franchise can be used to separate the small-group and big-group logic into 
two distinct arenas. Although the local franchise continues to be based on small-
group interactions, the overarching franchise system can establish rules that allow 
reaping the efficiency advantages of a growing, impersonal organization that follows 
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a big-group logic. As a result, social franchising offers a strategy for social entrepre-
neurs to scale their impact without experiencing the cultural tensions of organiza-
tional growth. Social franchising allows reduced complexity and increased 
transparency in the local venture, even while the complexity and impact of the over-
arching organization increase. If the social entrepreneur’s value creation model 
largely depends on a small-group culture, a systematic separation of small-group and 
big-group logics can be the key to successful scaling.
In short, duplicating and preserving small-group logics through social franchising 
can be of great value. The next two sections show that this idea has interesting implica-
tions for resource scarcity and agency theory.
Social franchising and resource scarcity. Like any other venture, social ventures need 
capital to grow. Since many social ventures are underfinanced, social franchising has 
been discussed as a means of overcoming this (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). The focus of 
traditional resource scarcity theory, however, is largely on scarce financial capital 
(Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). This is an undeniably important aspect, but our Hayekian 
perspective shows that it is possible to further amend resource scarcity theory.
In those social ventures that operate according to a small-group logic, a key asset is 
social capital. People cooperate in the small group not (only) for pay, but because they 
share a common group identity and believe in the same mission (Kreutzer & Jager, 
2011). Like any other capital, social capital is scarce. Amending Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s 
(1969) resource scarcity theory, we suggest that social franchising can be a way of 
overcoming the scarcity of social capital. In fact, it is very difficult for a centrally oper-
ated organization to find, mobilize, or build up social capital when scaling an organi-
zation to, say, another city. In like vein, we argue that, similar to financial capital in 
commercial franchising, a social franchisee would be willing to start a subsidiary only 
if he or she were already familiar with the local environment, already involved in 
social networks, and thus able to institute the small-group logic from the start.
It is interesting that this argument is in line with two empirical findings about 
social franchising. First, social franchisees typically already run a local organization 
and use the franchise as a complement (Montagu, 2002). This implies that they have 
already built up social capital that can then be accessed to sustain a small-group set-
ting. Second, in a study by Zeyen and Beckmann (2011), almost all social entrepre-
neurs using social franchising reported that the franchisees had approached them 
proactively—thus indicating a strong self-selection effect.
In short, creating a separate small-group domain through social franchising can be 
an effective strategy for overcoming the problem of limited access to social capital. At 
the same time, it facilitates a self-selection process that helps social franchisors find 
qualified and motivated franchisees. Similarly, Chirico, Ireland, and Sirmon (2011) 
have suggested that the small-group “familiness” of family business can be an impor-
tant aspect for facilitating the matching process between family-run franchisors and 
franchisees.
Small groups and agency theory. In commercial franchising, agency theory is 
employed to study the difficulties that arise because of conflicts of interests between 
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franchisor and franchisee as both parties are considered self-interested and with con-
flicting private interests.
How can this agency perspective be transferred to social entrepreneurship? This is 
an interesting question because much of the literature on social entrepreneurship 
emphasizes that the social entrepreneur is not interested in personal gain but is moti-
vated by a strong social mission (e.g., Dees & Anderson, 2006). Thus, one could argue 
that a social franchise will not face the same principal–agent problems as commercial 
franchises.
We take a more nuanced perspective on agency problems in social franchising by 
differentiating between the narratives about social franchising and the actual underly-
ing incentives.
The founder of Dialogue Social Enterprise once stated that he does not run a fran-
chise but a “friendchise” (Heinecke, 2011). It is interesting that the very term friend-
chise strongly implies that the franchise system is characterized not by impersonal 
relations and formal rules but by personal relationships typical of the microcosm. In 
effect, Heinecke is stating that his franchise is built on friendship.
According to this narrative, social franchisor–franchisee relations follow a small-
group logic. And, indeed, Volery and Hackl’s (2010) empirical findings on social 
franchising seem to support this claim. They found that franchising contracts were 
rather short or covered only crude essentials (Volery & Hackl, 2010). This contract 
brevity is striking from an agency theory perspective. After all, these franchise sys-
tems often have complex high-quality products and considerable information asym-
metry. So, to limit opportunistic behavior, agency theory would predict that both 
parties would be willing to invest in relatively detailed contracts (Alchian & 
Woodward, 1988). Moreover, when considering the Dialogue Social Enterprise 
example, there are franchisees in 25 countries. How can such franchise systems work 
if the contracts are basic?
We suspect that the idea of friendchising is misleading if interpreted to mean that 
the franchise exclusively relies on the personal franchisor–franchisee relationship. No 
doubt, personal and even friendship-like relationships play a significant role in these 
networks; however, in a complex social franchise system, there is too little contact and 
too little transparency for the small-group coordination to be fully effective. In addi-
tion, such large franchising systems would be inherently instable if they rested primar-
ily on a friendship between the franchisor and the franchisees. What would happen if 
the franchisor became ill or left the organization?
We claim that the social franchise system has the potential to avoid opportunistic 
behavior, but not (only) because social franchisees and franchisors are per se close 
friends. Rather, we conjecture that the small-group logic within the local venture 
serves as a functional equivalent to detailed contracts between the franchisor and the 
franchisee. The argument is simple. If the “business model” of a social franchise 
hinges on mobilizing resources through a mission-driven small-group logic, then local 
employees, volunteers, and other supporters automatically act as strong control mech-
anisms. Endowed with local knowledge, they observe the franchisee’s behavior on a 
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daily basis. Moreover, they can also sanction any departure from the organization’s 
mission through the feedback mechanisms of “exit” or “voice” (Hirschman, 1970). As 
a means of articulating criticism, people can either exit an interaction context—that is, 
they may quit their jobs, stop buying the products, or terminate contracts with that 
organization—or voice their dissatisfaction by, for example, hosting protests or com-
plaining to the company.
Applying these options to a small-group social franchise, volunteers and other sup-
porters can sanction a mission abuse either by leaving the organization (exit) or by 
contacting the original franchisor (voice), hence ultimately threatening the venture’s 
survival. A Hayekian small-group logic may thus create strong self-monitoring effects 
for a social franchise. Note how different this situation is from commercial franchis-
ing. If a McDonald’s restaurant sold poor-quality burgers, the employees might not be 
happy about it, but few of them would want to report this breach of contact to the 
McDonald’s headquarters (voice) or would quit their job (job). Even if some did, they 
could be easily replaced. However, if a social franchisee violated important mission 
ethics, it would drastically erode its legitimacy and lose critical resources that cannot 
be easily replaced.
In other words, the small-group logic can solve both ex ante and ex post agency 
problems. For one, the small-group logic helps solve the ex ante problem of hidden 
characteristics and hidden intentions when recruiting franchisees. Because of the 
shared social mission, goal alignment can potentially be achieved more easily. After 
all, a nonprofit organization that applies to become a franchisee of another organiza-
tion in the same field of work (e.g., youth welfare) does so because it perceives both 
organizations’ goals to be similar or at least complementary.
Also, the small-group logic addresses the ex post problem of moral hazard and hid-
den action by establishing an effective self-monitoring mechanism that enjoys the 
lower sanctioning costs of the small group (North, 2005) by moving both monitoring 
and enforcement from the principal to local stakeholders. The essential element for 
avoiding and addressing principal–agent problems between the franchisor and the 
franchisee is, in other words, the small-group relationship between the franchisee and 
their local employees and volunteers, which acts as a functional equivalent to detailed 
contracts. This thus makes it easier for a big-group logic relation to evolve between the 
franchisor and the franchisee. The franchisor–franchisee relationship can then be rule 
based (contract based, more formal, and more anonymous) without compromising the 
motivation of volunteers or other essential small-group elements of the value creation 
model.
In short, replication of the small-group logic through social franchising can be an 
effective strategy for lowering agency costs. The stronger the small-group logic in the 
subsidiary, the lower the agency costs. This explains both the brevity of many social 
franchising contracts and Heinecke’s idea of friendchise. Given small-group logics, 
this somewhat idealistic-sounding narrative is not just a façade but is backed up by 
informal governance incentives.
In a final step, we now use the case of Wellcome to illustrate our arguments.
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An Illustrative Case Study: Wellcome
Wellcome is a German social venture founded in 2002 by Rose Volz-Schmidt. 
Wellcome’s objective is to support young mothers directly after birth to better cope 
with the emotional and logistical stress of having a completely different daily routine. 
In a way, Wellcome volunteers are substitutes for a role more traditionally played by 
the baby’s grandmothers or neighbors. As such, volunteers might watch the baby for 
an hour so that the mother can take a relaxing bath, share tips how to soothe the baby, 
or provide information about good pediatricians in the neighborhood. Volunteers stay 
in families for (usually) no longer than 6 weeks as this is the most turbulent time after 
birth. After 6 weeks, most new families have found their own routines and can cope 
on their own. It is important that Wellcome is not a substitute for youth welfare ser-
vices but taps into the gap of families that are not in “enough” trouble to be a case for 
youth welfare services but still struggle in their first weeks as parents. The service is 
available to all mothers (and fathers) and costs a small but affordable amount. In addi-
tion, Wellcome started offering a new service to families with financial problems 
called “families in distress.” Here, families receive financial aid from “godparents” 
who help them afford a new bike, pay the fees for the school outing, or refurnish the 
child’s bedroom. These financial supports are not long term but for specific small 
investments that the families, however, cannot afford themselves. The budget of 
Wellcome is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Composition of Wellcome’s 2012 budget of EUR1.4 million.
Source: Wellcome (2012).
Since 2002, the organization has expanded to more than 200 franchisees. The local 
Wellcome programs are embedded in existing social service delivery organizations 
that already deal with family issues (Wellcome, 2012). In 2011, Wellcome’s 2,335 
volunteers offered almost 60,000 hours of support to 3,332 families across 15 of the 
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16 federal German states. In comparison, in 2004, Wellcome had only 150 volunteers 
supporting 250 families in two states (Wellcome, 2012). This enormous increase in 
locations, volunteers, and supported families has been achieved through the mecha-
nism of social franchising.
Wellcome is an interesting example for demonstrating how social franchising can 
be used to separate and recombine elements of the two Hayekian logics. At its very 
heart, Wellcome is a volunteer organization that is firmly based in a small-group logic. 
In each Wellcome subsidiary, volunteers join with others who share the social mission 
to support young families in need of assistance. Furthermore, these women not only 
know each other personally, they also engage in peer coaching. They meet regularly to 
talk about their volunteer experience and discuss how they can better assist young 
mothers. The volunteers do not receive any remuneration; they work for Wellcome 
because they believe in its mission. A Wellcome group thus strongly builds on the 
small-group logic characterized by a shared mission, personal relationships, and fre-
quent face-to-face interaction.
How do you scale up such an organization to the national level? How do you mobi-
lize resources for expansion? How do you find and commit local partners and, above 
all, the volunteers who are essential for Wellcome’s work?
The case of Wellcome nicely shows how social franchising can be used to solve 
these problems. By partnering with local social service organizations as franchisees, 
Wellcome mobilizes not only financial capital but also, even more important, much 
needed social capital. Each franchisee brings in its social networks, local reputation, 
and the credibility needed to replicate the small-group logic in the local Wellcome 
subsidiaries.
Note, however, that the franchise system itself draws heavily on elements of a big-
group logic. The relationships within the franchise system are not between people but 
mostly between organizations. If a particular person leaves a local venture, the fran-
chising arrangement remains largely unaffected. The system thus does not rely on 
face-to-face contact—which Volz-Schmidt could hardly sustain with a total of 250 
local partners. Rather, the franchise partners coordinate their behavior through a set 
of general rules. These rules include following the guidelines on brand usage and 
service provision laid out in the contract, paying an annual fee of 500 Euro (see “own 
income in Figure 2”), and attending biannual trainings. Given this rule-connected 
governance model, Wellcome was able to detach its scaling efforts from the single 
small group, replicate its model widely, and increase its impact dramatically.
Just as we would expect for a small-group-based franchise system, Wellcome’s 
franchising contracts are brief and selective (Ahlert et al., 2008). More interesting, the 
franchising contract is strongly focused on defining the mission and establishing those 
rules that guarantee the small-group logic of the local subsidiary. Most notably, fran-
chisees must agree not to have more than 15 to 20 volunteers (Volz-Schmidt, 2011). If 
the number of volunteers exceeds this specification, they are split into two new groups. 
Keeping the group small not only makes coordination simpler but also ensures that all 
members will come to know each other, have the opportunity to actually engage in 
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volunteer work frequently, and interact regularly with each other. Moreover, peer 
coaching is mandated for each Wellcome subsidiary. In short, there are formal rules in 
the big-group logic contract that are specifically designed to protect the informal 
small-group logic of the local ventures.
The Wellcome franchise system is thus designed to strengthen and protect the 
small-group logic that serves as the very basis for its volunteer model. By so doing, it 
also addresses potential agency problems. In fact, the small size of each volunteer 
group and the principle of peer-coaching are effective mechanisms for ex ante self-
selection and ex post self-monitoring. The social franchise model is thus a highly 
effective way of replicating and safeguarding the small-group logic in Wellcome’s 
core service delivery. At the same time, it allows separating the small-group logic from 
more formal structures governing the big-group relations of a nationwide franchise 
system, thus clarifying expectations and minimizing friction.
The big-group logic is found not only in the franchisor-franchisee relationship but 
also between the Wellcome franchise and the new mothers. As mentioned earlier, the 
service is not free even though the volunteers are not paid. Having to pay for the ser-
vice means that more parents use the program as many, especially the well-educated, 
are more comfortable paying for a service than receiving help from child care authori-
ties (Volz-Schmidt, 2011). Employing the big-group logic of a priced service makes 
the program’s users market customers instead of problem cases.
In sum, Wellcome is able to spread quickly while protecting the small-group logic 
necessary to the effectiveness of its volunteer work. At the same time, these small 
groups help stabilize the big-group interactions between franchisor and franchisee. 
Moreover, Wellcome utilizes the big-group logic to reach even more new mothers than 
if it offered the services for free.
Implications and Concluding Remarks
In this article, we developed a Hayekian perspective on social franchising that distin-
guishes between the end-connected logic of the small group and the rule-connected 
logic of the big group. Our key claim is that mission-driven social entrepreneurs often 
draw on the small-group logic when starting their ventures and then face difficulties 
when the process of scaling shifts their operation toward a big-group logic. In this 
situation, social franchising offers a strategy to replicate the small group despite sys-
temwide scaling, to mobilize decentrally accessible social capital, and to reduce 
agency costs through mechanisms of self-selection and self-monitoring.
This perspective has some interesting implications but is not without its limitations. 
First, our argument implies that the more strongly the small-group logic characterizes 
the core of a social entrepreneurship “business model,” the larger the benefits of social 
franchising. However, this argument is applicable only if the mission-driven small-
group logic is critical for the actual production of the venture’s goods and services. 
This could be the case where volunteers carry the business model or where key benefi-
ciaries of the social venture contribute to the team production with Hirschman options. 
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If, however, the production of a social venture does not necessarily hinge on a small-
group logic, our argument for the benefits of social franchising is not just inapplicable; 
rather, social franchising might even be counterproductive. Take the case of micro-
credits. Could micro-credits be provided by an organization that does not build on a 
mission-driven small-group logic? The existence of for-profit micro-lenders shows 
they can indeed. In this situation, franchising the Grameen brand to third organizations 
without significant contractual control mechanisms would be highly risky: It could 
attract franchisees who are in it only for the money and who would exploit not only the 
Grameen brand but also poor borrowers.
Second, if the small-group logic is important for the very operating model of a 
social venture, then scaling can be achieved by means of franchising that specifically 
strengthens the small-group logic in each local venture. As a policy recommendation 
for practitioners, franchising contracts—though still limited in length and complexity—
could systematically include one or several of the following elements: (a) limitations 
on the size of the local group, (b) making peer-monitoring and peer-coaching elements 
mandatory, (c) increasing transparency and strengthening mechanisms for voice, and 
(d) investing in storytelling, shared branding, and so on to foster group identity and 
provide focal points for best-practice standards. In short, the idea is to use the formal 
big-group logic franchise system to promote the informal small-group logic on the 
ground. By doing so, it might help social ventures or nonprofit organizations to over-
come conflicts of different identities (Kreutzer & Jager, 2011). In addition, such con-
tracts would support the “grassroots” link (Foreman, 1999) and provide governance 
structures to protect them.
Third, we believe we have answered the question of why so many successful social 
entrepreneurs seem to prefer social franchising to wholly owned subsidiaries or open-
source forms of replication. With regard to the former, social franchising allows social 
entrepreneurs to avoid the problem of strong intraorganizational growth threatening its 
small-group logic mechanisms of motivation and coordination. With regard to the lat-
ter, social franchising offers the advantage of setting succinct but effective standards 
for safeguarding the small-group logic and thus exerting a limited, yet sufficient 
degree of control.
Given our still limited knowledge about social franchising, these implications 
are necessarily preliminary, but they point out many avenues for future research. 
For example, our argument suggests that social franchising is not the optimal strat-
egy for every social venture. To test and refine our claims, empirical research could 
look into what types of social ventures choose social franchising as a successful 
scaling strategy and analyze whether this correlates to specific small-group logic 
business models. This line of work would also open rich opportunities to more 
closely link research on social franchising with the discussion about the differences 
and similarities between social and business entrepreneurship. Moreover, it could 
be of great interest to nonprofit and volunteer research to investigate social fran-
chising as a specific social context in the often underresearched volunteer experi-
ence (Wilson, 2012).
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Notes
1. As Hayek (1988) argues, 
Part of our present difficulty is that we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts 
and our emotions, in order to live simultaneously within different kinds of orders 
according to different rules. If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed, rules of the 
micro-cosmos (i.e., of the small band or troop, or of, say, our families) to the micro-
cosmos (our wider civilization), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make 
us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were always to apply the rules of the 
extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. So we must learn 
to live in two sorts of world at once. (p. 18)
2. Similar yet slightly different ideas are discussed in the literature on reciprocity and coop-
eration. See, for example, Bowles and Gintis (2011) for an interesting discussion.
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ABSTRACT 
Despite the increasing popularity of social franchising to scale social enterprises, 
there has been little research on this topic. We further social franchising research through 
three key contributions. First, we argue that the general applicability of agency theory to 
social franchises is limited as the psychological and situational characteristics underlying 
the relationship between actors differ from traditional principal-agent relationships. To 
address this gap we distinguish different types of (social) franchises based on the 
franchisee’s and franchisor’s dominant motivation. Second, we apply stewardship theory 
as an alternative approach to explain the previously identified types of social franchising. 
To connect to two major aspects in existing franchising literature, selection and 
management, we draw on the psychological factors of stewardship theory to explain 
selection and use the situational factors to explain management in social franchising. 
Third, we extend stewardship theory by pointing towards stewardship costs that help to 
understand limitations of social franchising in scaling social innovations. 
Keywords: Social franchising, stewardship theory, stewardship cost 
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INTRODUCTION 
As former US president Bill Clinton once said, “nearly every problem has been 
solved by someone, somewhere. The challenge […] is to find out what works and scale it 
up.” (Ashoka, 2013). Social franchising is an increasingly popular strategy of social 
enterprises to scale social innovations as it allows social enterprises to grow more rapidly 
and less resource-intensively than via branching but facilitates better quality control than 
dissemination (e.g. Ahlert et al., 2008; Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Dees, Anderson, & 
Wei-Skillen, 2004; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012; Lyon & Fernandez, 2012). Similar to 
commercial franchising (Combs, Ketchen, & Short, 2011), social enterprises use 
franchising by licensing the right to use a brand name, a business format, and / or 
products or services to a franchisee (Montagu, 2002).1 However, social enterprises differ 
from conventional businesses by combining the social mission of charity and non-profit-
organizations (NPOs) with financial self-sustainability of conventional businesses 
(Defourney & Nyssens, 2010; Thompson & Doherty, 2006; Wilson & Post, 2011).  
Despite its increasing importance and popularity in practice, there has been little 
research on social franchising (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 
2007). While existing research has generated important insights into understanding social 
franchising, we see three gaps in the literature that we aim to contribute to with this 
paper. 
First, existing social franchising research has largely drawn on the same 
economic assumptions and theories as commercial franchising literature, mainly agency 
theory (see e.g., Kistruck et al., 2011 and Tracey & Jarvis, 2007 for social franchising 
research and e.g.,Combs et al., 2011 and Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004 for 
commercial franchising research). Agency theory is based on specific economic 
assumptions about human behavior such as self-interested, profit maximizing, motivated 
by external incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and explains franchising based on 
financial ownership incentives of the franchisee (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the 
general applicability of these assumptions to social franchises is limited as the 
psychological characteristics underlying the behavior of actors and situational 
characteristics underlying the relationship between actors differ in social enterprises. For 
example, social enterprises usually strive to maximize social not economic value (Austin 
et al., 2006), making it less attractive for actors whose psychological characteristics are 
based on a self-serving nature and an extrinsic motivation. This is also reflected in 
situational characteristics such as social enterprise’s use of legal arrangements that 
deliberately suppress financial ownership incentives by making profit reinvestment 
mandatory (e.g. Defourney & Nyssens, 2010; Yunus & Weber, 2010). As a consequence, 
explaining behavior in social franchises focusing on psychological and situational 
characteristics of agency theory is limited. To address this gap in the literature we 
distinguish different types of (social) franchises based on the franchisee’s and 
franchisor’s dominant motivation. We then delineate them from commercial franchising, 
and identify those types of social franchising that are least conducive to the application of 
the behavioral assumptions of agency theory and thus, most conducive to the application 
of different theoretical assumptions. This hitherto neglected distinction between different 
                                               
1 We describe two examples of social enterprises that use franchising to grow, Dialogue Social Enterprise and 
Specialisterne, in the Appendix. We use those examples throughout the paper to underpin the plausibility of our 
theoretical arguments. 
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types of (social) franchising is important to avoid treating similar yet different 
phenomena with the same theory.  
Our second contribution to the literature is to apply stewardship theory as an 
alternative approach to explain the previously identified types of social franchising. 
There are no studies applying stewardship theory to franchising or social franchising 
despite its particular suitability to address the “social” aspect of social franchising due to 
its behavioral assumptions of self-actualizing and collective-serving (Davis, Schoorma, 
& Donaldson, 1997; Hernandez, 2012). On top, it represents a complementary 
perspective to agency theory to explain the “franchising” aspects of social franchising 
(Caers et al., 2006). To connect two major aspects in existing franchising literature, 
partner selection and franchise management,2 we draw on the psychological factors of 
stewardship theory to explain partner selection and use the situational factors to explain 
franchise management in those types of social franchising that we identified in the 
previous step. We respond to a call by Tracey and Jarvis (2007) who critically discuss the 
application of agency theory to social franchising and encourage fresh theoretical 
perspectives that make use of different i.e. non-economic behavioral assumptions.  
Our third contribution aims at extending stewardship theory by pointing towards 
associated costs, which we term stewardship costs, that help to understand limitations of 
social franchising in scaling social innovations. To our knowledge, the concept of 
stewardship costs has so far been neglected in stewardship theory, which merely focuses 
on its potentially performance enhancing features (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Seelos & 
Mair, 2005). Although mutual stewardship relationships have the potential to maximize 
performance (Davis et al., 1997), focusing on the benefits only risk neglecting relevant 
costs that occur in every transaction (Arrow, 1969; Williamson, 1998) Thus, we identify 
potential stewardship costs that can reduce the performance potential of such 
relationships in social franchising and inhibit their scaling process. While, for example, 
agency costs result from weak goal alignment (Caers et al., 2006), we claim that 
stewardship costs are rooted in the psychological and situational factors of stewardship in 
situations of strong goal alignment. 
We develop our argument in the following four steps. 
First, we define social enterprise and social franchising and provide a brief overview of 
existing literature. In a second step, we use the concept of mutual stewardship 
relationships by Davis et al. (1997) to distinguish different types of (social) franchises 
and identify non-beneficiary social franchising as most conducive to the applications of 
stewardship theory. Third, to develop propositions we draw on the psychological factors 
of stewardship theory to explain partner selection and partner selection costs and use the 
situational factors of stewardship theory to explain franchise management and franchise 
management costs of non-beneficiary social franchising. To illustrate the plausibility of 
our arguments we will use two examples of non-beneficiary social franchising 
throughout the paper. Fourth, we discuss implications of our theoretical framework. We 
                                               
2 With the term partner selection we refer to the process of the franchisor’s and the franchisee’s mutual selection. 
Agency theory has focused on the franchisor’s selection of franchisees (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007) while stewardship 
perspecitves emphasize that selection is a mutual process (Chirico et al., 2011). With the term management we 
refer to what is described as control of franchisees by franchisors in agency theory. However, as stewardship 
proposes an involvementoriented instead of control oriented management philosophy, we use the term 
management as it is neutral (Davis, et al., 1997).  
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point to potential future research avenues in the fields of social franchising, commercial 
franchising and stewardship theory.  
SOCIAL FRANCHISING 
Social Enterprise and Social Franchising Defined 
We define social enterprises as organizations that follow a business approach to 
achieve a social mission. While there is an ongoing debate regarding the exact 
specificities of a social enterprise3 (e.g. Defourney & Nyssens, 2010; Kerlin, 2012), most 
researchers agree that the social mission and the business approach taken to achieve it are 
the main key features of social enterprises (Buckingham, Pinch, & Sunley, 2010; Clark & 
Ucak, 2006; Dees & Anderson, 2006; Di Domenico, 2009; Herranz, Council, & McKay, 
2011; Mair & Martí, 2006; Peredo & McLean, 2006; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). We 
distinguish social enterprises from other organization types based on their business 
approach. Social enterprises differ from the traditional nonprofit organization by using 
commercial activities such as selling goods or services to customers to generate the 
majority of their income rather than by collecting donations or grants (Yunus & Weber, 
2010). Social enterprises differ from conventional businesses by deliberately suppressing 
financial ownership incentives. Particularly, they prohibit or greatly limit the possibility 
of dividend payments and make profit reinvestment into the enterprise or the mission 
mandatory (e.g. Thompson & Doherty, 2006). These governance mechanisms serve to 
direct as much financial value as possible into achieving the social objective (Yunus, 
2007). By making profit reinvestment mandatory, the social mission becomes the focal 
point (Schelling, 1960) of the organization. As a result, owners and investors are not 
incentivized by potential financial gains but by the creation of social value through, for 
example, job creation for disadvantaged or disabled people (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2006; Zadek & Thake, 1997).  
Increasingly, social enterprises use franchising to scale their operations (Ahlert et 
al., 2008; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012; Kistruck et al., 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). The 
concept of social franchising is a derivative of the franchising concept found in 
conventional business (Montagu, 2002). Franchising is generally defined as one firm (the 
franchisor) selling “the right to market goods or services under its brand name and using 
its business practices to a second firm” (Combs et al., 2004, p. 907) or an individual (the 
franchisee). We follow the legal definition by the US Federal Trade Commission that 
includes three criteria to identify franchising (Lafontaine & Blair, 2009). Thus, an 
enterprise uses franchising when (1a) it licenses a trademark or trade name that the 
franchisees operate under or (1b) the franchisees sell products or services recognized by 
this trademark; (2) it significantly controls or assists the franchisee over or during their 
operations; and (3) it receives a fee of at least US$ 500 within the first six months.4  
                                               
3 There are also various terms for the same or similar types of business in the literature such as social purpose 
business (e.g., Cooney, 2010), social purpose business venture (Hockerts, 2006), for-profit social ventures (Clark 
& Ucak, 2006), social enterpreneurial organization (Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012), or social enterprise (e.g. 
Defourney & Nyssens, 2010). While these organizations vary in the specificities of their design, all strive to 
achieve a social mission as their core objective and mainly do so through generating a profit (e.g. Haugh, 2006; 
Yunus & Weber, 2010). We use the term social enterprise as it is the most commonly used term.  
4 Although this distinction is based on US-American jurisdiction, other countries such as the European Union 
member states apply similar criteria to distinguish franchise systems from other networks (Lafontaine & Blair, 
2009) 
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Review of Social Franchising Literature 
Despite its increasing popularity in practice and importance as organizational 
form, there has been little research on social franchising (Kistruck et al., 2011; Tracey & 
Jarvis, 2007). A large proportion of social franchising research investigated the impact of 
social franchising on the welfare of their beneficiaries, communities, or society in general 
(e.g., Beyeler, York De La Cruz, & Montagu, 2013; Koehlmoos, Gazi, Hossain, & 
Zaman, 2009; Lönnroth, Aung, Maung, Kluge, & Uplekar, 2007; Ngo, Alden, Phan, & 
Phan, 2010), while only a few papers studied social franchising as organizational form 
and investigated the relationship between franchisee and franchisor (e.g. Beckmann & 
Zeyen, 2014; Kistruck et al., 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007; Volery & Hackl, 2010). Our 
paper contributes to the latter stream of research.  
Existing social franchising research has largely drawn on the same economic 
assumptions and theories as conventional commercial franchising literature, mainly 
agency theory. Applying agency theory some researchers came to the conclusion that 
agency problems are more prevalent in social franchising than in commercial franchising 
(Kistruck et al., 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). For example, studying the failure of the 
UK social franchise “Aspire Group”, Tracey & Jarvis (2007) state that “social venture 
franchising is not liable to lead to goal alignment, and may actually encourage goal 
asymmetry” (2007, p. 680) between the franchisor and franchisee. Similarly, Kistruck et 
al. (2011, p. 514) identified “opportunistic behavior and costs associated with monitoring 
and enforcement of the microfranchising relationship [as] a significant challenge to the 
microfranchisor and to the profitability and scalability of the overall model” in their 
study of microfranchising in developing countries across different industries. Contrarily, 
for example, Beckmann & Zeyen (2014) suggested that agency problems are similarly 
present but are dealt with differently in social franchising by pulling apart the small 
group logic of personal interaction from the large group interaction of contracts while 
Volery & Hackl (2010) suggested that agency problems are less important in social 
franchising due to trust between actors.  
While existing research has generated important insights into understanding 
social franchising as organizational form, the applicability of economic assumptions and 
theories in the context of social enterprises is questionable (e.g. Kistruck et al., 2011; 
Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). For example, Tracey and Jarvis (2007, p. 680) state that “Both 
resource scarcity and agency theories can be criticized for their one-sided focus on the 
franchisor, and their narrow assumptions about human behavior, i.e., self-interested, 
profit maximizing, motivated by external incentives, and engaged in arms’-length 
relationships. […] Other frameworks that draw on a range of behavioral assumptions 
[…] may provide fruitful lines of inquiry for future theorizing about social venture 
franchising.” To address this gap in the literature we identify those types of (social) 
franchises that are least conducive to the application of the behavioral assumptions of 
agency theory, delineate them from other types of social franchises as well as from 
commercial franchising and – following Tracey and Jarvis’ call – suggest stewardship 
theory as an alternative approach to explain social franchising.  
To our knowledge there are no studies applying stewardship theory to franchising 
or social franchising5. Stewardship theory has been prominent in studies on family firms 
                                               
5
 One exception is the study by McCuddy, Pinar, Zeliha, & Bahar (2011). However, the authors address the 
ethical theory of stewardship, which differs from stewardship theory discussed in management literature.  
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(Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010; Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, & Scholnick, 2007), while studies on family firm franchising have drawn on 
stewardship-akin concepts such as ‘familiness’ (e.g. Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2011). 
Although ‘familiness’ is coherent with stewardship behavior as both rely on long-term 
orientation, collective identity, and strong commitment to common values (Chirico et al., 
2011; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), it does not cover the whole range of 
psychological and situational variables of stewardship theory to explain social 
franchising. To address this gap in the literature we draw on the psychological factors of 
stewardship theory to explain partner selection and use the situational factors to explain 
franchise management in those types of social franchising that we identified in the 
previous step.  
Moreover, the majority of studies on the effects of stewardship behavior or 
familiness in firm management stress its positive influence on performance (Davis et al., 
2010; Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). Although some studies 
found stewardship to have mixed performance results (Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009), 
most emphasize that stewardship behavior enables firms to leverage reduced agency 
costs in order to increase performance (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004). As a consequence, existing research has neglected potential costs in 
stewardship relationships. To address this gap in the literature, we identify costs in the 
mutual stewardship relationship in social franchising, which we term stewardship costs.  
STEWARDSHIP RELATIONSHIPS IN SOCIAL FRANCHISING 
To develop accurate predictions in the next section, in this section we identify 
situations of (social) franchising that are most conducive to the occurrence of 
stewardship behavior. In stewardship theory, actors are conceptualized as stewards who 
are characterized as self-actualizing and collective-serving individuals whose relationship 
with their principal is dominated by goal alignment rather than goal conflict (Davis et al., 
1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1989, 1991; Hernandez, 2012). While most individuals will 
exhibit a mixture of self-serving behavior as prescribed by agency theory and self-
actualizing, collective serving behavior as prescribed by stewardship theory, we will 
conceptualize human behavior as either more self-serving or more collective serving to 
develop meaningful propositions. The relationship between franchisee and franchisor is 
determined by their predominant motivation. In case both act our agency behavior, a 
mutual agency relationship develops, while a mutual stewardship relationship emerges 
when both behave as stewards. If, however, one party acts out stewardship behavior 
while the other party acts out agency behavior a mixed-motive (i.e., agent-steward) 
relationship develops, which will be prone to opportunism (Davis et al., 1997) (quadrant 
II and III). The table below illustrates how we distinguish different types of franchises 
based on different behavioral assumptions of franchisor and franchisee. 
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TABLE 1: SYSTEMATIZATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
FRANCHISING 
 Franchisor’s dominant behavior 
Self-actualizing and 
collective serving 
Economic and self-serving 
Franchisee’s 
dominant 
behavior 
Self-actualizing 
and collective 
serving 
I 
Social franchising, when 
franchisee is not beneficiary 
 
Mutual Stewardship 
Relationship  
 
Predominantly Stewardship 
Costs/Problems 
 
Our study, examples are 
DSE and Specialisterne 
III 
Does not occur as a stable 
situation 
 
Mixed-Motive Relationship 
 
Both Agency & 
Stewardship 
Costs/Problems 
Economic and 
self-serving 
II 
Social franchising, when 
franchisee is beneficiary 
 
Mixed-Motive Relationship 
 
Both Agency & 
Stewardship Costs/Problems 
 
e.g., Kistruck et al. 2011 
IV 
Traditional literature on 
commercial franchising  
 
Mutual Agency 
Relationship 
 
Predominantly Agency 
Costs/Problems 
 
e.g., Combs et al., 2011 
 
Based on our definition of social enterprise, we assume that social franchisors are 
more strongly self-actualizing and collective-serving than self-serving as they are 
deliberately willing to accept low financial compensation and bear entrepreneurial risks 
while pursuing a social mission aimed at benefiting poor or otherwise disadvantaged 
people (Brooks, 2008; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012; Weerawardena & Mort, 2006) 
(quadrant I and II in Table 1). It is tempting to assume that all social franchisees are 
rather collective serving as well, as they, too, pursue the social mission of the franchise 
organization and accept low financial compensation. However, the behavior of the social 
franchisee will depend on their predominant motivation for becoming a social franchisee. 
Social franchisees that rely more strongly on extrinsic economic rewards such as job 
creation and poverty alleviation are more likely to behave rather self-serving, while 
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franchisees that rely less on economic rewards and often resign from their better-paid 
jobs in order to serve others are more likely to behave in a collective serving way. 
Usually, social franchisees who benefit economically from being a franchisee are 
beneficiaries of the franchise.6 For example, Kistruck and colleagues (2011) investigated 
microfranchises across different industries at the base-of-the-pyramid (BOP) in which the 
franchisees were the poor and disadvantaged people that the franchisors were “seeking to 
help” (Kistruck et al., 2011, p. 514). In this example, the micro-franchisees were the 
beneficiaries of the franchise (quadrant II). In case social franchisees are less motivated 
by economic rewards and more strongly motivated by self-actualization, franchisees are 
usually not beneficiaries but employ beneficiaries in their outlet or serve them as 
customers. Examples for these types of franchises (quadrant I) are Dialogue Social 
Enterprise (DSE), a German-based social enterprise that employs blind people to work as 
guides in their dark exhibitions and Specialisterne, headquartered in Denmark, that 
employs people with autism and utilizes their special abilities and attention to detail to 
offer services such as software testing to IT companies (Dialogue in the Dark India, 
2013; Heinecke & Sonne, 2012; Specialisterne, 2013a). At DSE and Specialisterne 
franchisees are not beneficiaries of the franchise (i.e., they are not blind or autistic 
people) but employ them (INSEAD, 2010).7 
This distinction is important as the predominant motivation of the social 
franchisee determines the type the relationship between social franchisor and social 
franchisee. While mixed-motive relationships and opportunistic behavior in social 
franchises more likely develop in social franchises with beneficiary franchisees (quadrant 
II) – as reported by Kistruck and colleagues (2011) – mutual stewardship relationships in 
social franchising more likely emerge in social franchises with non-beneficiary 
franchisees (quadrant I).  
Based on our definition of social enterprise, we do not consider franchises as 
social franchises if the franchisor prioritizes self-serving over collective-serving behavior 
(quadrant III and IV). Most commercial franchising research has conceptualized 
franchisees and franchisors are rather economically motivated and self-serving (Combs et 
al., 2011) (quadrant IV) and successfully applied agency theory to explain their 
relationship. A situation where the franchisor prioritizes commercial over social 
objectives while the franchisees are more strongly behaving in a collective-serving way 
(quadrant III) represents a mixed-motive relationship situation conducive to opportunism 
(Davis et al., 1997). We, thus, conclude that such a situation does not represent a stable 
relationship. However, as with quadrant III relationships, it can occur as a result of, for 
example, mission drift (see Jones, 2007) when social franchises start off as a quadrant I 
relationship but the franchisor’s focus shifts from a dominant collective-serving to a 
dominant economic behavior due to situations of financial hardship or through the 
influence of new investors with finance-first motivation. With due care, the conflicts at 
and the eventual demise of the social franchise Aspire as reported by Tracey & Jarvis 
(2007) can be interpreted as a social franchise that developed from a quadrant I to a 
quadrant III relationship.  
As the development of a mutual stewardship relationship is most likely in social 
franchises with non-beneficiary franchisees (quadrant I), the focus of this paper will thus 
                                               
6 While the franchisee’s role as beneficiary does not allow a perfect a perfect assessment the underlying 
motivation, it is a reasonably reliable and empirically observable proxy.  
7 See a more detailed description of those exmaples in the Appendix. 
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be the development of stewardship (cost) theory propositions for those types of social 
franchises.  
A STEWARDSHIP COST THEORY OF SOCIAL FRANCHISING 
Partner selection and franchise management are the two key aspects of interest in 
franchising (Combs et al., 2011). To connect to existing franchising, in this section we 
apply stewardship theory to explain partner selection and franchise management and 
their associated costs in non-beneficiary social franchises. We draw on the psychological 
factors of stewardship theory – motivation (by higher order needs and intrinsic), 
identification (with organization and values), and personal power – to explain 
stewardship selection and selection costs in social franchising. To decide whether 
franchisee and franchisor can enter a relationship, identifying each other’s characteristics, 
motivation and values are important. The situational factors of stewardship theory – 
management philosophy (involvement orientation) and culture (collectivism and low 
power distance) – become crucial once franchisee and franchisor have entered a mutual 
stewardship relationship. The way in which franchisee and franchisor interact is 
determined by the management philosophy and culture in the franchise network. 
Accordingly, we draw on the situational variables to explain stewardship franchise 
management and franchise management costs in social franchising. We illustrate the 
plausibility of our propositions with anecdotal evidence from social franchise examples 
such as Dialogue Social Enterprises (DSE) and Specialisterne.  
Stewardship Selection in Social Franchising  
Stewardship theory poses that the motivation of stewards is intrinsic and based on 
higher order needs such as “self-efficacy, self-determination, and feelings of purpose” 
(Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012), while identification with the organization occurs 
when being a member of an organization becomes an important defining characteristic of 
the steward. It can be triggered by identifying with the organization’s values, mission, 
and objectives as well as with the people who lead, work for or are associated with the 
organization. As opposed to institutional power that is based on a person’s position in the 
organization, personal power as prevalent in stewardship relationships is grounded on 
expertise of and reverence for a person (Davis et al., 1997).  
Applying stewardship theory to partner selection suggests that intrinsic 
motivation to pursue the social enterprise’s mission, identification between franchisor 
and franchisee, and personal power are important psychological characteristics for the 
development of a mutual stewardship relationship (Davis et al., 1997). While intrinsic 
motivation refers to the support of an enterprise’s mission in general – i.e., ‘what’ to do –
, identification relates to the agreement with how a particular organization or person 
pursues the mission – i.e., ‘how’ they do it (see similarly Volery & Hackl, 2010). The 
franchisee’s intrinsic motivation to pursue the franchisor’s social mission – i.e., ‘what’ to 
do – is important because social franchises have limited financial resources to incentivize 
their franchisees extrinsically when franchisees are not beneficiaries (Tracey & Jarvis, 
2007). As a consequence, they need to select intrinsically motivated franchisees that 
serve the mission without the requirement of additional incentives. Intrinsic motivation in 
stewardship relationships relies on psychological ownership (Hernandez, 2012), a “state 
of mind in which an individual feels as though the target of ownership or a piece of it is 
‘theirs’” (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003, p. 86) which develops independently of 
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financial or legal ownership status (Hernandez, 2012). Offering financial incentives may 
even crowd out the steward’s intrinsic motivation under certain circumstances (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2007). Thus, we argue that 
the dominance of psychological over material ownership in social enterprises and 
franchises is reflected by the situational characteristics of deliberately suppressing 
financial ownership incentives (Yunus & Weber, 2010). For example, during selection, 
Specialisterne tries to understand how the potential franchisee is personally affected by 
the social problem e.g. being a family member of an autistic person. In turn, the 
franchisor, too, reveals her personal motivation and history (Heinecke & Sonne, 2012). 
Thus, the franchisee’s intrinsic motivation to follow the franchisor’s social mission – i.e., 
‘what’ to do – is an important selection criterion in social franchising with non-
beneficiary franchisees. 
However, intrinsic motivation is not sufficient for successful mutual selection 
between franchisor and franchisee, as the franchisee may not identify with the 
franchisor’s approach to solve the social problem – i.e., ‘how’ to do it (Chirico et al., 
2011). Identification occurs when being a member of an organization becomes an 
important defining characteristic of the franchisee (Hernandez, 2012; Klein, Molloy, & 
Brinsfield, 2012). While identification can be triggered by identifying with the 
organization’s values, mission, and objectives (Klein et al., 2012), identification in social 
franchising often focuses on a charismatic leader (see similar Miller et al., 2007). Thus, 
perceived personal power of the franchisor facilitates identification of the social 
franchisee with the social franchisor. Failure to identify with each other will likely inhibit 
mutual selection even if both franchisee and franchisor have the same high level of 
intrinsic motivation. For example, after almost one year of negotiation, the potential 
franchisee of Specialisterne’s first unit in Germany decided to establish his own social 
enterprise employing people with autism because he eventually did not identify with 
Specialisterne’s values and approach (Müller-Remus, 2012). In sum, the weaker 
franchisee benefits extrinsically the more both intrinsic motivation – i.e., ‘what’ to do – 
and identification with how a particular organization or person pursues the mission – i.e., 
‘how’ they do it (see similarly Volery & Hackl, 2010) become important. We thus posit: 
Proposition 1: The weaker the extrinsic benefits of the franchisee, the more 
important are intrinsic motivation, identification between franchisor and 
franchisee, and personal power of the franchisor as partner selection criteria. 
Stewardship Selection Costs in Social Franchising 
Selecting franchisees with a strong personal commitment to the business reduces 
opportunistic behavior and thus agency costs (Jambulingam, Joseph, & Nevin, 1999). 
However, we argue that the reduction in agency costs leads to an increase in stewardship 
costs during selection (i.e., ex-ante) and as a result of the selection process (i.e., ex-post).  
Ex-ante stewardship selection costs 
Usually, franchisors draw on various criteria to select franchisees, such as 
financial background, previous work experience, local knowledge, and personality 
(Clarkin & Swavely, 2006; Jambulingam et al., 1999). While some criteria such as 
financial background and track record can be evaluated objectively and based on facts, 
personal motivation and identification require more intuitive assessment. More 
importantly, while intrinsic motivation for the cause is usually pre-existing in our 
scenario, identification between franchisor and franchisee and the perception of personal 
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power need considerable time to develop and are a dynamic, complex and interactive 
process (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008). To determine intrinsic motivation as well 
as develop identification and a perception of personal power, both franchisee and 
franchisor have to get to know each other’s values, personal history, and character 
through repeated personal meetings (Volery & Hackl, 2010). For example, at Dialogue 
Social Enterprises, it usually takes an average of 2 years from the first contact until the 
contract is signed (Heinecke & Sonne, 2012). Moreover, out of 20 requests from 
potential franchisees only one or two outlets are eventually established (INSEAD, 2010). 
To discourage not truly motivated individuals, Andreas Heinecke, founder of DSE, 
characterizes himself as ‘the worst salesman’ because he reveals the most unpleasant 
facts in the very first meetings with potential franchisees (Volery & Hackl, 2010).  
Identification and the perception of personal power in the stewardship 
relationship have to be established between the person of the franchisor and the 
franchisee and cannot easily be delegated. Thus, the selection process in social franchises 
will be time and resource intensive and will, as a consequence, slow down the growth of 
the social franchise (Heinecke & Mayer, 2012). For example, established as a franchise 
in 1995 (INSEAD, 2010), in 2013 DSE operates 20 permanent exhibitions worldwide. 
While the two locations in Germany, the headquarter in Hamburg and the Frankfurt 
outlet, are company-owned, the remaining 18 outlets are franchised (Dialogue Social 
Enterprises, 2013). Thus, DSE has since grown by approximately one unit per year, 
while Specialisterne is growing at an even slower rate despite following an active growth 
strategy (Specialisterne, 2013b) and enjoying global media coverage. Founded in 2004, 
Specialisterne currently operates two locations in Denmark, six in other European 
countries, and one in the United States (Specialisterne, 2013a). Thus, ex ante stewardship 
selection costs emerge primarily as opportunity costs of delayed growth of the social 
franchise. We thus propose: 
Proposition 2: The more important intrinsic motivation, identification between 
franchisor and franchisee, and personal power of the franchisor are as partner 
selection criteria, the slower the growth of the franchise. 
Ex-post stewardship selection costs 
While identification between intrinsically motivated franchisees and franchisors 
increases the likelihood of successful mutual selection and decreases the risk of 
opportunistic behavior, it can have dysfunctional effects when overemphasized (Sluss & 
Ashforth, 2007). This “over-identification” can lead to the suppression of certain 
behaviors when identification is strong (Katz & Genevay, 2002) i.e., the franchisor or 
franchisee fails to see their counterpart’s lack of necessary knowledge or capabilities. For 
example, one aspect in the failure of Aspire, a UK-based social franchise that provided 
employment and housing for the homeless, was the fact that the charismatic personality 
of one of the founder’s, Harrod, obscured flaws in the business model and led investors 
and franchisees to invest although first issues had already become apparent (Tracey & 
Jarvis, 2007). Thus, over-identification increases the risk of selecting a “wrong” partner. 
While the negative effects of selecting a wrong partner despite everyone’s honest efforts, 
may be indistinguishable from the negative effects of adverse selection due to 
opportunism, they are conceptually different (Hendry, 2002). The important difference is 
that wrong partner selection due to over-identification is not based on a combination of 
opportunism and information asymmetry but on a psychological dysfunction leading to a 
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selective information processing and perception (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) leading to 
different managerial implications.  
We hence propose: 
Proposition 3: There is an inverted u-shape relationship between the strength of 
identification between franchisee and franchisor and partner selection success. 
Stewardship Management in Social Franchising 
Management in stewardship relationships is involvement oriented instead of 
control oriented and is characterized by participation and shared leadership practices, 
collaborative communication, empowerment, and trust (Hernandez, 2012; Meek, Davis-
Sramek, Baucus, & Germain, 2011). Furthermore, collective responsibility for outcomes 
is achieved through autonomy, self-inspection and self-management and ensures high 
quality outcomes (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012). While control orientation is 
more suitable if short-term cost control and productivity are important, involvement 
oriented management is preferable to achieve long-term effectiveness and performance 
enhancement (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012). As stewards are conceptualized as 
collective-serving and other-regarding (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012), a 
collectivistic organizational culture that emphasizes organizational membership and 
harmony among members is more favorable for the development of stewardship 
relationships than an individualistic organizational culture (Hofstede, 1980). Another 
aspect of culture in stewardship relationships is organizational power distance (Hofstede, 
1980). Due to the collectivistic sociology and the motivational aspects, stewardship 
relationships are facilitated by a low power distance organizational culture, which usually 
favors decentralized organization and shared leadership (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 
2012).  
Applying stewardship theory to franchise management suggests that involvement 
orientation and a collectivistic and low power distance organizational culture are 
important situational characteristics for maintaining a mutual stewardship relationship 
(Davis et al., 1997). As identification between franchisee and franchisor are central to 
establishing a mutual stewardship relationship in social franchising with non-beneficiary 
franchisees, maintaining the level of identification is key to maintaining a mutual 
stewardship relationship.  
In a mutual stewardship relationship, it is counterproductive to control and 
monitor franchisees. “When stewards are controlled as if they were agents, they cannot 
enjoy the types of internal rewards they desire (i.e. growth, achievement, or self-
actualization), and as a result, they may engage in anti-organizational behaviors (Argyris, 
1964).” (Davis et al., 1997). Instead, involvement-oriented franchise management relying 
on participation, open communication, and trust is more suitable when franchisees are 
more intrinsically motivated (Davis et al., 1997). Thus, contractual agreements become 
less important in managing the social franchise system than social relationships between 
franchisor and franchisees. In effect, contracts are usually less detailed (Volery & Hackl, 
2010). For example, in their contract with franchisees DSE merely requires that the 
exhibition must be in total darkness, that visitors need to pay entrance fees, and that the 
guides must be severely visually impaired or blind citizens (Volery & Hackl, 2010).  
Stewardship relationships are conceptualized by a collectivistic organizational 
culture in which the success of the group is more important than individual success 
(Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012; Hofstede, 1980). This collectivistic nature in social 
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franchising is represented by the franchisor’s and the franchisee’s commitment to serve 
their beneficiaries. Within the social franchise network a collectivistic orientation is 
reflected by individual adjustments to fees and royalty rates in order to support weaker 
members of the franchise system. In the past, Dialogue Social Enterprises has, for 
example, initially reduced fees and royalties for franchisees with fewer financial 
resources to help them start-up and reduced or postponed payment of fees or royalty rates 
if a franchisee has (temporary) financial difficulties (Heinecke, 2011).  
Furthermore, stewardship relationships are facilitated by a low power distance 
organizational culture, which leads to franchisee autonomy, shared leadership and small 
differences in salary and prerequisites (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012; Hofstede, 
1980). For example, at Specialisterne and DSE, franchisors are transparent about their 
wages that do not exceed twice the amount of the minimum entry wage of employees 
(Heinecke & Sonne, 2012). 
We thus propose: 
Proposition 4: The weaker the extrinsic benefits of the franchisee, the more 
contractual controls will be substituted with involvement orientation and a 
collectivistic and low power distance organizational culture in franchise 
management. 
Stewardship Management Costs in Social Franchising 
As in the case of social franchisee selection, we argue that while agency costs 
decrease, franchise management based on involvement-orientation, low power distance 
and collectivistic culture leads to stewardship costs.  
Involvement-oriented franchise management practices require personalized 
managerial attention as even “the most carefully designed relationship will crumble 
without good, frequent communication” (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993, p. 16). As such, 
involvement-oriented franchise management requires frequent interactions, reciprocal 
feedback, informal communication, and the nurturing of individual relationships (Meek 
et al., 2011). In both our examples, the franchisor devotes a lot of time and resources in 
meetings, on the phone, or travelling to the respective subsidiaries to maintain good 
relationships with the franchisees (Heinecke & Sonne, 2012; Volery & Hackl, 2010). 
However, the franchisor can only manage a limited number of close personal contacts, 
which ultimately limits the total number of franchisees. Thus, the stronger the franchise 
system relies on involvement-orientated management, the more it limits size of the 
franchise. Put differently, stewardship involvement orientation management costs arise 
primarily as opportunity costs of limited maximum scale of the social franchise. We thus 
propose: 
Proposition 5: The stronger the franchise management relies on involvement 
orientation, the more limited will be the maximum size of the franchise. 
Although collectivistic orientation is an important factor in supporting 
stewardship behavior, it can lead to conflict between franchisor and franchisee. In social 
franchises in which the franchisee is not the beneficiary, there are multiple principal-
stewards relationships, which favors the emergence of a collectivistic dilemma. From the 
franchise perspective the franchisor is the principal and the franchisee is the steward. 
However, from a social enterprise perspective, both franchisee and franchisor are 
stewards of the beneficiaries. As a consequence, the franchisee is a steward for two 
different groups, the franchisor and the beneficiaries. In an ideal situation the success of 
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both the franchise as a whole and the local units perfectly match. However, as soon as 
trade-offs emerge, the likelihood of a collectivism dilemma increases. In these situations, 
social franchisees are torn between the desires to serve both groups. As Tracey & Jarvis 
(2007) have shown social franchisees are more likely to prioritize the support of their 
beneficiaries (i.e., local units) over the success of the franchise in case of trade-offs. 
Heinecke (2011) reports similar issues.  
Thus, although collectivists tend to preserve harmony in groups and avoid 
conflict (Davis et al., 1997; Hofstede, 1980), we argue that the franchisee’s collectivistic 
orientation may potentially reduce cooperation between franchisee and franchisor in case 
of trade-offs between the success of the franchise and the unit. As in the case of Aspire 
this can lead even to the termination of the franchise relationship (Tracey & Jarvis, 
2007). We propose: 
Proposition 6: In case of trade-offs between the support of the beneficiaries and 
the support of the franchisor, a stronger collectivistic orientation of the 
franchisee will increase the likelihood of conflict between franchisee and 
franchisor.  
Standardization is a key success factor in franchising as it minimizes cost, 
increases scale economies, facilitates benchmarking in quality control and leads to image 
consistency (Bradach, 2003; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998). However, low power distance 
increases the difficulty for social franchisors to standardize their operations. Low power 
distance increases franchisees’ autonomy, which, together with less detailed contracts, 
facilitates local adaptation. Furthermore, most social franchises are business format 
franchises (as opposed to product franchising) (Heinecke & Mayer, 2012) and critical 
knowledge is often tacit (Bradach, 2003), making it more difficult to find the “delicate 
balance between the large-scale economies derived from system standardization and 
small-scale economies derived from local market adaptation” (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 
1998, p. 70). Thus, the lack of standardization increases costs, reduces benchmarking and 
the associated the potential for improvement and learning. For example, Heinecke (2011) 
describes himself as a “toothless tiger” in his role as franchisor stating that franchisees 
are often unwilling to, for example, report results, accept changes or even pay royalties.  
Proposition 7: The lower the power distance between franchisee and franchisor, 
the higher the cost of standardization. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION 
Applying stewardship theory allowed us to develop propositions explaining 
partner selection and franchise management as well as their associated costs in mutual 
stewardship relationships in social franchising. However, we believe our propositions 
have important implications and contributions to make not only to social franchising and 
social enterprise literature and practice, but also to commercial franchising literature and 
practice as well as to stewardship theory development. We will discuss the implications 
and contributions of our propositions, the limitations of our study, potential for future 
research as well as its managerial relevance in the following.  
Implications for Social Franchising and Social Enterprise Literature 
There are two main implications of our study for social enterprise and social 
franchising literature. The first implication relates to the distinction between the 
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dominant motivations of beneficiary versus non-beneficiary franchisees and the second 
relates to franchising as a growth mechanism for social enterprises. 
We introduced a hitherto neglected distinction between the dominant motivations 
of beneficiary versus non-beneficiary franchisees in social franchising that allows us to 
distinguish between different types of (social) franchising and determine the applicability 
of stewardship theory and its assumptions to the different types of (social) franchising 
(propositions 1 and 4). This distinction has implications for social franchising research. It 
contributes to guiding researchers in the choice of agency and/or stewardship theory 
when explaining social franchising phenomena. For example, Tracey & Jarvis (2007) 
study social franchising with non-beneficiary franchisees using agency theory. However, 
as we argued, stewardship theory is more suitable to explain social franchises with non-
beneficiary franchises as these types of franchises are more likely based on mutual 
stewardship relationships (quadrant I). Furthermore, using our framework of different 
types of (social) franchises would allow to study the shift from success to the demise of 
Aspire with a transition from quadrant I to quadrant III. Thus, applying stewardship 
theory framework to explain the Aspire case by Tracey & Jarvis (2007) would contribute 
to a more nuanced understanding of this case of social franchising and its demise. As a 
further implication for social franchising research and practice these propositions suggest 
that social franchisors should apply and researchers should consider different partner 
selection criteria and franchise management practices depending on whether franchisees 
are beneficiaries or not. While we proposed that selecting and managing non-beneficiary 
franchisees are rather based on intrinsic motivation, identification, and involvement 
orientation, future research could investigate selection criteria and management practices 
for beneficiary social franchises and their similarities and differences to commercial 
franchises. One interesting aspect to study could be how extrinsic ownership incentives 
are implemented in beneficiary social franchises to serve both the social mission and 
financial sustainability of the enterprise. A stimulating case in this regard could be 
Buffed, a recently established Australian beneficiary social franchise operating shoe 
shine stands in the major Australian cities. Buffed selects franchisees that are 
disadvantaged on the job market based on their drug addiction history or criminal record. 
To support the long-term success of their franchisees Buffed ties financial incentives 
such as reduction of franchise fees to the franchisee’s compliance with quality standards 
of reliability, image, and reporting of market research data (Buffed, 2013).  
Important implications from our propositions 2 and 5 refer to franchising as a 
growth mechanism for social enterprises, indicating that franchising may not be the best 
growth strategy for social enterprises when franchisees are not beneficiaries. First, 
opposing existing conceptualizations (Ahlert et al., 2008; Dees, Anderson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2004a; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012), social enterprises may grow slower or more 
cost-intensively via franchising, than, for example, via branching. While branching 
requires more financial resource investment of the social entrepreneur (e.g. Heinecke & 
Mayer, 2012), franchising requires more resources to select franchisees ex ante as they 
cannot be monitored as effectively as employees via ex-post behavioral control. 
Resulting from proposition 2, we conclude that social franchises with non-beneficiary 
franchisees grow faster when the identification process between franchisee and 
franchisor can be shortened. This is achievable when franchisee and franchisor already 
know each other well by, for example, being friends or family members. Chirico et al. 
(2011) have shown that being a family member facilitates mutual selection in family firm 
franchises. However, this only solves the problem partially. First, while including family 
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and friends into the franchise network reduces selection cost, it limits the size of the 
franchise network to number of family and friends each franchisor has. Second, even if 
partner selection costs and time can be reduced, franchising confines the growth to the 
franchisor’s capacity to maintain close relationships with franchisees (proposition 5). 
Thus, further research is needed to untangle those effects.  
To grow beyond that capacity some social franchises have introduced a hierarchy 
of franchisees in which the upper-tier franchisees act as regional leaders “reporting” to 
the franchisor, allowing the franchisor to delegate some responsibilities to the upper-tier 
franchisees, and thus reducing the need of the franchisor to interact with the lower-tier 
franchisees (Volery & Hackl, 2010). However, the reduction of interaction between 
franchisor and all franchisees bears the risk of reduced identification between franchisees 
and franchisor. Furthermore, this raises the question whether hierarchies within firms or 
firm-owned outlets – at least at later stages of age or growth – do not represent a more 
suitable governance structure to achieve both scale and high levels of identification in 
social enterprises. This notwithstanding, hierarchies may shift the behavior of branch 
managers or lower-tier franchisees towards agency behavior. If the founder or franchisor 
continues to act out stewardship behavior, the resulting relationships could fail (Davis et 
al., 1997). Therefore, to safeguard mutual stewardship relationships, hierarchies both 
within firms and multi-tiered franchises only function if lower-tier franchisees or 
employees accept upper-tier franchisees or managers as a ‘substitute’ for the founder or 
franchisor. This acceptance entails the same degree of identification with and the 
ascription of personal power to that person. Moreover, as stewards may perceive 
reporting as interference, it is necessary to critically consider how such governance 
structures would need to be designed. These questions and their boundary conditions 
represent interesting avenues for future research. 
Overall, a stewardship perspective on social franchising conjectures a paradox. At 
first, stewardship behavior helps to overcome limited extrinsic ownership incentives by 
substituting them with psychological ownership incentives. However, at the same time 
stewardship behavior incurs costs that slow down the speed of scaling and limit the size 
of the franchise network. Thus, regardless if mutual agency or mutual stewardship 
relationships prevail, both incur costs that need to be managed. To help practitioners to 
determine in which situations they should choose management based on agency or 
stewardship behavior, more research is needed into additional contextual factors. We 
introduced the distinction between beneficiary and non-beneficiary franchisees. 
However, other factors might be the financial situation of the franchisee or the 
enforceability of contracts, which might then also applicable to commercial franchising.  
These implications have to be considered against the background of some 
inherent limitations of our study. For example, as we apply stewardship theory, our 
framework is prone to the same limitations as stewardship theory. For example, it is 
questionable whether the psychological and situational factors of stewardship theory 
cover all aspects that explain when stewardship behavior likely prevails over agency 
behavior. Moreover, the cultural aspects of collectivism and low power distance are 
interdependent and often found in contradictory constellations such as low power 
distance but individualistic cultures as the US versus high power distance but 
collectivistic cultures such as Japan (Davis et al., 1997). Disentangling those 
interdependencies and studying how national cultures affect the emergence and cultures 
of social franchises is thus another important avenue for future research. 
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Implications for Commercial Franchising Literature 
Existing franchising research has emphasized opportunistic and self-serving 
behavior (Combs et al., 2004), although self-actualizing and collective serving 
motivations can be observed in traditional commercial franchises as well, such as in 
“socioemotional wealth” in family businesses (Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson, & Brigham, 
2011), in family firm franchises (e.g. Chirico et al., 2011), in the mission of founders 
such as in Ray Kroc’s passion to bring lunch at a reasonable cost to America and the 
world (Kincheloe, 1977), or in practices such as waiving royalty payment at Ben and 
Jerry’s Ice Cream (Lafontaine & Blair, 2009). Thus, we call for more applications of 
theories that rely on behavioral assumptions of self-actualization and intrinsic motivation 
to commercial franchising. Our framework offers the opportunity for re-examining 
commercial franchising literature to identify potentially cases or phenomena of 
stewardship behavior that have been neglected in existing literature. Applying our 
stewardship theory propositions to those cases will contribute to a better understanding of 
differences in franchising practices such as in the amount of royalty rates or in 
phenomena such as sizes of the franchise network or proportion of company-owned 
versus franchised units (Lafontaine & Blair, 2009). For example, research in commercial 
franchising suggests that commercial franchisors emphasize or even prioritize 
commitment of the franchisee as a selection criterion over financial criteria (Clarkin & 
Swavely, 2006; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Jambulingam et al., 1999). Thus, the partner 
selection costs associated with personal interviews and the process of getting to know 
each other also seems to apply to commercial franchising settings. If this is the case, 
commercial franchisors, too, may face stewardship costs to the extent to which their 
franchise relationships are based on stewardship behavior. Furthermore, in situations 
commercial franchisors expect a high level of agency costs because ownership incentives 
are less effective, for example in cases of horizontal agency in outlets with little repeat 
business (Combs et al., 2004), they could resort to stewardship partner selection and 
franchise management to reduce agency costs for those outlets.  
Implications for Stewardship Theory 
In addition to applying stewardship theory to a new field of research we 
contribute to the development of stewardship theory by introducing the concept of 
stewardship costs that arise during establishment and maintenance of mutual stewardship 
relationships. Negative effects of stewardship behavior such as costs have so far been 
neglected in literature as steward researchers primarily focused on its potential to 
enhance performance (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2004). We identified opportunity costs of 
delayed growth and the cost of wrong partner selection due to over-identification as 
stewardship selection costs and limited franchise size and costs of standardization and 
conflict as stewardship management costs in mutual stewardship relationships in social 
franchising. Stewardship costs are conceptually different from agency costs. While 
agency costs result from weak goal alignment due to opportunism, stewardship costs 
result from psychological and situational factors that enable stewardship relationships 
leading to different recommendations for practice.  
For example, our framework suggests a different perspective on agency costs in 
existing social franchising research. For example, applying our framework to explain the 
demise of Aspire (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007) suggests that maintaining the initial mutual 
stewardship relationship by managing franchisees involvement-oriented and 
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acknowledging their collectivism may have better helped to overcome Aspire’s 
difficulties than “monitor[ing] closely the actions of franchisees” (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007, 
p. 680). While applying agency theory clearly leads to the identification of agency costs 
and the latter conclusion, applying our framework suggests that agency costs were 
obscured stewardship costs and thus leads to different conclusions and recommendations 
for practice. Reassessing the results of some commercial franchising studies may lead to 
similar conclusions and thus, represent an interesting avenue for future research.  
The major limitations of our stewardship theory development are two-fold. First, 
our identification of stewardship costs is not exhaustive and focuses on the social 
franchising context. Thus, future studies should identify further stewardship costs 
occurring in different contexts. Second, as most studies applying agency or stewardship 
theory, we also apply an either-or perspective and do not integrate both theories. While 
this was necessary to establish the applicability of stewardship theory to (social) 
franchising, the next step should be an integrative approach that acknowledges that both 
agency and stewardship behaviors are inherent in every economic transaction. We thus 
call for shifting the agency-stewardship debate from a discussion about conflicting 
“models of man” to contingent “models of alternative situations”. Both agency and (our) 
stewardship theory are paradoxical in the sense that they, on the one hand, explain how 
businesses can scale their operations using motivational mechanisms – financial 
ownership incentives in agency theory and psychological ownership incentives in 
stewardship theory – but, on the other hand, explain the occurrence of costs based on the 
very same motivations – agency costs based on ownership incentives and stewardship 
costs based on psychological ownership. Thus, combining both perspectives will allow a 
more nuanced explanation of which costs occur in under which circumstances. One 
notable example is a study conducted by Scarlata and Alemany (2011) who investigated 
venture philanthropy and found that the wording of contract clauses determines the 
prevalence of stewardship or agency relationships, respectively.  
Finally, another important avenue for future research is the empirical testing of 
our propositions and the operationalization of the stewardship constructs and costs. For 
example, to measure identification, future research could draw on existing studies on 
organizational identification (e.g. Ashforth et al., 2008). 
Managerial relevance 
From a practitioner’s perspective, our framework points to the importance of 
understanding the motivation of the actor’s involved. Thus, if a practitioner is more 
intrinsically motivated, she should consider choosing franchisees (or employees) that are 
also intrinsically motivated. Moreover, if potential franchisees or employees are 
intrinsically motivated, management needs to reduce control mechanisms to avoid 
crowding out this motivation, which could lead to anti-organizational behavior.  
More importantly, our conceptualization shows that even if both parties are 
intrinsically motivated, problems may occur. Practitioners need to be aware of these 
potential challenges and should thus weigh if the benefits of stewardship management – 
i.e. reduced costs of monitoring, are greater than potential stewardship costs of e.g. 
reduced growth.  
Additionally, our framework indicates that franchising might not constitute the 
most suitable growth strategies for some social enterprises. Therefore, social enterprise 
managers who wish to grow their organization need to consider their management style – 
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agency-based versus stewardship-based – in addition to other factors that usually 
influence their decision on growth strategies such as resource availability or cultural 
closeness to the new location. Such considerations might be further influenced by the 
dominant local culture. If a potential franchisee is embedded in a national culture that is 
based on low power distance or collectivism, stewardship behavior might occur even 
more frequently than in other national cultures. Thus, a social enterprise may need to 
follow a mix of growth strategies including. This mix should not only depend on 
‘traditional’ aspects such as the political, social or legal environment but also on the 
personal characteristics of a new franchisee as well as on the situation in which he or she 
is embedded. To give an example, if a social enterprise’s franchisees are also 
beneficiaries branching would be a more suitable option. However, even if franchisees 
are non-beneficiaries their economic situation might make branching a more promising 
option as poor franchisee will first need to satisfy their lower-order needs before they are 
able to act upon their higher-order needs.  
In conclusion, we hope that our framework will help to enrich the theoretical 
foundations and empirical findings of future research when studying social franchises 
and enterprises as well as commercial franchises and stewardship theory. Going back to 
Clinton’s statement, more research is needed to better understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of social franchising as scaling strategy for social enterprises.   
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APPENDIX 
Examples of Social Franchising  
Both examples qualify as social enterprises that use franchising to grow and 
where franchisees are not beneficiaries.  
Dialogue Social Enterprise (DSE) is a German-based social enterprise that 
operates exhibitions called “Dialogue in the Dark” where blind guides escort seeing 
people through everyday situations in complete darkness (Volery & Hackl, 2010). The 
purpose of this experience is to demonstrate the circumstantial nature of disability. 
DSE’s social mission is to enable the dialogue between visually impaired people and 
people with ‘normal’ eyesight. DSE’s financial self-sustainability is based on admission 
fees to its exhibitions as well as on income generated through management trainings in 
the dark, which it offers to corporate clients (Volery & Hackl, 2010). Currently, DSE 
operates 20 permanent exhibitions worldwide.8 While the two locations in Germany, the 
headquarter in Hamburg and the Frankfurt outlet, are company-owned, the remaining 18 
outlets are franchised (Dialogue Social Enterprise, 2013). To franchise exhibitions, DSE 
signs a license agreement with franchisees that allows franchisees to run exhibitions 
under the brand name “Dialogue in the Dark” 9 against the immediate payment of a 
license fee and, depending on the contract, a share from sales (criteria 1a and 3 from 
Lafontaine & Blair, 2009) (Insead, 2010). DSE also supports and trains franchisees in 
various stages of their operation, gives out handbooks, and holds annual meetings for all 
franchisees to share their knowledge (criterion 2 from Lafontaine & Blair, 2009) (Insead, 
2010).  
Another example is the organization Specialisterne, headquartered in Denmark, 
that employs people with autism and utilizes their special abilities and attention to detail 
to offer services such as software testing to IT companies. While Specialisterne’s social 
mission is to support regular employment of people with autism, they operate financially 
self-sustainably by offering their services to companies at market rates. Founded in 2004, 
Specialisterne currently operates two locations in Denmark, six in other European 
countries, and one in the United States (Specialisterne, 2013). Specialisterne has been 
growing its operations through a license model that allows franchisees to use its business 
model and brand name for a license fee and share from sales (criteria 1a and 3 from 
Lafontaine & Blair, 2009). Specialisterne assists its franchisees with its knowledge on 
how to select, train, and support people with autism during their work, a model all 
franchisees have to comply with (criterion 2 from Lafontaine & Blair, 2009) (Sonne, 
2012).  
 
 
                                               
8 Since it’s opening in 1988 Dialogue in the Dark has been presented to more than 7 million visitors through 
exhibitions and workshops in more than 31 countries and 127 cities in the world.  
9  The exhibition name „Dialogue in the Dark“ is translated into the respective national language to ensure 
comprehensibility of its meaning.  
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ABSTRACT  
Inspired by the entrepreneurial motivation literature, this paper empirically analyzes the post-
founding stage of social and commercial entrepreneurs to derive a taxonomy of different 
entrepreneurial characters. The study uses a three-step empirical approach. First, based on 80 
interviews, the article identifies seven dimensions of success, beyond the familiar social and 
commercial objectives, that drive entrepreneurs. Second, it quantifies the interview data with a 
scoring system. Using cluster analysis, the third step identifies five empirical types of 
entrepreneurs: rational missionary, bonding self-actualizer, number junkie, textbook 
businessperson, and product-adjusting competitor. The article ends with a discussion of 
contingency factors and implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social entrepreneurship organizations come in many shapes and forms, use a multitude of 
scaling and funding strategies, and are organized in very different ways. Based on single- or 
small-N-case studies (Hoogendoorn, Pennings, & Thurik, 2010), researchers try to discover the 
underlying mechanisms that lead one social entrepreneur to choose one specific scaling strategy 
while others use a different one. The work on commercial entrepreneurship also studies this and 
similar questions (e.g., Fern, Cardinal, & O’Neill, 2012). 
To understand these choices, one strand of entrepreneurship literature takes on an actor 
perspective, finding that the entrepreneur plays a central role within the venture (e.g. Mintzberg, 
2003; Smith & Miner, 1983). Given that the entrepreneur’s choices strongly affect the venture’s 
strategy and daily operation (B. McCarthy, 2003; Woo, Cooper, & Dunkelberg, 1991), 
researchers investigate entrepreneurial motivation (Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003), 
entrepreneurial orientation (e.g., Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), and entrepreneurial traits (e.g., Rauch 
& Frese, 2007). However, much of this research predominately focuses on the pre-founding or 
early-stage entrepreneurship; to date, there is little research on what drives an entrepreneur once 
the organization is “up and running” except for growth aspirations. It is known, however, that 
motivations can change over time, especially when an individual’s situational circumstances 
change (Carsrud & Brännback, 2011). Therefore, the factors that drive an entrepreneur in the 
post-founding phase might be different from his or her motivations before founding. Indeed, 
recent studies evidence that motivations alter with distance from the founding stage (Renko, 
2013). Therefore, this paper aims to generate insights into what drives entrepreneurs in the post-
founding phase. 
Due to the diversity of entrepreneurial motivations (Shane et al., 2003), research on this 
topic often employs typologies or taxonomies to reduce complexity and achieve greater 
homogeneity within subgroups. For instance, the distinction between necessity- and opportunity-
driven entrepreneurs sorts entrepreneurs by their initial motivation to found an organization (e.g., 
C. C. Williams, 2008). In contrast, this study develops a taxonomy of entrepreneurs that is not 
based on entrepreneurial motivation (i.e., it does not focus on a pre-founding and founding phase) 
but on their entrepreneurial drivers (i.e., it focuses on issues that drive entrepreneurs in a post-
founding phase). 
This approach has an added advantage of also providing a more differentiated perspective 
on the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurs. Similar to the necessity-
opportunity distinction, currently this differentiation is based on motivations. That is, social 
entrepreneurs are portrayed as striving to “do good”; commercial entrepreneurs are viewed as 
profit seekers (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010; Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009). However, in light 
of the literature on entrepreneurial motivation that emphasizes the multidimensionality of 
motivations (Shane et al., 2003), the social-commercial distinction seems too simple, and may 
run the risk of overlooking important aspects. Thus, taking a closer and more differentiated look 
at the drivers of entrepreneurs may yield a more nuanced perspective on social and commercial 
entrepreneurs that goes beyond the simple commercial-social distinction and may even provide 
some insight into that special breed of founders who are both social and commercial 
entrepreneurs (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006). 
Thus the research questions are: What drives social and commercial entrepreneurs in a 
post-founding phase? Can these drivers be used to identify different types of entrepreneurs and, if 
so, what are these different types? How do these empirically observable entrepreneurial 
characters relate to the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurship found in the 
literature? To answer, this paper employs a three-step approach that combines emergent coding 
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of 80 interviews with social and commercial entrepreneurs with a cluster analysis of the 
identified driver dimensions. As entrepreneurs are generally portrayed as being driven by the 
desire to achieve success (Perwin, 2003), the paper uses their understanding of success as a proxy 
for their drivers. This approach thus allows inductively determining what drives entrepreneurs. 
The analysis identifies not just two, but seven drivers. Using cluster analysis to study the 
combination of these seven drivers for all interviewed entrepreneurs produces five distinct 
entrepreneurial characters that can be observed empirically. 
This study contributes to literature in the following ways. (1) It provides a more 
differentiated perspective of the factors that drive entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage. (2) It 
provides a description of five types of entrepreneurs based on their unique combination of 
drivers. (3) It offers evidence that when investigated from an actor perspective, social and 
commercial entrepreneurs, although different, are also quite similar. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Based on a presented literature review, the paper combines 
three main arguments, which form the basis of the empirical investigation. These are: the 
centrality of the entrepreneur and a too narrow perspective on social and commercial 
entrepreneurs, the multi-dimensionality of entrepreneurial motivations and the lack of knowledge 
as to entrepreneurial drivers, and the benefits of taxonomies based on a sample with social and 
commercial entrepreneurs. 
Second, the paper outlines a three-step methodology, which combines emergent coding of 
80 interviews of social and commercial entrepreneurs with a scoring scheme and cluster analysis. 
Thus, it combines qualitative and quantitative methods. In addition, it provides a detailed 
justification for using the entrepreneurs’ notions of success as a proxy for their drivers. 
Third, based on the above, five identified clusters of entrepreneurs are described. These 
are rational missionary, bonding self-actualizer, number junkie, textbook businessperson, and 
product-adjusting competitor. 
Fourth, three issues are discussed: (1) the question of whether social and commercial 
entrepreneurs constitute distinct types of entrepreneurs, (2) the difficulty of expressing and the 
complexity of success notions, and (3) contingency factors that correlate with certain types of 
entrepreneur. The paper concludes with implications for practice and future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The entrepreneur, of course, is central to the entrepreneurial firm (e.g. B. McCarthy, 2003; 
Mintzberg, 2003; Smith & Miner, 1983; C. E. Williams & Tse, 1995; Woo et al., 1991). 
Entrepreneurs, equally obvious, constitute a diverse set (Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2001), 
and thus entrepreneurship research tends to subdivide them into groups based on a specific 
commonality and then studies particularities of a subgroup and how it is different from others. 
Such distinctions range from gender differentiation to differentiation based on the overall goal of 
the entrepreneurial endeavor. 
An example of the latter is the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurs. 
One of the best-known examples of this type of research is Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-skillern 
(2006), in which the authors raise the question of whether social and commercial entrepreneurs 
are the same, different, or both. To answer this question, they propose a continuum that allows 
for overlap between social and commercial entrepreneurship by distinguishing between the two 
motivations of financial and social value creation. The following literature review provides a 
foundation for further refining the distinction between entrepreneurial types that goes beyond the 
social-commercial two-dimensional distinction. 
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Why look at the entrepreneur’s motivation in the debate on social and commercial 
entrepreneurs? 
Social entrepreneurship aims at fulfilling a social mission. The missions are as diverse as 
the societal problems humankind faces and thus include poverty reduction as well as 
environmental protection (Dees, 1998, 2012). This form of entrepreneurship is receiving an 
increasing amount of attention from academics (Granados, Hlupic, Coakes, & Mohamed, 2011), 
yet is still poorly understood (Felício, Martins Gonçalves, & da Conceição Gonçalves, 2013; 
Welsh & Krueger, 2012). One issue of particular interest in this work is to understand the 
distinctiveness and particularities of social entrepreneurs and social ventures. To this end, 
scholars often use commercial entrepreneurship as a frame of reference. Studies in this strand of 
research investigate differences in funding structure (Bacq, Hartog, & Hoogendoorn, 2013), 
organizational layout (Thompson, Alvy, & Lees, 2000), legal form (see Dees & Anderson, 2006; 
Defourney & Nyssens, 2010; Roper & Cheney, 2005), need for innovation (e.g. Shaw & Carter, 
2007), size (Bacq et al., 2013), and survival rates (e.g. Terjesen, Lepoutre, Justo, Bosma, & 
GERA, 2012). 
Despite this diversity of perspectives on social entrepreneurship, the one thing scholars do 
seem to agree on is that social entrepreneurship is different from commercial entrepreneurship as 
it pursues social rather than financial value creation (Bacq & Janssen, 2011; Dacin et al., 2010; 
Mair & Martí, 2006; Short et al., 2009; Welsh & Krueger, 2012). Yet, despite this apparent clear-
cut distinction, the literature on social entrepreneurship is still in flux over the precise “nature” of 
this distinction. In sum, there are three different perspectives—a dichotomy, continuum, and 
matrix perspective. The dichotomy perspective clearly distinguishes social from commercial 
entrepreneurship in an almost strictly binary way, i.e., a zero-one perspective of either social or 
commercial. The continuum perspective advances this zero-one view by reconfiguring purely 
social and purely commercial forms onto each end of a continuum (Austin et al., 2006; Tan, 
Williams, & Tan, 2005). However, this approach does not allow for ventures that have as their 
objective both high social and high financial value creation as it depicts the link between social 
and commercial as a tradeoff. That is, from this perspective, to achieve more financial value 
creation necessitates less social value creation and vice versa. The third view—the matrix 
perspective—overcomes this shortcoming by moving “social mission” and “profit seeking” from 
the ends of a continuum into two separate dimensions. From such a perspective, the entrepreneur 
can be motivated by different degrees of both financial and social value creation simultaneously. 
Yet, despite their differences, all three perspectives have one thing in common: they take 
their start from the entrepreneur’s motivation, be it financial or social. Along the same lines, this 
paper takes the insights of Mintzberg (2003) and Woo et al. (1991) on the central role of the 
entrepreneur within the entrepreneurial venture as a starting point to shed new light on the actors 
involved, i.e., the social and commercial entrepreneurs. Such an approach is common in 
commercial entrepreneurship literature yet less so in social entrepreneurship literature 
(Hoogendoorn et al., 2010). Looking at both social and commercial entrepreneurs, this paper 
analyzes the diversity of motivations these entrepreneurs experience in the post-founding stage of 
their venture. In so doing, the paper takes up the question as to whether only two motivations—
social and financial—are sufficient for this purpose. This is an especially relevant question in the 
case of those entrepreneurs who fall into the “social and commercial” quadrant of the matrix 
perspective. Thus, to better understand social and commercial entrepreneurs and in particular 
those that cross the boundaries of “social” and “commercial,” a more nuanced look at the motives 
of both types of entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage seems valuable. 
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Why look at entrepreneurial motivation and drivers of entrepreneurs? 
Generally, research on motivation attempts to understand why individuals choose one 
course of action over another (Carsrud & Brännback, 2011). Taking a pronounced actor 
perspective, research on entrepreneurial motivation more specifically explores the reasons why 
an entrepreneur founds an own venture (e.g., Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; Hessels, Gelderen, & 
Thurik, 2008; Shane, Locke, & Collins, 2003; Verheul, Thurik, Hessels, & Zwan, 2010). Overall, 
entrepreneurial motivation is subdivided into push and pull motivations (Gilad & Levine, 1986). 
Push motivations are those that externally force an individual into entrepreneurial action, for 
example, unemployment (for more see, Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; Verheul et al., 2010). In 
comparison, pull motivations involve all the extrinsic and intrinsic factors that make an 
individual want to become an entrepreneur. These range from the wish to be independent (e.g., 
Carter, Gartner, Shaver, & Gatewood, 2005; Shane, Kolvereid, & Westhead, 1991) and self-
actualize (e.g., Carter et al., 2005; Renko, Kroeck, & Bullough, 2011; Scheinberg & MacMillan, 
1988) to proving the feasibility of an idea (e.g., Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; Scheinberg & 
MacMillan, 1988) to accumulating wealth (e..g, Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; GEM, 2011; Renko 
et al., 2011) to the desire for a better work-life balance (e.g., GEM, 2011) or wanting to employ 
talented people as staff (e.g., Verheul et al., 2010). 
Although the entrepreneurial motivation literature focuses primarily on the pre-founding 
stage of entrepreneurial choices, this stream of research generates useful insights for looking at 
entrepreneurs in their post-founding stage as well. The fact that entrepreneurs start their ventures 
for multiple reasons and a diversity of motivations suggests that the two-dimensional perspective 
on social and commercial entrepreneur is too narrow to account for the diversity of motivations 
that drive entrepreneurs—the ‘entrepreneurial drivers’—in their post-founding stage. In this 
paper, “drivers1” are understood to include all the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Carsrud, 
Brännback, Elfving, & Brandt, 2009) of an individual entrepreneur that shape his or her choices 
and actions during the continuation and/or growth of the venture.  
This paper claims that understanding these entrepreneurial drivers is essential as they 
influence the entrepreneur’s decisions, which in turn shape the venture’s strategy and daily 
operation. Indeed, the entrepreneur’s influence is well researched in the area of growth strategies 
(e.g., Barringer, Jones, & Neubaum, 2005; Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001; Delmar & Wiklund, 
2008; Getz & Petersen, 2005; Hessels et al., 2008; Kolvereid, 1992). These studies suggest that if 
an entrepreneur perceives great growth potential, it affects the venture’s growth strategies. If, 
however, the entrepreneur does not wish to grow the venture or does not perceive growth 
potential, the organization is unlikely to grow, whether it be in terms of sales or staff numbers. 
While these studies are of great value to the literature on growth, their potential to identify an 
exhaustive list of what drives entrepreneurs is limited due to their focus on growth. 
With a reference to the entrepreneurial motivation (founding stage) literature, this paper 
conjectures that, just like the many and varied reasons people have for becoming entrepreneurs, 
what drives them after the decision has been made and the venture is founded is also most likely 
multi-dimensional. Yet, entrepreneurial motivation research falls short when it comes to actually 
explaining what drives entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage. As motivations change with time 
(e.g., Carsrud & Brännback, 2011; A. M. McCarthy, Krueger, & Schoenecker, 1990), it is 
inappropriate to assume that entrepreneurial motivations and entrepreneurial drivers are identical. 
Moreover, recent studies indicate that distance from founding influences entrepreneurs’ 
                                                 
1
 This paper refers to the motivations of entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage as 
“drivers” to avoid confusion with the well-established concept of entrepreneurial motivation. 
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motivations (Renko, 2013). Additionally, actions and the time allocated to them by entrepreneurs 
are also prone to change once the organization is founded (e.g., Mueller, Volery, & von Siemens, 
2012). As behavior is shaped by motivation (Carsrud & Brännback, 2011), this further supports 
the idea that entrepreneurial drivers are not identical to entrepreneurial motivations. In short, 
entrepreneurial drivers constitute a relevant, yet so-far under-researched field of study, thus 
creating the potential for fruitful inductive research into the multi-dimensionality of the issues 
driving entrepreneurs in a post-founding stage.  
Why build a taxonomy with social and commercial entrepreneurs? 
An inductive analysis of what drives entrepreneurs is interesting not only for purposes of 
understanding the multidimensionality of drivers per se; knowing what these drivers are can also 
aid in deriving and describing different types of entrepreneurs based on their unique combination 
of the various drivers. Such classification approaches are common in the entrepreneurship 
literature to enhance comparability (Gundry & Welsch, 2001). To derive such a taxonomy 
empirically is the overall purpose of this study. 
Previous classifications of different types of entrepreneurs have used the traits or the 
educational background of the entrepreneur (Jones-Evans, 1995; Miner, 2000; Siu, 1995), the 
size and industry of the venture (e.g. Webster, 1977), extent of entrepreneurial experience 
(Delmar & Davidson, 2000; Westhead & Wright, 1998), or type of entrepreneurial activity (for 
details, see Maniam, Leavell, & Renteria, 2001). Others classify entrepreneurs based on their 
motivations or objectives. For instance, the distinction between the “craftsman” and the 
“businessman” focuses on the entrepreneur’s objectives (Miner, 2000; Siu, 1995; Woo et al., 
1991): the former type focuses on products and has no clear intention of growing the 
organization, the latter is much more market and growth oriented (Cohen, Smith, & Mitchell, 
2008; Filley & Aldag, 1978). Despite its established position in the entrepreneurship literature, 
Woo et al. (1991) consider this dichotomy too narrow and call for more research to uncover more 
entrepreneurial types. 
Another popular distinction is that between necessity- and opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship (Verheul et al., 2010). In broader terms, this classification is based on push and 
pull motivations, as discussed above. To date, entrepreneurship research has benefited a great 
deal from both the craftsman-businessman and the necessity-opportunity classifications, but 
critics also point out that there may be other types of entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al., 2001; Woo 
et al., 1991). This paper takes this criticism and the fact that neither classification scheme 
includes social entrepreneurs as its inspiration for employing an empirical approach to discover 
new types of entrepreneurs. 
To achieve this objective, it seems useful to have as diverse a sample as possible, and thus 
this study uses both social and commercial entrepreneurs. Specifically, the concept of social 
entrepreneurship introduced an until-then overlooked motivation or driver of entrepreneurs: the 
desire to help others (Carsrud & Brännback, 2011) yet insinuates the potential diversity of 
individual motives (Spear, 2006). Due to its novelty, this motivation is as yet not well-researched 
(Renko, 2013), but that is no grounds for believing that only social entrepreneurs experience this 
motivation. And, ironically, if this is the only motivation investigated for social entrepreneurs, 
other, equally important ones might be overlooked. Furthermore, recent empirical studies indicate 
that prosocial and self-interested motivations are not mutually exclusive but may occur 
simultaneously (De Dreu, Nijstad, Bechtoldt, & Baas, 2011; Sharir & Lerner, 2006). Moreover, 
so far there is little knowledge on the link or co-occurrence of prosocial and self-interested 
motivations (Renko, 2013). Thus this could be some benefit to studying social and commercial 
entrepreneurs together (Renko, 2013) as both types may have the same sets of motivations (see 
What Drives Entrepreneurs? 
 107 
similar Dacin et al., 2010) and thus a combined sample might generate insight into the link or co-
occurrence of both prosocial and self-interested motives. 
Indeed, social entrepreneurship scholarship shows that many entrepreneurs blur the 
boundary between social mission and profit (Austin et al., 2006; Wilson & Post, 2011). By 
investigating their underlying drivers, this paper will provide a better understanding of these 
mixed types of entrepreneurs. In particular, it will shed light on similarities between social and 
commercial entrepreneurs and, to preview the results, discover new entrepreneurial types. 
In short, the literature calls for more refined ways of classifying entrepreneurs. To answer 
this call, this paper suggests using entrepreneurial drivers, i.e., the motivations of entrepreneurs in 
a post-founding stage, as a basis for developing a taxonomy. However, despite the rich literature 
on entrepreneurial motivation (pre-founding and early-stage motivations), there is little research 
on entrepreneurial drivers (post-founding stage). Moreover, as motivations change over time, 
entrepreneurial motivations and entrepreneurial drivers may differ. Thus, this paper employs an 
inductive approach to determine these drivers based on a sample of social and commercial 
entrepreneurs. This diverse sample is chosen to discover as many drivers as possible. Moreover, 
methods such as cluster analysis can be used to investigate whether there are new types of 
entrepreneurs that cut across the social-commercial distinction and thus offer a more nuanced 
perspective on entrepreneurship. 
METHODOLOGY 
This empirical study employs a three-step approach to develop a taxonomy of 
entrepreneurs based on their unique combination of multi-dimensional drivers, i.e., the factors 
that motivate entrepreneurs during a post-founding phase. An often-used tool for developing 
classifications or taxonomies is cluster analysis (step 3). This powerful statistical tool enables 
researchers to find structures within datasets by identifying subgroups with high intergroup 
heterogeneity but high intragroup homogeneity (Kleinbaum, Lawrence, Nizam, & Rosenberg, 
2013; Punj & Stewart, 1983; Rencher & Christensen, 2012). Thus, on that score, cluster analysis 
would appear suitable for the purposes of this paper. However, cluster analyses require quantified 
or at least quantifiable data, and such datasets or the required information to collect them 
quantitatively are not available. As a consequence, primary qualitative data was collected from 
open-question interviews, which allowed capturing the diversity of drivers. To quantify these 
insights, categories were derived from the emergent coding process (step 1) and then used as a 
basis for a scoring system (step 2). These scores then became the data for a cluster analysis (step 
3). The following subsections provide details on the research design and methods of data 
collection and sampling, as well as on the chosen measure. 
Sample 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the drivers of entrepreneurs in a post-founding 
stage and use them to classify entrepreneurs. Specifically, the research tries to find out whether 
such types go beyond the two-dimensional distinction of social and commercial entrepreneurs. To 
do so, the sample needs to include members of both groups and thus purposive sampling was 
done (Kerlinger, 1973; Warwick & Lininger, 1975). Put differently, if the sample only included 
“social” entrepreneurs, it would not be possible to identify any overlap of this type with 
“commercial” entrepreneurs, much less discover any new types that go beyond the social-
commercial distinction. Thus, the sample purposively comprises social and commercial 
entrepreneurs who were identified by award-bestowing agencies through a standardized selection 
process. Moreover, the analysis focuses on one country—Germany—to minimize effects of 
cultural diversity in responses and thus obtain clearer data. 
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Social entrepreneurs: The Ashoka2 database was relied on to procure a sample of social 
entrepreneurs, as Ashoka Fellows are widely recognized as being social entrepreneurs (e.g. Sen, 
2007). Following Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, and Reynolds's (2010) call and to 
ensure diversity within the subsample, the subsample contains social entrepreneurs from all fields 
of work. The raw sample included all 47 German Ashoka Fellows (as of end of 2012), all of 
whom were contacted. In contrast to Ashoka Fellows in many developing nations, all German 
Ashoka Fellows included in the final sample started their venture before becoming Fellows. As 
such, they are all in a post-founding stage. 
Commercial entrepreneurs: Commercial entrepreneurs were chosen on the basis of their 
receipt of awards similar to an Ashoka Fellowship—in terms of prizes and selection process and 
criteria (see Table 1) to enable comparability. Hence, these commercial ventures are also in a 
post-founding stage. This created a list of a total of 217 commercial entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneurs were then randomly chosen until 50 interviews were reached. The final sample 
contains 30 social entrepreneurs and 50 commercial entrepreneurs. Details of the sample in terms 
of demographics and so forth can be found in Table 2. 
Success as a proxy for drivers 
To date, there is little research on drivers in a post-founding stage (see previous section), 
which necessitates an empirical approach. However, the investigation of drivers entails at least 
one major challenge. An entrepreneur might not be willing to disclose all his or her drivers due to 
issues of social desirability, and this reluctance might be even more pronounced in the case of 
social entrepreneurs. Take, for example, a social entrepreneur who in the course of fighting for 
the integration of minorities has developed a taste for media attention. Out of fear of damaging 
her “hero” image, this entrepreneur might be reluctant to openly reveal her love affair with the 
media, as in social entrepreneurship circles there is a general norm that press attention is “good” 
if it is for the cause, but “bad” if it is for personal reasons. In short, most social entrepreneurs 
(and many commercial entrepreneurs for that matter) would likely not give high scores to a 
survey item such as “I like personal media attention.” 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Ashoka is a dominant player in social entrepreneurship as it was the first and is still the 
largest organization that seeks social entrepreneurs to support with its fellowship program 
(Ashoka, 2013). 
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TABLE 1 
Overview of Award-Granting Organizations 
 
Name Criteria Prize Funding sources 
Ashoka Social entrepreneurs with innovative and 
scalable ideas 
Stipend for three years and 
coaching/consulting 
Primarily companies; no 
government funding 
EXIST Innovativeness, potential market 
performance of idea 
Monthly scholarship, support for 
material expenses, coaching 
German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Energy, 
European Social Fund 
GruenderChampion Successful in the market, profitability, 
creation and maintenance of jobs and 
apprenticeship, interplay of profitability and 
ethical responsibility, achieving a work-life 
balance 
Certificate, possibility to present the 
company at the conference for German 
founders and entrepreneurs (deGUT), 
support from a PR agency, prize money 
of 6,000 € 
Kreditanstaltu für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW) – 
Promotional Bank for Re-
Financing and 
Development Finance 
IKT innovativ Innovation, market potential/competitiveness, 
feasibility, qualification/experience of 
participant 
Prize money between 6,000 and 30,000 
€, coaching, written feedback 
German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Energy 
 
Source: Ashoka (2013); Drayton (2006); EXIST (2014); Fuer Grunder (2014); GruenderChampion (2013) 
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TABLE 2 
Overview of Sample (as Included in the Cluster Analysis) 
  Type Total 
  Commercial Social   
  Total 43 30 73 
Industry 
Categories* 
Professional Services 6 4 10 
Social Services 1 21 22 
Production 13 2 15 
Services 1 2 3 
Information and 
Communication 22 1 23 
Gender Male 41 21 62 
Female 2 9 11 
Org. Age Median** 3 8.5 5 
Org. Size Median** 6 14 8 
* All organizations were first assigned to an industry according to the International Standard Industry 
Classification (ISIC) as issued by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ISIC, 2008). 
Certain industries were combined into an industry group as some industries contained only one entrepreneur. For 
example, we combined M - Professional, scientific and technical activities, K - Financial and insurance activities, N- 
Administrative and support services, and L - Real estate activities into “Professional services.” 
** Medians were chosen to avoid noise in the data due to outliers. 
 
To overcome these difficulties, this study uses the entrepreneur’s notion of success as a 
proxy for the entrepreneur’s drivers in a post-founding stage. Success is an inherently subjective 
term and thus allows insight into the perspective of the respective actor. On the other hand, from 
an etymological perspective, success refers to achievements and goals (Oxford Dictionaries, 
2014), which ties in well with the common notion of an entrepreneur as an achievement-driven 
individual (Perwin, 2003; Renko, 2013; Shane et al., 2003; Stewart & Roth, 2007). In addition, 
this relates back to pull motivational factors. Thus, an entrepreneur’s goals will determine his or 
her choices (see Locke & Latham, 2002). Similarly, the theory of planned behavior posits that 
once individuals have set a goal (defined for themselves what “success” is), they will adjust their 
behavior to achieve it (Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & Conner, 2001). Goal setting theory also 
postulates similar relationships between goals and behaviors (Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Thus, asking an entrepreneur to explain how they understand success can provide insight 
into those issues that drive them in their strategic as well as daily decisions. Moreover, previous 
studies on success notions also indicate that these are multi-dimensional (Dyke & Murphy, 2006; 
Reijonen & Komppula, 2007; Walker & Brown, 2004). 
Data collection 
Interviews provided the opportunity to obtain non-guided responses (Creswell, 2009). 
Spontaneous responses were of particular interest as such are less likely to be influenced by 
social desirability. To ensure spontaneity, interviewees were not informed about the subject of the 
interview either prior or during the interview. The essential question as to their notion of success 
was asked within an interview that also addressed questions of scaling strategies, barriers to and 
success factors of their ventures, as well as their understanding of social entrepreneurship (if 
applicable). Thus it is unlikely that the interviewees were aware of the actual purpose of the 
interview, further reducing the chances of their answers being affected by a social desirability 
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bias. As discussed above, their understanding of success served as a proxy for their drivers. Thus, 
interviewees were asked to describe future circumstances in which they would consider 
themselves successful. The interviewees did not receive prompting in any particular direction, 
even if they appeared to struggle with the answer. 
All interviews were conducted in German via phone or Skype. The interviews were then 
transcribed and translated into English. Translations were double-checked at random by a person 
not personally involved in the research project. The interviews were between 20 and 45 minutes 
in length with an average of 36 minutes, resulting in 48 hours of interview data. The interviews 
were conducted between January 2011 and July 2013 and between July 2012 and March 2013 for 
social and commercial entrepreneurs, respectively. In total, 80 entrepreneurs were interviewed. 
 
Research Design and Analysis 
To most effectively and appropriately discover the drivers of social and commercial 
entrepreneurs, and in answer to Short et al.’s (2009) and Hoogendoorn et al.’s (2010) call for 
more diversity in methodologies, this study employed a three-step research design. 
Step 1 – Category development based on emergent coding 
The first step employed emergent coding to determine different drivers. Emergent coding 
was used as this inductive content analysis tool allows discovery of drivers with no regard to 
whether or not they have been previously mentioned in the literature (Saldana, 2009). This 
inductive approach, which utilized the qualitative data analysis software HyperResearch, led to a 
total of 58 codes. To make the data more manageable, the 58 codes were condensed into seven 
code families (in accordance with Saldana, 2009). For example, statements such as: “I want to be 
satisfied at work and have fun” (12), “We [founders] are successful if we are having fun” (36), 
“that I can work” (26), “From a personal perspective, [success is] when independence is secured 
and maintained” (13), or “I see success in that I can implement my ideas such as [states several 
new ideas]” (31) were coded as “personal satisfaction” (12), “having fun—entrepreneur” (12 & 
36), “generating income for entrepreneur” (26), “being independent—entrepreneur” (13), and 
“implementation of ideas—entrepreneur” (31), respectively. These codes were then combined 
into the category labeled personal gratification. 
The final code categories derived through the condensation of the emergent codes are 
numbers, employee, personal gratification, market, customer, product, and impact. A description 
and exemplary quotes for each category are set out in Table 3. To enhance reliability of the 
coding process, another researcher and the lead author both performed the emergent coding and 
category-building process. Disagreements in coding and category building were discussed and 
resolved. 
Step 2—Quantifying qualitative data through a scoring system 
The seven code categories (see Table 3) then served as a basis for quantifying the 
qualitative data and preparing it for a statistical cluster analysis. A scoring system was employed 
in which the code categories were included as column headings. The second part of the scoring 
table was made up of interview fragments. Each case (entrepreneur) could have multiple 
interview fragments. These fragments were taken from step 1 (see coding example in the 
previous subsection) and constitute the smallest content item found in each interviewee’s 
response. 
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TABLE 3 
Code Categories, Their Meaning, and Exemplary Quotes 
Name of 
Category 
Description of Category Exemplary Quotes 
Numbers - Reference to indicators (calculable 
numbers) 
- Content of indicator can be both 
financial and nonfinancial 
“Success for me primarily is numeric, that is profit and turnover” (E65) 
“to increase cost-efficacy” (E68) 
“our placement rate” (E79) 
Employees - Reference to staff 
- E.g., satisfaction, salary 
 “to work in interdisciplinary teams with qualified staff” (13) 
“that we can pay our staff appropriate wages” (E32) 
“securing secure jobs for our employees and to ensure that they can develop 
their skills further” (E33) 
“Moreover, our staff should have fun working here and feel some sort of 
fulfillment” (E67) 
Personal 
Gratification 
- Entrepreneurs talk about themselves 
- E.g., wage, independence, 
satisfaction 
“to be able to develop our skills further” (E8) 
“as we spend half of our live at work, I consider it success if I manage to 
have design this half so that I have fun” (E40) 
“To design the venture so that we can live from it” (E70) 
Market - Reference to their current or desired 
position in the market 
“if we are able to influence the market” (E19) 
“we are known in the market” (E31) 
“If we are able to establish as the ‘go-to’ [service]” (E42) 
Customer - Reference about customer 
satisfaction 
- May refer to beneficiaries if they are 
considered customers 
“[Success] is customer satisfaction, if they return, how often they return” 
(E52) 
 “The highest goal is satisfied customers” (63) 
Product - Reference to the product or service 
offered 
- E.g., quality, price, unique selling 
proposition 
“[Success] means short product development cycles” (E22) 
“[Success is] simply to have really cool and innovatie products” (E25) 
“a system that is fast, reliable and continuously offers support” (76) 
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Name of 
Category 
Description of Category Exemplary Quotes 
Impact - Reference to impact or desired 
impact on society  
“to continuously increase our political influence, in particular in a [specific] 
ministry so that we can influence legislative processes” (E 7) 
“to inspire others to start their own ventures so that more people can benefit 
from help and support” (E53) 
“the biggest success would be our own redundancy i.e. [our services] are no 
longer needed” (E56) 
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Therefore, the final table contained 285 rows, i.e., one row per interview fragment, even 
though there were only 80 interviews. The 285 fragments were then sorted alphabetically so that 
the different fragments from one entrepreneur were much less likely to appear near each other. 
Furthermore, the fragments were made anonymous, i.e., every mention of the name of the 
entrepreneur or his or her organization and any identifying detail of activity was erased or 
replaced with generic phrases such as “our company” or “our product.” This was necessary to 
ensure the anonymity of the interviewees but even more so to reduce a bias during the scoring 
process as knowing which fragment came from a social or a commercial entrepreneur might have 
influenced the scoring coders in their interpretation.  
Three researchers (excluding the author) then assigned a score between 1 (not applicable) 
and 3 (fully applicable) to each interview fragment for each category. The scoring coders were 
taught the meaning of the categories during two workshops. Inter-coder reliability was 77%. 
Following the scoring process, the interview fragments and their respective scores were 
cumulated into one set of scores for each case (entrepreneur). The maximum score approach, i.e., 
the highest overall score of each category for each case, was used for the final case score. For 
example, imagine a case (entrepreneur) with two interview fragments: “I want to have fun” and 
“I want to make profit.” The first fragment would score a “3” in the personal gratification 
category and “1”s in the remaining six categories, whereas the latter would score a “3” in the 
numbers category and “1”s in the other categories. In this scenario, the maximum score approach 
merely means that this entrepreneur would accumulatively score a “3” in both numbers and 
personal gratification and a “1” in the five remaining categories. This would not change even if 
the second quote would also have score a “3” in personal gratification. This process was done 
separately by all three score coders. In a final step, the average of the scores per case were 
calculated. 
Step 3—Cluster analysis 
In a final step, the case scores were used in a cluster analysis. Cluster analyses are one 
form of multivariate statistical analysis (Fraley, 1998; Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Rencher & 
Christensen, 2012), but in contrast to other multivariate methods (e.g., regression analysis), 
cluster analysis is an exploratory method of identifying structures in datasets (Fraley, 1998). 
Specifically, cluster analysis aims at creating subgroups that are in themselves homogenous but 
heterogeneous to other subgroups of the sample (Cormack, 1971). Cluster analysis is a well-
established tool in marketing research where it is used to identify stereotypical personas (Punj & 
Stewart, 1983). As the purpose of this empirical investigation is to identify types of 
entrepreneurs, cluster analysis seems appropriate. A cluster analysis usually follows a two-part 
approach. The first part involves identification of dimensions (step 1 above) and collection of 
numeric data for each dimension (step 2 above). In the second part, the data analysis process 
follows a two-step procedure: determination of cluster numbers and identification of cluster 
centroids (Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Milligan, 1980; Punj & Stewart, 1983). For the first analysis 
step, this study employed Ward’s method, a type of hierarchical clustering that outperforms other 
hierarchical clustering methods (Punj & Stewart, 1983). Based on the resulting dendrogram, the 
analysis identified seven outliers that were not part of any cluster and were thus excluded from 
the remainder of the analysis. For reasons of reliability, the dendrogram was cross-checked by 
another researcher; this researcher arrived at the same number of clusters and identified the same 
outliers. To determine cluster centers, the k-means method, which is an integrative method 
(Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Rencher & Christensen, 2012), was utilized. The resulting clusters are 
part of a specific classification, i.e., variables not part of the cluster variables (e.g., age and size 
of organization) may vary within each cluster (Woo et al., 1991). Prior to the cluster analysis, the 
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initial scoring scheme of 1–3 was expanded to 1–7; however, this expansion has no mathematical 
influence on the final outcome and merely improves readability. 
Limitations 
The sample studied suffers from three biases. First, the dataset is biased toward 
companies operating in information and communication technologies (ICT) (see Figure 1). This 
bias is the result of choosing award-winning entrepreneurs because the funding structure of such 
awards is biased toward high-technology innovation. Second, but somewhat relatedly, the 
analysis is based exclusively on award-winning entrepreneurs, who may have certain 
unobservable characteristics that make them a less generalizable sample. Third, the sample was 
comprised entirely of German entrepreneurs, meaning that the results may be influenced by 
cultural factors. 
Another limitation lies in the maximum score approach. This approach does not account 
for multiple mentions of the same category. For example, imagine that an interviewee said that 
profits, sales, turnover (each an aspect of numbers), and own satisfaction comprised his notion of 
success. The final score for numbers would remain at the maximum of “3” even though this 
entrepreneur clearly is more focused on numbers than on personal gratification, which was only 
mentioned once but also receives a “3.” Other methods, however, such as weighing responses 
according to number of repetitions or order would not have yielded a uniform scale, which would 
potentially have increased noise in the data. 
A third limitation is methodological. The measure used in this study (success notions) is 
only a proxy for the research subject (drivers). Therefore, some drivers might not have been 
uncovered. Moreover, interviews cannot fully mitigate effects of social desirability despite the 
measures taken (e.g., open-questions, no information about interview objective). 
RESULTS 
This section first presents some general findings in regard to the overall research query. 
These are followed by a brief description of the identified clusters. 
General findings 
The general analysis resulted in three major findings. First, the analysis identified not just 
two dimensions of drivers, but seven. That is, the analysis identified seven categories of drivers 
that can independently drive an entrepreneur’s decisions and actions. Second, combining these 
dimensions into one seven-dimensional “function of drivers” made possible the identification of 
five distinct clusters of entrepreneurs in this sample. Put differently, the study revealed five types 
of entrepreneurs, each of which has a unique combination of scores in the various dimensions, 
i.e., while one type might score high in dimensions 1 and 2, medium in 3, 4, and 5, and low in 6 
and 7, a second type will have a different combination (e.g., high in 4, 5, and 7, medium in 1, and 
low in 2, 3, and 6). No common pattern was found among the clusters; each has its unique driver 
function, i.e., there is no category that always scores high or low. Third, one of the five clusters 
could be exclusively assigned to the subset of commercial entrepreneurs in this sample. However, 
the remaining four clusters contained both social and commercial entrepreneurs (see Table 4). 
Identified clusters 
The analysis revealed five distinct clusters. The separate spider web diagrams of Figure 2 
illustrate these clusters. Below are stereotypical descriptions of each type of entrepreneur, along 
with some exemplary quotes from entrepreneurs of that type. 
  
  
Identified Clusters and Their Potential Contingencies
*Medians were chosen to avoid noise in the data due to outliers.
**Only for social entrepreneurs; according to German law.
Rational Missionary 
The rational missionary is the entrepreneur most driven by creating 
most deeply about achieving a social or environmental value and thus are very outward
An interviewee in this cluster stated: “Success … 
even big role in [a big societal change] or by transforming [the industry] in the whole of Europe 
or even the world towards a more intelligent use of resources. Short, being part of a historical 
change process” (19). Another boldly stated: “Success is when we are not needed anymore
problem is solved” (80). 
This outward-orientation is accompanied by a focus on 
on achieving a mission that benefits individuals outside their organiz
naively, which is indicated by their medium scores for 
rational missionary said: “The one thing is that we help as many [our beneficiaries] as possible, 
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yet we still need to make sure we achieve our marginal return at the same time” (9). Another said: 
“We measure it [success] by looking at how effective [our services] were, how people use them, 
if they tell others …” (24). 
As the quotes suggest, the numbers mentioned by these entrepreneurs include both those 
aimed at impact, e.g., number of people reached, and those aimed at internal aspects such as 
financial stability. They wish to help others but do so in a rational manner, making sure that they 
achieve what they want to achieve. They seem to pay almost no attention to their staff, seeing as 
they have the second lowest score among all clusters on this dimension (1.1 out of 7). 
Bonding Self-Actualizer 
This cluster scores the highest in personal gratification and second highest in employees 
within the cluster and between all clusters. Bonding self-actualizers focus their attention both on 
themselves and on their employees. They are interested in their own satisfaction, independence, 
and wages as well as the same for their employees. It appears that these entrepreneurs need to 
have happy and satisfied employees to bolster their own satisfaction. Example quotes from 
bonding self-actualizers include: “As I spend half my life at work, I want to design it in a way 
that I have fun. […] I bring motivation to the team through my high-spirits” (40), “that I can 
work scientifically” (13), “To make sure our employees have a safe job and are able to develop 
their skills further” (8), and “that we […] are happy doing what we’re doing… And have satisfied 
staff” (41). 
Interestingly, this type of entrepreneur is relatively less focused on customers but does 
have a medium impact score. This may indicate that they are interested in creating value for 
society, perhaps as another way of making themselves “feel good.” 
Number Junkie 
Number junkies are almost one-dimensional when it comes to what drives them. Their 
numbers score is not only the highest, it is much higher than the second highest score within the 
cluster (6.8 to 3.2). Moreover, 6.8 is the highest score in all categories and every cluster. This 
indicates a very strong emphasis on achieving certain financial return or growth, with the term 
“growth” being used in reference to finance, participants, or visibility. Number junkies do not 
seem interested in their employees, their products, or their impact on others. Number junkies can 
be found among both commercial and social entrepreneurs. One number junkie summarized this 
type of entrepreneur nicely: “Success is reaching the indicators and numbers you set for yourself. 
That is number of projects, increase in partners, and sales” (60). 
“Textbook” Businessperson 
This cluster is the smallest with only five members. Interestingly, textbook 
businesspersons score high in six of the seven categories, making them almost a complete 
opposite from the number junkies. Number junkies are almost one-dimensional; “textbook” 
businesspersons are six-dimensional. The only category they do not seem to associate with 
success is impact. However, they have the highest overall score for employees and product and 
the second highest for personal gratification, numbers, and market. “[Success] is to easily get 
access to customers and increase the customer base; that the customers themselves recognize the 
value of our services and the things we offer, so you don’t have to explain to the customer what 
the benefit is; that we are able to generate enough sales to pay not only our [entrepreneur] own 
wages but also those of our employees” (21). In short, these entrepreneurs are driven by the 
success of their organization, their products, and their own and employees’ satisfaction to an 
almost equal degree. Interestingly, this cluster contains male commercial entrepreneurs only. 
What Drives Entrepreneurs? 
 118   
FIGURE 1 
Spider web diagrams of identified clusters 
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Product-Adjusting Competitor 
The largest cluster is that of the product-adjusting competitors. Their highest score is 
market, which is also the highest overall score for market. Additionally, they score fairly high for 
product. Their high market focus indicates their preoccupation with their position in the market. 
For example: “to place ourselves well in the market” (49), “[Success is] when our operations are 
available in all of Germany, thus blanket-coverage” (42), and “that [company name] is well-
known and that our brand is understood as such” (31). 
To ensure this position, they are interested in product quality and other product-related 
issues, as they want to provide products that match market demand. Entrepreneur 14 said: 
“Success for me is when customers choose us over others, as there are so many others they could 
choose from.” Or as one interviewee put it: “Success is when you got a good product that places 
nicely in the market and in the end makes money. We are operating in niche markets and define 
our success in that we are market leaders in those niches, sometimes even world leader” (58). In 
addition this type of entrepreneur tends to connect success at least with a medium score to impact 
and to a lesser degree to their personal gratification. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In the following, results of the cluster analysis are discussed and some suggestions made 
for future research. The discussion particularly focuses on the distinction between entrepreneurs, 
the multi-dimensionality of drivers, and contingency factors. 
Social, profit, or a combination thereof? This is not the question 
Earlier in this paper, the question was asked whether a two-dimensional perspective on 
entrepreneurs, i.e., “social mission” versus “profit focus” was sufficient. The answer found in this 
paper is “no.” Otherwise, the emergent coding process would have revealed only two drivers. 
Moreover, the fact that four out of five clusters contained both social and commercial 
entrepreneurs indicates that when investigated from an actor perspective, social and commercial 
entrepreneurs might be more alike than different. Indeed, recent research suggests that social and 
commercial entrepreneurs are very similar when it comes to opportunity recognition and resource 
mobilization (e.g., Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & Reynolds, 2010) and may not differ 
in their traits (e.g., Dacin et al., 2010). 
This study’s findings suggest that the field might benefit from empirical studies that 
investigate samples that exhibit diverse driver functions, instead of continuing to focus on 
conceptual differentiations such as “social” or “commercial” entrepreneurs. Such research might 
generate more insight into the linkage between an entrepreneur’s drivers, his or her choices, and 
the venture’s strategy and structure (as called for by Simpson, Tuck, & Bellanney, 2004) as well 
as between specific entrepreneurial types and their strategic choices (Ucbasaran et al., 2001). 
Moreover, such an approach might lead to more accurate results. As the identified clusters 
indicate, there are social ventures that have only a medium or even low impact focus. If these are 
included in the same sample with social ventures having a high impact focus, results might be 
blurry or difficult to interpret. Ultimately, there seems to be much more heterogeneity within 
allegedly homogenous groups such as “social entrepreneurs” than sometimes assumed. The 
number of studies on types of commercial entrepreneurs (see literature review) and scattered 
research on social entrepreneur types further supports this (e.g., Miner, 2000; Vidal & Claver, 
2006; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009).  
Moreover, such integrated research projects might find connections and patterns between 
and among entrepreneurs that have so far been overlooked due to research mostly focusing on 
only one type of entrepreneur. For example, research will probably gain more insight by 
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investigating the 20 product-adjusting competitors as one group, rather than dividing them into 
halves. Such an approach may also overcome the small-N problem in social entrepreneurship 
research (e.g., Hoogendoorn et al., 2010; Mair, 2010; Short et al., 2009). By combining social 
entrepreneurship cases with commercial entrepreneurship cases, much larger samples can be 
created. 
Despite these potential benefits, however, this sort of integration may be suitable for only 
specific types of research questions, namely, research engaged with the aim of better 
understanding entrepreneurs and their drivers and motivations. Integrated samples would be less 
useful in studying contextual situations, as these are often very different for social and 
commercial entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, integrated-sample studies could be very valuable in 
shedding light on commercially-oriented social ventures and socially-oriented commercial 
ventures. 
Knowing what success is, isn’t easy 
The study indicates that what drives entrepreneurs is far from being only two-
dimensional. This finding is in line with Reijonen and Komppula (2007), who call for a more 
differentiated perspective on entrepreneurship, and with Walker and Brown (2004), who urge 
considering diversity of motives when studying entrepreneurship. Indeed, multiplicity of success 
notions (and thus drivers) revealed in this paper paint a much more complex picture of 
entrepreneurs than is often found in the extant research. 
This complexity also seems to make it difficult for some entrepreneurs to articulate their 
individual notions of success. During the data-collection process, 15% of the interviewed 
entrepreneurs struggled to answer the question about how they defined success. This struggle 
manifested as longer than usual pauses before answering (up to 10 seconds), in expressions such 
as “blimey, that’s a tough one … let me think,” and in a multiple repetition of the first few words 
of the first sentence. Note that the same entrepreneurs did not struggle in answering any of the 
other interview questions. Adding to the puzzle is that in many studies, entrepreneurs are 
described as decisive and focused individuals who know what they wish to achieve, whether it be 
profit maximization (e.g., Carland, Hoy, & Carland, 1988; Drucker, 1999) or social change (e.g., 
Dees, 1998). Therefore, it might be a good idea to take a fresh look at the traits ascribed to 
entrepreneurs (for a review, see Rauch & Frese, 2007; Zhao & Seibert, 2006) and find out 
whether they vary between entrepreneurs who are very clear about their goals and those who 
appear to be less certain, or at least less articulate, about them. Moreover, studying these 
“struggling” entrepreneurs might also be of value to research on goal setting theory (Locke & 
Latham, 2002) or on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). 
It is thus proposed that future research attempt to understand why some entrepreneurs are 
less clear about their own success notions than are others. Possible factors could include personal 
situation (e.g., home life), time spent with the venture (e.g., dilution over time), or changes in the 
market. Entrepreneurship practice and, in particular, organizations that support entrepreneurs 
might benefit from better understanding the consequences to the organization of the entrepreneur 
either being unclear about his or her objectives or in the process of changing them. It would also 
be interesting to discover if driver functions change over time and what triggers such changes. 
It all depends on the context 
The following subsections briefly and non-exhaustively elaborate on potential 
contingency factors that correlate with the different types of entrepreneur. 
What Drives Entrepreneurs? 
 121 
Gender 
The cluster analysis suggests that rational missionaries and product-adjusting competitors 
are 1.5 times more likely to be women than men (see Table 3). In comparison, men are 2.5 times 
more likely to be number junkies than are women. These findings are at least partially in accord 
with gender differences discussed in the literature. In general, women tend to focus more on 
relationships or so-called soft factors, whereas men generally are described as more rational 
(Dyke & Murphy, 2006; Harding, 2006; e.g. Kirkwood & Walton, 2010; Walker & Brown, 2004) 
and more focused on growth or profit (Dyke & Murphy, 2006; Hughes, 2006; Kimmel, 1993). 
However, these gender differences fail to explain why product-adjusting competitors are more 
likely to be women than men. Future research could investigate to what degree gender plays a 
role in the individual driver function of an entrepreneur. 
Industry 
The findings suggest that certain types of entrepreneurs are found more often in a certain 
industry. For example, organizations active in social services are most likely to be either rational 
missionaries or product-adjusting competitors. The former seems obvious, as this cluster is most 
focused on impact, which is the perceived key driver of an organization active in education, 
health care, or social work (e.g., Defourney & Nyssens, 2010). However, the latter appears 
counterintuitive at first glance as product-adjusting competitors have a very low impact score yet 
score high for market and product. However, in many cases social service organizations find 
themselves in tight competition with other social service organizations (e.g., Aldashev & Verdier, 
2010). This competition predominately involves grants or subsidies, but could also touch on 
public awareness or staff and volunteers. For that reason, these organizations may focus on the 
market to better understand what new projects or ideas their competitors have. If they perceive a 
competitor’s idea superior to their own, they might adjust their own products. 
However, this study cannot explain why some social service organization entrepreneurs 
are rational missionaries while others are product-adjusting competitors. Put in simple terms, the 
data do not allow for discovering whether it is the industry that shapes the entrepreneur, or 
whether, instead, a certain type of entrepreneur seeks a certain industry. Thus, future research 
could include other factors, such as type of product, external environmental factors, or 
entrepreneur background, to discover the direction of causality. Such work would benefit support 
organizations wishing to further a certain industry, as they would better understand the 
entrepreneurs and could tailor their programs based on industry. 
Age and size of the organization 
The data suggest that those clusters that contain younger organizations—bonding self-
actualizer and “textbook” businessperson—place much higher emphasis on their employees than 
do the other three entrepreneurial types. While it would be tempting to conclude that the age of 
the organizations or its size influence the success notions and drivers of the entrepreneur, such a 
conclusion would be extremely speculative and cannot be made based on the single-point data. 
However, it would be of great value to both practice and academia to further investigate these 
possibilities by conducting longitudinal studies to understand the effects of change in age and 
size of the organization on the drivers of the entrepreneur (and vice versa). 
These insights could improve support structures both in terms of funding and coaching. 
Thus, if what drives an entrepreneur changes with the size and age of the organization, 
entrepreneurs will be more responsive to or in need of different types of coaching. Additionally, 
the different entrepreneurial types might be interlinked, i.e., one may be a predecessor of another. 
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Future research could investigate the influence of other factors often discussed in 
entrepreneurship literature such as educational background and work experience of the 
entrepreneur. Other factors with potential influence include age of the entrepreneur and his or her 
“membership” in a specific generation such as generation Y (Martin, 2005), economic situation, 
ethnicity (Edelman, Brush, Manolova, & Greene, 2010), and the venture’s geographical 
placement (see Reijonen & Komppula, 2007). The identification and testing of contingency 
factors will benefit both entrepreneurship scholars and practitioners in fine-tuning their research 
or support efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
Inspired by the literature on entrepreneurial motivation, this paper looked at the post-
founding stage of social and commercial entrepreneurs and conducted an empirical analysis to 
discover what drives them. Based on these drivers, a taxonomy of different entrepreneurial types 
was developed using a three-step empirical approach. First, based on 80 interviews with social 
and commercial entrepreneurs, seven dimensions of success that drive entrepreneurs were 
identified. Second, the interview data were quantified with a scoring system. Using cluster 
analysis, the third step then identified five empirical types of entrepreneurs. The identified 
clusters are rational missionary, bonding self-actualizer, number junkies, “textbook” 
businessperson, and product-adjusting competitor. Contingency factors that correlate with 
specific types of entrepreneurs were discussed and suggestions made for future research. 
This paper thus contributed to the literature by investigating what drives entrepreneurs in 
the post-founding stage of the venture, expanding the list of motivations to encompass more than 
the usual profit or social good dichotomy often found in the literature on social and commercial 
entrepreneurship. The paper describes five types of entrepreneurs, a taxonomy that will aid future 
research in better understanding the entrepreneur from an actor perspective. Finally, this paper is 
one of the few on social entrepreneurs that goes beyond a single or low-number-case perspective 
and uses a larger-N sample. In conclusion, this paper contributes to the understanding of social 
and commercial entrepreneurs as well as to entrepreneurship research in general. 
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